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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
Einführung 
 
Ziel dieser Magisterarbeit ist es, die Möglichkeiten und die Grenzen von 
Partnerschaften zwischen großen Unternehmen und kleinen sozialen Gruppierungen im 
forstwirtschaftlichen Bereich anhand einer Erfahrung im brasilianischen Bundesstaat 
Espírito Santo näher zu untersuchen. Die Erforschung von „company-community 
partnerships“, wie solche Zusammenschlüsse im Entwicklungshilfebereich und in der 
Fachliteratur genannt werden, ist eingebettet in Studien über neue Möglichkeiten der 
Regulierung der Interaktion zwischen staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Akteuren – auch 
Governance Studien genannt. In der vorliegenden Magisterarbeit wird ein eigener 
Governance-Ansatz herausgearbeitet, der auf Studien von Mitra (2006), Risse (2007) 
und Lewy/Newell (2005) basiert. Die ersten zwei Autoren bieten Instrumente für die 
theoretische Einbettung von Governance in einen post-kolonialen Staat, wogegen die 
zuletzt genannten Autoren weisen auf die wachsende Bedeutung von nicht-staatlichen 
Akteuren in Bereichen des öffentlichen Lebens, wie z.B. in der Regulierung und 
Kommerzialisierung von Holz, hin.  
Der analytische Rahmen der Magisterarbeit wird vom Neoinstitutionalismus 
vorgegeben. Zunächst werden zwei relevante Varianten des Neoinstitutionalismus 
vorgestellt, anschließend wird die Rational Choice-Variante näher erläutert und das 
spieltheoretische Rationale als analytisches Werkzeug für die Betrachtung der 
Interaktion der Akteure, deren Präferenzen und Handlungsoptionen verwendet. Ziel ist 
es zu analysieren, wie die Partnerschaften zustande kommen und was für Bedingungen 
für nachhaltige Partnerschaften erfüllt werden müssen. 
Die Feldforschung wurde in Espírito Santo, einem im Südosten gelegener Bundesstaat 
mit 3.408.365 Einwohnern aus verschiedenen Bevölkerungsgruppen in Brasilien, 
durchgeführt.  
Das brasilianische Unternehmen „Aracruz Zellulose“ ist seit den 60er Jahren in Espírito 
Santo tätig. Aus eigenem Anbau von Eukalyptusbäumen auf einer 286.000 Hektar 
großen Fläche in den Bundesstaaten Espírito Santo, Bahia, Minas Gerais und Rio 
Grande do Sul produziert es Zellulose für die Papierherstellung und erwirtschaftete in 
den letzten Jahren 27% des weltweiten Marktes für Zelluloseherstellung. Der Markt für 
die Nutzung von Eukalyptusholz sowohl für die Papierindustrie als auch für die 
 Herstellung von Möbeln erfuhr in den letzten Jahrzehnten sowohl in Brasilien als auch 
weltweit einen Boom. Die Eukalyptusproduktion mit dem Zweck der 
Zelluloseherstellung begann vor etwa vierzig Jahren mittels staatlicher Subventionen. 
Die Entstehung eines agro-industriellen Komplexes in Brasilien, zu dem der 
waldwirtschaftlicher Sektor gezählt werden kann, diente der Fortentwicklung der 
brasilianischen Ökonomie während der insgesamt zwanzigjährigen militärischen 
Diktaturzeit. Die Ausbreitung der Eukalyptusproduktion im Südosten Brasiliens erfuhr 
mehr und mehr Kritik von sozialen und Umweltschutz- Bewegungen im Laufe der Jahre 
und gilt als heutzutage sehr umstritten. Anfang der 90er Jahre, schließlich nicht zuletzt 
auf Grund des Erdgipfels Rio 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, wurde das globale kollektive 
Bewusstsein von Nachrichten über Abholzungen u.a. im Amazonas-Gebiet überflutet, 
und neue Initiativen zur Reduzierung menschlicher Ausbeutung natürlicher Ressourcen 
erhielten erneute Aufmerksamkeit. Im Rahmen der weltweit interdisziplinären Debatte 
über die Notwendigkeit des Trachtens nach einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung gewannen 
kommerzielle Branchen wie die des monokulturellen Anbaus von Eukalyptus an 
Bedeutung – im Rahmen der Debatten über environmental Governance allerdings 
wurde seitdem die Regulierung der Verfügung über natürliche Ressourcen seitens der 
Unternehmen und lokalen Bevölkerungsgruppen im Namen einer umweltfreundlicheren 
Entwicklung mehr und mehr befürwortet. 
In diesem Sinne wurden in den letzten Jahren weltweit Partnerschaften zwischen 
Unternehmen und lokaler Bevölkerung im forstwirtschaftlichen Bereich initiiert, die 
einerseits den Unternehmen mehr Zugang zu Anbauflächen und die Legitimation als 
sozialverantwortliche Organisationen gewähren und andererseits der jeweiligen 
Bevölkerung mehr Möglichkeiten der Kommerzialisierung ihrer Holzproduktion 
ermöglichen sollte.  
Die Interaktion zwischen sozialen Akteuren im Rahmen einer solchen Partnerschaft 
steht im Zentrum der Untersuchung dieser Magisterarbeit. Das Programm „ Forestry 
Partners“ wurde im Jahre 1990 vom multinationalen Unternehmen „Aracruz Zellulose“ 
mit der Einwilligung des Bundesstaates Espirito Santo implementiert und zielt darauf 
hin, Kleinbauern und anderen sozialen Gruppierungen im Umfeld des Unternehmens 
die Möglichkeit des Anbaus von Eukalyptusbäumen anzubieten. Der Anbau von 
Eukalyptus erfolgt nach Vorschriften und Anweisungen des Unternehmens und die 
Produktion wird von der lokalen Bevölkerung übernommen. Es besteht die Möglichkeit 
eines kleinen Gewinns, z.B. aus der guten Verwaltung der unternehmerischen 
 Ressourcen, die dem einzelnen Bauern zur Verfügung gestellt werden, oder auch aus 
den 3,5% der Holzproduktion, die der Kleinbauer für sich behalten darf. Das 
Unternehmen hat seit dem Anfang des Programms Kontakte zu mehreren 
Gruppierungen aufgenommen und mit ihnen Partnerschaften dieser Art geschlossen. In 
dieser Magisterarbeit werden die Interaktionsmuster zwischen dem Unternehmen und 
Kleinbauern der Region Domingos Martins, im Hinterland des Bundestaats Espírito 
Santo, sowie zwischen dem Unternehmen und den indigenen Bevölkerungsgruppen der 
Tupinikim und Guarani, in der Region Aracruz, anhand eines neo-institutionalistischen 
Governance Modells untersucht.  
 
Fragestellung, Hypothesen und Methodologie 
 
Die Fragestellung, die beantwortet werden muss, ist folgende: können Partnerschaften 
zwischen  Unternehmen und kleineren lokalen sozialen Gruppierungen eine Art der 
Governance im Forstwirtschaftssektor hervorbringen? Um diese Frage zu bejahen, 
bedarf es zweier Grundvoraussetzungen: der ökonomische Nutzen, der Akteure dazu 
bringt, eine solche Partnerschaft einzugehen, müssen erkennbar sein. Des Weiteren, 
sollte die Partnerschaft beidseits in der Perzeption, also in der subjektiven 
Wahrnehmung der Akteure, als vorteilhaft (als eine win-win Situation) angesehen 
werden. Meine zwei Hypothesen, die der Beantwortung der Fragestellung dienen 
sollten, sind folgende: die Partnerschaft stellt eine Gewinnsituation für alle Beteiligten 
dar, wenn (1) ökonomische Bedingungen durch die Vertragsschließung und 
Programmdurchführung, nach Ansicht der Partner, ausreichend erfüllt werden und (2) 
wenn andererseits auch die Bedingungen sozialer, kultureller und politischer Art in den 
Augen der beteiligten sozialen Gruppierungen befriedigt werden. Die erste Hypothese 
hat zum Ziel, allgemeine Bedingungen für eine solche Partnerschaft zu erforschen. Hier 
gilt es zu herauszuarbeiten, ob und welche konkrete Gewinne aus einer Partnerschaft 
zwischen Kleinbauern und Unternehmen für alle Beteiligten entstehen können. Die 
zweite Hypothese dient der Evaluierung der Qualität der Partnerschaft anhand von 
Kriterien wie der Beteiligungsmöglichkeit der Akteure in der Partnerschaft und des 
Respekts seitens des Unternehmens vor kulturellen und identitätsbezogenen Werten der 
Gruppierungen.  
Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, anhand von unterschiedlicher Literatur aus Disziplinen wie der 
Politischen Wissenschaft, der Betriebswirtschaft und der Forstwirtschaft sowie anhand 
 der Befragung von einzelnen Beteiligten in einer konkreten Partnerschaft in Espírito 
Santo zu beweisen, dass, während die Erfüllung von Hypothese (1) für das Entstehen 
von Partnerschaften im forstwirtschaftlichen Sektor ausreicht, Hypothese (2) gegeben 
sein muss, um ein dauerhaftes Gelingen der Partnerschaft zu gewährleisten.  
Am konkreten Beispiel der brasilianischen politischen und sozialen Realität werden 
Fragen wie die der Marktöffnung im Zuge der Re-Demokratisierung des Landes in den 
90er Jahren, die des historischen Problems des Landbesitzes vor allem von indigenen 
Bevölkerungsgruppen und die der ebenfalls historisch bedingten Ausbeutung 
natürlicher Ressourcen wieder aufgegriffen. 
 
Kapitelstrukturierung 
 
Kapitel 1 und Kapitel 2 umreißen den theoretischen und analytischen Rahmen dieser 
Magisterarbeit darzustellen. Das erste Kapitel bietet in erster Linie einen Überblick über 
die Debatten, die Governance in der Politikwissenschaft geführt werden, und bemüht 
sich um die Frage der Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Übertragbarkeit des Governance-
Ansatzes auf „Räume begrenzter Staatlichkeit“ (Risse 2007) und andere post-koloniale 
Staaten (Mitra 2006). 
Das zweite Kapitel stellt den analytischen Rahmen der Magisterarbeit vor. Nach der 
Einführung in die Begrifflichkeit der „Institution“ und der Vorstellung des 
„Neoinstitutionalismus“ werden zwei der drei bedeutendsten Schulen des 
Neoinstitutionalismus präsentiert und anhand deren Übereinstimmungen, Differenzen 
und ihrer Bedeutung für die vorliegende Studie analysiert. Der Rational choice 
Neoinstitutionalismus bekommt einen besonderen Stellenwert in Kapitel 2. Das 
spieltheoretische Rationale wird genutzt um Interaktion zwischen Akteuren in der 
Partnerschaft zu verstehen und deren Gewinnoptionen anhand ihrer Präferenzen zu 
erfassen. Die analytische Matrix, die die Präferenzen und Handlungsoptionen der 
Akteure aufzeigt, wird mit konkreten Daten aus der Feldforschung ergänzt. 
Die Kapitel 3, 4 und 5 haben zum Ziel, Elemente aus dem theoretischen und 
analytischen Ansatz auf den brasilianischen Kontext anzuwenden. Kapitel 3 führt den 
Leser zunächst in den makro-politischen Kontext des Landes ein und fasst die Gründe 
und Konsequenzen der marktwirtschaftlichen Liberalisierung Brasiliens im Laufe der 
90er Jahre zusammen. Meines Erachtens, kann die Frage der Governance in Brasilien 
nicht von zwei entscheidenden Phänomenen abgekoppelt werden, der Liberalisierung 
 und der Re-Demokratisierung des Landes. Beide Aspekte, sowohl ökonomischer als 
auch politischer Hinsicht, trugen dazu bei, dass die nicht-staatlichen Akteure sowie die 
Unternehmen mehr Möglichkeiten der sozialen Partizipation und der Gestaltung des 
politischen Lebens erhalten haben.  
Kapitel 4 bietet ein Panorama der Politikfeldanalyse des Forstwirtschaftssektors in 
Brasilien. Ziel ist es, anhand einer historischen Zusammenführung von Erkenntnissen 
über die Entwicklung des Forstwirtschaftsbereichs in Brasilien zu verstehen, wie die 
Regulierung der Nutzung von natürlichen Ressourcen in Brasilien historisch gehandhabt 
wurde und wie die Mechanismen der gemeinsamen Steuerung des 
Forstwirtschaftsbereichs durch staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure in den 90er 
Jahren entstanden sind. Kapitel 4 erklärt, welche gesetzlichen Rahmen geschaffen 
wurden, um Partnerschaften zwischen Unternehmen und kleinen Gemeinschaften zur 
Nutzung natürlicher Ressourcen zu ermöglichen. Kapitel 5 wendet das spieltheoretische 
Rationale auf die Interaktion der drei Hauptakteure dieser Studie an, nämlich der 
Kleinbauern der Region Domingos Martins, der indigenen Bevölkerungsgruppen der 
Tupinikim und Guarani und des entsprechenden Unternehmens in der Region Aracruz. 
Kapitel 6 widmet sich der Analyse der Fallstudie in Espírito Santo. Dort werden die 
zwei oben angeführten Hypothesen wieder aufgegriffen und anhand des theoretischen 
Teils analysiert. Die Verifizierung der ersten Hypothese und die Falsifizierung der 
zweiten werden diskutiert und Generalisierungen vorgenommen.  
 
Ergebnisse  
 
Die Literatur über neue Regierungsmodi in der Politikwissenschaft zeigt, dass Studien 
über Governance und insbesondere die Studien über die so genannte environmental 
Governance zur Analyse von Abkommen zwischen nicht-staatlichen Akteuren in 
verschiedenen Sektoren der (nationalen) Ökonomie nützlich sein können. Einige 
Themen, die in der Magisterarbeit angesprochen werden, wie z.B. die mögliche 
Interaktion zwischen Akteuren der in der Fallstudie untersuchten Konstellation, 
erweisen sich als spezifische Charakteristika dieser Fallstudie. Andere Themen, wie z.B. 
die allgemeine Machtverteilung zwischen schwachen und starken Akteuren, 
Ressourcenverteilung oder soziale Regulierungsmechanismen im Schatten des Staates, 
sind auch für andere Bereiche der Politikwissenschaft von Interesse.  
 Die Literaturrevision über Governance im Allgemeinen und über company-community 
partnerships im Spezifischen sowie die Auswertung der empirischen Daten, gewonnen 
aus der Befragung von Indigenen, Kleinbauern, eines Vertreters des Unternehmens, 
eines Vertreters der lokalen Behörde für Forstwirtschaft IDAF und eines ehemaligen 
Mitarbeiters der indigenennahen Regierungsbehörde FUNAI zeigen, dass diese Art der 
Partnerschaft tatsächlich einen ökonomischen Mehrwert für Kleinbauern in Domingos 
Martins bedeutet. Die Kriterien, die für die Analyse der Partnerschaft aufgestellt 
wurden, nämlich deren ökonomischer, sozialer und umweltbezogener Nutzen aus Sicht 
des Kleinbauern bzw. des Indigenen, wurden im Falle der Kleinbauern positiv bewertet. 
Die Interviewten beurteilen die Partnerschaft mit dem Unternehmen anhand der eigenen 
Präferenzordnung, die im Kapitel 5 untersucht und im Kapitel 6 diskutiert wird, als 
positiv. Für sie stehen ökonomischer Nutzen vor den sozialen (kulturellen Rechte) und 
umweltbezogenen Nutzen. Der soziale Nutzen erlangt eine zweitrangige Rolle. Die 
Landrechte der Kleinbauern sowie deren Kultur werden im Rahmen der Partnerschaft 
respektiert. Der umweltbezogene Nutzen konnte von den Kleinbauern nicht beurteilt 
werden und erfuhr ebenso eine zweitrangige Stellung in der Beurteilung des 
allgemeinen Nutzens, der aus der Partnerschaft gezogen wird. Anders bei den 
Indigenen: in der Partnerschaft mit dem Unternehmen gaben sie den immateriellen 
sozialen und umweltbezogenen issues größeren Wert als dem ökonomischen Nutzen, 
den sie aus der Partnerschaft zwischen 1998 und 2005 gewannen. Im Vorfeld der 
Aufnahme der Partnerschaft zwischen Unternehmen und Indigenen stand ein Streit 
zwischen beiden Parteien um das Recht auf die Nutzung von 18.000 Hektar Land in der 
Munizipalität von Aracruz. Die Partnerschaft scheint vom Unternehmen vorgeschlagen 
worden zu sein, um die Streitfrage zu schlichten. Die Indigenen entschieden sich für den 
Kampf um ihre, mit dem Land verbundenen, identitätsbezogenen und kulturellen 
Rechte und verzichteten auf den ökonomischen Nutzen der Partnerschaft durch die 
Vertragsauflösung mit dem Unternehmen im Jahre 2005. 
Somit kann die erste aufgestellte Hypothese bestätigt werden. Für die Entstehung einer 
Partnerschaft ist es notwendig, dass die Präferenzen und Gewinnoptionen beider 
Parteien offensichtlich sind, und dass diese auch von allen Beteiligten als Gewinne 
angesehen werden. Die Interaktion zwischen Unternehmen und Kleinbauern in der 
Region Domingos Martins zeigt, dass eine Partnerschaft aufgrund 
perzipierten/wahrgenommenen ökonomischen Nutzens etabliert werden kann. In der 
Präferenzordnung dieser Kleinbauern bekam der ökonomische Nutzen eine weit höhere 
 Wertung während der soziale oder der umweltbezogene Nutzen eine eher unbedeutende 
Stellung zugewiesen wurde.  
Nehmen hingegen gerade ideelle Werte und damit verbunden de Frage nach dem 
sozialen und umweltbezogenen Nutzen einen höheren Stellenwert in der 
Präferenzordnung beteiligter Partner ein als der rein ökonomische, kann die 
Partnerschaft nicht als nachhaltig bezeichnen werden. Dies wird deutlich in der 
Beziehung zwischen dem Unternehmen und die Bevölkerungsgruppen der Tupinikim 
und Guarani. Werden kulturelle und identitätsbezogene Rechte der Bevölkerung außer 
Acht gelassen, kann die Partnerschaft zum Scheitern verurteilt sein. Die zweite 
Hypothese ließ sich folglich in der Fallstudie nicht wiederfinden. Die zweite Hypothese 
führte diese Arbeit jedoch zu dem generalisierbaren Ergebnis, dass sowohl 
ökonomische als auch soziale und umweltbezogene Nutzen (solange sie für die 
jeweiligen Partner für wichtig gehalten werden) allesamt politische Werte sind, die in 
der Policy-Implementierung einer Partnerschaft mitberücksichtigt werden sollten. Im 
Falle der brasilianischen Indigenen wurden sie anscheinend instrumentalisiert um die 
Partnerschaft bewusst zu beenden. Die zweite Hypothese kann außerdem in der 
Literatur zur Zertifizierung von Holz wiedergefunden werden: die FSC Normierungen 
zeigen auf, dass sowohl ökonomische als auch kulturelle und umweltbezogene Kriterien 
eine Partnerschaft zwischen Unternehmen und der lokalen Bevölkerung bestimmen 
sollten. 
Zusammenfassend ist zu sagen, dass Partnerschaften im forstwirtschaftlichen Bereich in 
Brasilien anhand des Beispiels in Espírito Santo durchaus positive Auswirkungen auf 
die ökonomischen Grundlagen von Kleinbauern haben, für die indigene Bevölkerung 
jedoch bedeuten sie noch keine nachhaltige Möglichkeit der gemeinsamen Nutzung von 
natürlichen Ressourcen.  
Somit zeigen sich aus der Sicht der jeweiligen Beteiligten deutlich Chancen, aber auch 
Grenzen solcher Partnerschaften, die es in dieser Arbeit anhand der Anwendung des 
neo-institutionalistischen Governance-Ansatzes auf company-community partnerships 
in der brasilianischen Realität zu erforschen galt.  
 INTRODUCTION 
“Of the several processes that all human societies in all ages have had in common,  
none has been more fundamental than their continual interaction with their natural 
environment” 
 (Guha 2000: vii).  
 
Throughout the centuries, mankind has been developing methods of producing and 
reproducing its relationship with its own environment in a dialectical movement of both 
transforming nature and being transformed by it.  
Since the consolidation of the first nation states some five centuries ago and the slow 
transition from the Middle Age to the Enlightment, the belief in a bottomless pool of 
resources called nature, along with the discovery of the “New World” served as a motor 
for exploiting raw materials of all kinds, and the exploration of natural resources knew 
no bounds (Becker 2004; Perlin 1991).  
The myth of development pursued by the countries of the northern hemisphere since the 
industrial revolution in the middle of the nineteenth century, and also pursued 
intensively by those in the southern hemisphere since the Second World War, has taken 
nature hostage as though it would only be freed after reaching its most advanced stage. 
Some may call it the irony of history, others may simply call it its progress – the past 
century witnessed the emergence of independent political actors in the southern part of 
the globe through decolonization processes. At the outset of the twenty-first century, the 
relationship between man and nature seems inevitably determined by the dominant 
capitalist production mode. In fact, it also seems to be nearly reaching exhaustion. 
The responsibility for sustainable shared living seemed to exceed the capacities of the 
nation states. The post-war period, in particular the years after the 1970s, saw the 
proliferation of so-called “green politics”, and the emergence of a variety of actors laid 
the ground for new channels of political participation. Environmental issues had finally 
made it necessary to consider new perspectives in political interaction. The debate 
between preservationists and developmentalists was finally incorporated in the 
Brundtland report on Earth’s “common future” and the (in-)compatibility of 
development and socio-environmental issues, published in 1987 by the UN Commission 
for Environment and Development. The report established the broad usage of the highly 
criticized concept of ‘sustainable development’, which mankind has interpreted as a 
license to continue searching for development, under the prognosis that there will still 
be resources left for future generations. According to the report, the concept of 
 ‘sustainable development’ defines as ‘sustainable’ the use of resources bearing in mind 
the necessities and desires of future generations and as such, seems to preach a kind of 
cross-generational economic, social and environmental justice in which the present 
generation as well as future ones will be equally blessed with economic, social and 
environmental benefits. This notion of “sustainable development” becomes highly 
problematic when applied to the countries of the southern hemisphere. There, intra-
generational justice - meaning the sharing of economic, social and environmental 
benefits among the present generations - remains the greatest challenge for any kind of 
development (Gutman 1994 apud Marques et al 2003: 21, see also Born 2002). From 
the nineties onwards, after the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, or Earth Summit, in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the North and South joined 
efforts to define parameters for sustainability involving state and non-state actors. 
At the dawn of the present twenty-first century, a more widespread understanding of 
non-sustainable modes of production as the main cause for environmental changes, such 
as the global climate change, has already been established in collective thought. 
Businesses and other non-state actors, which were once the main agencies responsible 
for predatory development, have frequently been invited to contribute technology and 
know-how with the aim of achieving sustainability. Further, in a still diffuse exchange 
of roles, their discourses have been absorbing many of the claims originally made by the 
organized civil society, those of social and environmental responsibility. 
The interaction between private actors, the state and national populations has been 
challenging the traditional perception of the steering state– in environmental matters, 
new governance mechanisms are arising both in northern and southern countries. 
Ultimately at stake are both a more environmentally friendly way of exploring natural 
resources and also, particularly in countries in the political south, the survival of 
communities that live off and are surrounded by natural resources, such as forests. The 
title of this thesis, “Consequences of Environmental Projects on Development: pilot 
case study of a company-community partnership in Espírito Santo, Brazil”1, indicates 
                                                 
1
 Because thorough definitions of “environment” and “development” and its criticisms are not among the major 
aims of this thesis, I provide generic explanations for each concept, being aware that those do not cover the 
variety of meanings surrounding them [those concepts]. Under environment, the Concise Oxford Dictionary of 
Politics understands a derivation “from the French verb environner [italics in the original], to surround. (…) The 
concept of environment, though, arose in the mid-nineteenth century. It was given force by a range of new ideas 
that human beings are, to an important degree, formed by their surroundings. These included Darwin’s discovery 
that the survival of species depends on their suitability to their surroundings and the German geographers´ 
theories of the importance of the environment (Umwelt) [italics in the original] in determining economic and 
cultural differences between peoples” (2003:173). For development, the same source states that it is a “normative 
concept referring to a multidimensional process. Some people argue that development must be relative to time, 
 two phenomena which are also discussed in broader lines in this thesis: the first is the 
growing willingness of industries, governments and local communities to become 
involved in the common intention of securing own living standards and protecting or 
managing well their (environmental) surroundings, and the second, the enhancing 
possibilities for environmental protection to go hand in hand with development, as the 
Brundtland report pointed out in the Eighties. Today, the concatenation of environment 
and development seems much more acceptable to common sense than some years ago, 
when in the South, the idea of environmental protection was understood as a maneuver 
from northern countries to hinder the south’s development. This common 
understanding, potentialized by real economic and political improvements in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe, turned sectoral initiatives, such as in the forestry sector, 
more intrinsically social.  
In Brazil, one of the richest of the so-called countries of peripherical capitalism, with 
over 60% of its national territory covered by the Amazon rainforest and endowed with a 
variety of flora and fauna that to this day has still not been fully catalogued, the debate 
over the dichotomy between development and preservation of the environment dates 
back to earlier than the historic Earth Summit of 1992. The economic cycles the post-
colonial state gone through and the historical notion of the abundance of natural 
resources were responsible for serious damage to Brazil's environment and a more 
ecological conscience was closely related to social and economic matters (Pádua 1992). 
In certain intellectual circles, the debate on the way in which nature and environmental 
damage were perceived were intrinsically related to concrete social problems, such as 
poverty and lack of formal education (ibid.). The proclamation of the Republic in 1889 
and successive regime changes throughout the past century demonstrated the frailty of 
the government's resolve to pursue a coherent policy with regard to environmental 
issues. On the other hand, developmentalist and nationalist ideas of progress paved the 
way for economic growth based on the exploration of non-renewable resources such as 
gas, oil and rare types of wood, at the expense of the rights of traditional populations 
such as indigenous communities, quilombolas (descendents of fugitive slaves that 
founded autonomous communities, living according to traditional pan-African 
traditions) and the rural peasantry in general.  
                                                                                                                                                        
space and circumstance, and dismiss any universal formula. (…) More fashionable now are notions of 
environmentally sustainable development, or development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (…).(…) Democratization, accountable 
government, and a respect for human rights have also recently become more prominent as features of political 
development contained by the generic sense of development” (ibid. 148-149). 
 Government incentives for ambitious projects to modernize production in specific 
sectors of the economy can thus be viewed as inherent to government purposes, 
regardless of the political regime in power at the time. The agro-industrial complex for 
instance, which comprises the industrial forestry sector, became one of the sectors to 
receive more fiscal incentives, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, in accordance with the 
government’s policy of expanding Brazil’s participation in the foreign timber and fruit 
markets. The prosperity of the industrial forestry sector in Brazil was doubtless due to 
the high investments in the cellulose industry as well as to the ability of exogenous trees 
– mainly eucalyptus spp and pinus spp – to adapt to the tropical climate. Lima 
(1993:46) points out that the cellulose industry was probably the sector responsible for 
the impressive expansion of the eucalyptus monoculture worldwide. One negative 
aspect of the growth of the planted forestry industry was the unsolved problem of land 
property in parts of the country, which led to the expansion of plantations on properties 
that are under dispute until the present day. Another was the incompatibility of the 
prosperity and technology of the industrial forestry complex with the poverty and 
traditional modes of cultivation used by smallholder farmers with whom they shared the 
same geographical space. After the 1988 democratic constitution, fiscal incentives for 
the already well established industrial forestry sector were stopped. The decade to come 
would pose serious challenges to the sector with regard to its social and environmental 
sustainability. At the beginning of the nineties, agreements between smallholder farmers 
and large businesses were implemented in the states of Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo, 
the states with the biggest presence of the industrial forestry sector after the state of São 
Paulo, the largest producer of pulp and cellulose in the country. Though the “Forestry 
Partner” program implemented by the Aracruz Cellulose company was not the first 
initiative in this area, it is certainly the most well-known and successful partnership in 
the sector2.  
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 This work relies on the definitions of companies, communities, forestry and partnerships as proposed by the 
specialized literature of the subject. Mayers/Vermeulen (2002:i) define the above mentioned concepts as follows. 
“Companies [in italics in the original] include large-scale corporations through small-scale private enterprises – 
the key feature being that they are organized for making profit. Communities [in italics in the original] include 
farmers and individual local “actors” as well as community-level units of social organisation such as farmers´ 
groups, producer user groups and cooperatives. When community groups organise for profit, there is an overlap 
between ´company´ and ´community´. Forestry [in italics in the original] is the art of planting, tending and 
managing forests and trees for goods and services. It may take place in dense forest, open woodlands, 
agroforestry, smallholder woodlots, and commercial scale plantations. Partnerships [in italics in the original] are 
relationships and agreements that are actively entered into, on the expectation of benefit, by two or more parties. 
(…)[T]he term partnership [describes] a very wide range of contracts and informal arrangements between 
companies and communities. Partnerships are meant to share risk between the two parties, and third parties often 
play important supportive roles”. 
 The program was launched in 1990 in some municipalities of Espírito Santo and Minas 
Gerais and was based on a contractual agreement between the company and smallholder 
farmers to plant eucalyptus trees on a small scale on the farmers’ properties, which were 
ultimately to be purchased by the company. The program soon extended to almost all of 
the 78 municipalities of the state of Espírito Santo and today is one of the most favored 
alternatives to the traditional economic activities of smallholder farmers in the region. It 
was also adopted in the state of Espírito Santo by two indigenous communities of the 
municipality of Aracruz – the Tupinikim and the Guarani – between 1998 and 2005.  
Much has been written about partnerships between companies and communities from 
organizational and technical points of view (see Mayers/Vermeulen 2002, Andrade/Dias 
2003). Though this dissertation necessarily draws on interdisciplinary views on the 
subject, my aim is to examine the constellation of such partnerships from the 
perspective of governance approaches, as developed in political science research over 
the past few years. The analytical framework of this work is based on the rational choice 
neo-institutionalist school of thought which provides a framework for the analysis 
following an empirical-analytical deductive model. For that, the relationship of both 
groups, smallholder farmers and indigenous communities, with the company were 
objects of study. 
Partnerships, as indicated in third sector literature, have been appointed as a solution 
found by companies and states to improve gains for themselves (for companies, a 
material gain, for the state, the possibility of drawing out from the responsibility of 
providing goods for populations) as well as for rural communities in the forestry sector. 
Several modes of partnerships have been documented in Latin America, Africa and 
Asia. Many characteristics such as the land tenure situation, the type of contractual 
agreement between partners, and the amount of involvement on the government’s side 
(through agencies or policies) have played an important role in their typification in 
research. Whether partnerships can improve from “raw deals to mutual gains” 
(Mayers/Vermeulen 2002), remains to be further researched in many contexts. This is 
the purpose of this thesis. 
 
Aim, Methodology, Core Question, Hypotheses, Empirical Data 
 
This work aims to analyze partnerships between communities and businesses in the 
forestry sector in Brazil. The background question to be answered is whether business-
 community partnerships can be considered a governance mode3 in the forestry sector in 
Brazil. Conclusions shall be drawn on the case of the “Forestry Partners” program of the 
firm Aracruz Cellulose, in the state of Espírito Santo. 
My methodology – the road map from theory to practice – is theoretically based on 
studies of governance in general and environmental governance in particular4 within the 
analytical framework of the neo-institutional rational choice approach (chapters 1 and 
2). Using these theoretical and analytical glasses, I attempt to analyze the development 
of governance and interaction between state and non-state actors at national level 
(chapters 3, 4, and 5) and at local/case study level (chapter 6). 
While the theoretical framework for the present analysis relies on recent political 
science literature on governance and policy implementation, the analytical framework is 
based on a neo-institutional approach to the interaction between the partners. The model 
of analysis, drawing on rational choice and game theory literature, identifies the main 
actors in the partnership, aims to analyze the fulfillment of socio-economic demands by 
looking into the contractual agreement between these parties and examining the 
partners' perception of the agreement itself, touching the role of the state and its 
agencies as mediators and issues such as culture and identity. The puzzle to be solved is 
whether, given the economic benefits out of the contractual agreement between partners 
in this specific partnership program and the actors´ opinion about the partnership, such 
partnerships can be considered a durable win-win situation.  
The hypotheses raised are: The partnership can be a win-win situation for both partners 
(1) if the economic demands of both partners are sufficiently met in their own view; and 
(2) if other social needs that should be equally important for participants are met as 
well5. 
The first hypothesis aims at identifying overall governance patterns. The second aims at 
identifying durable governance patterns. My personal aim is to show that while the first 
hypothesis can be validated in many cases, the second hypothesis is decisive for durable 
governance to take place. 
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 Though the concept of governance shall be discussed in depth later on, for now we can note that governance 
modes, as suggested by Mitra (2006:9), are modes with the ability of transforming “citizens into actors and 
stakeholders”.  
4
 Chapter 1 shall discuss the denomination of governance as “environmental”, pointing to new modes of 
concerted action between state and non-state actors as far as the management of natural resources is concerned. 
5
 In third sector literature on company-community partnerships, the definition of governance seems to focus 
more on the fulfillment of economic criteria (Mayers/Vermeulen 2002). Based on literature on environmental 
governance, I propose further in chapter 1 a broader concept of governance which considers social and cultural 
needs and benefits (such as environmental sustainability, participative structures and rights and identity, for 
instance) as important as economic ones as conditio sine qua non for its own durability. 
 Other contextual elements were also taken into consideration while analyzing literature 
on the topic: the institutional framework and empirical material such as questions of 
land ownership, which form the basis for contracts regarding the exploitation of natural 
resources, the structures of participation under which negotiations and contractual 
agreements take place, and environmental issues, such as the existence or possibility of 
nature-friendly exploitation of natural resources. 
 
Structure  
 
This M.A. thesis is structured as follows:  
The first two chapters aim to present the theoretical and analytical framework of the 
thesis. The first chapter begins by offering a panorama on the discussion of governance 
literature and its limits and possibilities when applied to post-colonial states. It also 
discusses the matter of the role of the state in new mechanisms of governance and how 
this has been debated in recent political science research.  
The second chapter presents the analytical framework of this M.A. thesis. After an 
introduction to the concept of institution and the embedding of this concept in two of 
the three neo-institutionalist approaches in political science, rational choice is detailed 
as to accentuate its contribution to this thesis: the rationality of social actors when 
voluntarily entering a game interaction, such as in the case of the “Forestry Partners” 
program. The rationale behind game theory is thus used to explain interactions between 
the partners in this specific case study. Whereas the analytical matrix of interaction was 
roughly designed before the field visit, it was only possible to complement it after 
collecting and analyzing the field data.  
The Chapters 3, 4, and 5 aim to apply elements of the theoretical and the analytical 
approach to the Brazilian context. Chapter 3 introduces the Brazilian macro-political 
context and resumes the question of state involvement in social and economic 
regulation by describing the motives and consequences of the commercial liberalization 
the country went through in the 1990s, the years following redemocratization. In my 
judgment, matters of governance in the Brazilian context have to be discussed in the 
light of both phenomena - democratization and liberalization. In short, the chapter shall 
suggest that the Brazilian state gradually withdrew from its interventionist position in 
many sectors of the economy and social life, laying the ground for new kinds of social 
regulation and for the increased social responsibility of non-state actors, such as 
 businesses. Chapter 4 takes a more detailed look at forestry policies in the target 
country, offering an overview of the exploration of forestry resources in Brazil and the 
regulation of their use. The aim is to show how forestry policies at the beginning of the 
21st century open up possibilities for mechanisms of interaction between businesses and 
communities regarding the management of natural resources, setting up the juridical 
framework for company-community partnership models to come into existence. Chapter 
5 applies game theory rationale to the actors of the targeted case. 
Chapter 6 is devoted to the analysis of the case study in Espírito Santo, to the 
verification of the two proposed hypotheses and to generalizations at theoretical level 
based on results obtained from the case study.  
The concluding chapter summarizes my findings.  
 
Results and Generalizations 
 
The literature used shows that questions of governance, in particular of environmental 
governance in specific economic sectors, have been at the center of research in 
numerous disciplines in many countries (Mayers/Vermeulen 2002). While some of the 
topics referred to here may relate specifically to this social arrangement between social 
and political actors, other questions regarding power, the distribution of resources, 
social arrangements under the shadow of the state, and so forth are familiar to political 
science learning.  
This thesis’s hope was to contribute to a better understanding of the limits and 
opportunities of company-community partnerships by analyzing one sample case in 
Brazil. The aim was to analyze the community-company partnership between both 
groups, smallholder farmers and indigenous communities, and a multinational company 
in the case of the “Forestry Partners” Program in Espírito Santo. The analysis was based 
on (1) the evaluation of governance mechanisms in the forestry sector and in the 
program itself, and (2) the interaction between actors in the program, under the auspices 
of the two hypotheses raised: (1) governance in this specific context takes place if 
economic benefits are perceptively met, and (2) other material and immaterial benefits 
that make the partnership durable are also perceptively met. 
Results were therefore obtained through the progressive investigation of the concrete 
case of the “Forestry Partners” program (first through bibliography and then through the 
analysis of empirical data) and through permanent recurrence to the theoretical 
 framework of governance and the analytical framework of neo-institutional rational 
choice and game theory.  
The steps can be resumed as follows: First, the Brazilian political context and forestry 
sector were presented and discussed. Next, a logical analysis of interactions between (1) 
the company and smallholder farmers and (2) the company and indigenous 
communities, having as influencing actors the IDAF and the FUNAI respectively and 
based upon conditions of the contractual agreement, was made.  
The results pointed to the satisfaction of hypothesis (1). The analysis of the contractual 
agreement leaves margin for producers to profit from selling timber to the multinational, 
giving them the opportunity to meet their own material needs of timber supply from 
their properties with eucalyptus trees and further allowing them to profit from 
approximately 3,5% of timber produced for the company in their properties, which 
according to the contract, will belong to them. All interviewees of the smallholder 
farmers group consider their economic demands as met; they evaluated the relationship 
with the company as a profitable one. All three stated that the “deal” with the company 
“paid off”, since they received all inputs (seeds and fertilizers, for instance) from the 
company at the beginning of the contractual agreement and were able to make a margin 
of profit after the first eucalyptus cycle6. Even overall disadvantages are seen as 
acceptable in the face of profits. For instance, though it is technically possible to leave 
the program after harvesting the eucalyptus trees first agreed in the contract, the 
tendency is for farmers to consider renewing the contract, since there are no legal wood 
buyers in the region to whom they would be able to sell their produce at better prices. 
This generates a long term dependency on the company, which could be combated, for 
instance, if the government were to offer programs to enhance productivity and 
communication in the eucalyptus chain of commerce.  
Reasons for entering the contract on the smallholder farmers´ side were the cultivation 
of otherwise unproductive land and the possibility profiting from eucalyptus as a 
secondary economic activity in which they do not invest initial capital. Hypothesis (1) 
therefore seems to be validated: concrete economic benefits are generated by the 
program and perceived by their participants. Further, it is acceptable for farmers to join 
the program even if gains are low. The rational farmer seems to enter into interaction at 
the sole condition that economic benefits be higher than zero. While economic benefits 
are at the focus of the interaction, environmental issues, participative structures and 
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 Interviewee P3 had not harvested the eucalyptus plantation from the contract but also rated the participation as 
positive. 
 other issues seemed of secondary importance. During the period of time in which 
indigenous communities and the company maintained the contract (1998-2005), the first 
hypothesis could also be verified. Indigenous communities could also profit  
Hypothesis (2), however, was falsified in the second interaction mode, i.e. the one 
between indigenous communities and the company. The break of the agreement came 
about because the indigenous´ preferences were of a symbolic nature, which outweighed 
the immediate economic benefits from the selling agreement. For them, issues such as 
the protection of the environment, the importance of participative structures, the 
recognition of the eucalyptus forests as exogenous to their culture, and the sense of not 
being respected in their identity became issues of more importance than the relationship 
to the company. The politization of those issues stimulated the reaffirmation that the 
area where eucalyptus trees had been planted was in fact indigenous land. This was 
strengthened by the communities' ancestral relationship to the place where they had 
been living for generations (in the case of the Tupinikim) and the place the Guarani 
communities believed was appointed for them in a dream by their past spiritual leader. 
Therefore, projects and programs in which cultural, social (and by extent 
environmental) benefits are not seriously taken into account have a higher probability to 
fail along the way. They cannot become durable if those issues, when judged of 
importance by participants, are not met. 
At empirical level, I encountered similar patterns of monocultural production and 
similar agreements between companies and communities within Brazil and in other 
parts of the world. In the Amazon region, so-called “family forests” are being developed 
with the aim of creating new possibilities for colonists to canalize the wood production 
from their properties to small/medium sawmills in the region. The advantage of these 
ventures is the steady legalization of wood cutting and commerce, which has 
historically been the greatest problem in the region. As for other countries in the 
southern hemisphere, similar initiatives, such as joint forestry management in parts of 
India, have been initiated with the aid of international finance agencies, such as the 
World Bank. Though the question of land ownership is not the same, since there is less 
private forestry in India, a multiparty/agency constellation seems to be necessary in 
order to achieve “sustainable” management of forests involving traditional populations 
and international aid, which also results in “hybrid regimes” of social regulation. 
At theoretical level, I found that it is not only necessary to look at the fulfillment of 
projects regarding their material/economic benefits but is it also necessary to evaluate 
 the quality of partnerships before rating them as a durable mechanism of governance. 
Actor’s preferences which exceed economic gains, encompassing above all cultural and 
identitarian issues, have to be taken into consideration when designing and 
implementing a company-community partnership.  
According to the findings systematized under the aggregate variables of economic, 
social and environmental benefits (see chapter 6), the relationship between the company 
and the indigenous communities show the potential conflicts between actors when these 
do not share the same rationality7. Different preferences influence channels of 
communication between actors. Further, though the institutional framework (in this case 
forestry policies and the contractual agreement) allows a number of actions, different 
rationalities based on different preferences will lead to different handling options. 
Unless those are negotiated in a sufficient manner by partners, mechanisms of social 
regulation tend to of limited durability. 
I suggest that the weight of important social, political, cultural, and identitarian rights 
linked to environmental issues should influence the ultimate choice of communities to 
cooperate with companies or not. Rationalities´ conflicts, which are strategic and 
political in their nature, go beyond the borders of Brazilian reality.  
Generalizations based on the results of this thesis are therefore possible at theoretical 
level and point to reflections on further interdisciplinary research regarding the 
durability and quality of relationships between forestry sector’s stakeholders with 
different interests. 
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 Expressed in the arguments of the indigenous communities, for instance, when they unilaterally terminated the 
contractual agreement with the company. The interaction between the company and the indigenous communities 
is emblematic for a situation in which different logical reasoning (and, thus, different preferences) lead to 
conflictual handling actions. While the company rendered means available for the funding of social projects in 
the communities in parallel to the forestry management program “Forest Partners” (fulfilling the communities´ 
economic and social needs), the indigenous´ pled for their lands back, without eucalyptus trees, and pointed to 
the importance of the fulfillment of cultural and symbolic needs, which were not taken into account by the 
company (see Andrade/Dias 2003 for an analysis of the company’s strategic action from an organizational point 
of view). 
 
 CHAPTER 1 –  TOWARDS AN ANALYSIS OF GOVERNANCE  
Introduction 
The idea of governance is embedded in the context of the institutional theories of 
political science. The present chapter aims to narrow down the definition of governance, 
primarily from this point of view.  
The chapter offers a state of the art on the concept of governance by drawing on 
relevant political science literature on the matter. It begins by generally discussing the 
concept and then moves on to a discussion of governance in political economy where 
the handling of non-state actors is being considered to have an increasingly significant 
impact on environmental issues. It highlights the strategic role of non-state actors 
amidst the discussion about environmental governance and discusses the role of the 
post-colonial state in this political constellation. 
While authors such as Rosenau (2006) and Willke (2006) attempt to deliver a definition 
of governance suitable to change as observed in politics at global level, Renate Mayntz 
(2004; 2005) focuses primarily on the concept of governance at national level and 
presents us with a concept distinctly different from the state-centered “regieren”. Her 
contributions to a definition of governance as a concept beyond the idea of “politische 
Steuerung” have promoted fruitful debate in German political science literature. 
Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) evaluate governance when talking about the role of 
private/non-state actors in economy and politics within the boundaries of nation states. I 
will present the patterns of interaction between state and non-state actors here and will 
attempt to apply the given typology to the focus of this paper.  
In the course of this text, recent scientific research on the phenomenon of environmental 
governance will be introduced. Environmental matters have extended national political 
boundaries, constituting an increasingly important part of the international agenda, 
bringing state and non-state actors to the negotiating table to discuss commonly 
accepted solutions. In this matter, the significance of businesses and their influence on 
environmental regimes at international level, and policy-making and implementation at 
national level, have often either been overlooked or underestimated. Levy and Newell 
(2005) take into consideration the presence of these powerful stakeholders in the 
environmental scenario. Studies on environmental governance highlight the limits and 
opportunities for nation states and point to the emergence of non-state actors, whose 
influence on the political scenario at national and international levels seems to be 
 increasing due to two phenomena: the globalization of markets and the increasing 
necessity of international regimes to deal with global/local environmental issues, such 
as the conservation and management of forests, climate and biodiversity. 
Finally, I will analyze Risse’s (2007) critical approach to governance when applied to 
states characterized by a “limited statehood”, and, in this framework, introduce a neo-
institutional approach to governance based on the work of Mitra (2006). Both authors 
state the importance of taking culture as well as rationality into account as elements in 
decision-making and components in interaction. Last but not least, Windhoff-Héritier 
(1980) renders important tools for the approach to policies and their implementation in 
preparation for the analytical framework of the chosen object of study – company-
community partnerships in the Brazilian context. 
1. 1. The Theoretical Framework of the Concept of Governance  
The concept of governance has come to be widely used in social sciences, but has taken 
on a certain complexity influenced by the empirical realities of world politics today and 
the progressive development of scientific thought over modes of governing within 
political science and economics. Benz (2004:12) reaffirms the complexity of the term 
and its usage in the field of political science by asking if the concept of governance 
should be considered a mere concept en vogue or indeed a useful concept in social 
science. 
Though a comprehensive overview of the concept of governance does not fit into the 
scope of this work, some initial words on its emergence and usage in current political 
science areas should help us to narrow down its scope. 
The use of the word gouvernance, according to Cassen (2002 apud Benz 2004:15) can 
be traced back to 13th century France, coming to be used in England in the 14th century. 
First approaches to this concept indicate that in political science learning, governance 
distanced itself from a mere definition of governing and coordinating to a more 
thorough attention to ways and modes of governing. In this context, attention slowly 
began to move away from the nation state and hierarchical forms of government to other 
types of social/sectoral regulation within and beyond the nation state.  
In a review of his own essays on recent developments in world politics, Rosenau (2006) 
refers to the present era as “marked by shifting boundaries, relocated authorities, 
weakened states, and proliferating nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at local, 
provincial, national, transnational, international, and global levels of community (…)” 
and comes to the conclusion that “(…) the time has come to confront the insufficiency 
 of our ways of thinking, talking and writing about government” (2006:111). He 
identifies the emergence of clearly observable mechanisms of a so-called global 
governance, such as the emergence of what he calls “spheres of authority”, i.e. spheres 
of collective or individual action that are, for instance, not necessarily territory-bound 
(Rosenau 2006: 117). Those spheres generate new units and forms of self-regulation, 
extending by and by beyond traditional state authority.  
Wilke (2006) identifies similar patterns of governance at international level, alerting his 
readers to the risk in existing social science of getting caught in the trap of state-
centricity while analyzing new modes of international governance and overlooking so-
called “contexts of governance” brought about through regimes, international law and 
treaties, and organizations. He emphasizes the complexity of actual governing scenarios 
at international level by underlining that patterns of individual action in such cases 
cannot be clearly identified. Governance mechanisms are mostly characterized by 
“hybridism”8 (Willke 2006:6). The author’s main concern lies on the analysis of which 
existing modes of governance will endure in world politics and which of them will 
slowly reach its limits in coping with complexifying political realities (ibid.). In their 
analyses of governance, Rosenau (2006) and Willke (2006) consider the changing 
balance of power between political actors and the proliferation of regimes that influence 
national politics – and both raise the question of the role of the state in this context. 
The idea of governance emerged from the steering theory debates, in which the state 
occupied a central role in analyzing political structures and processes (see Risse 2007). 
In political science research, the concept of governance emerged in the nineties in the 
Anglo-Saxon region, reflecting the analysis of institutions in society as a way of 
identifying phenomena of social networking between various social actors such as the 
market, non-governmental organizations and society itself.  
The usage of governance as a non-state-centered ‘regieren’ (such as suggested in the 
concept of government, steering or the German term Steuerung) reflected changes in 
institutions and processes for political development and social regulation in the modern 
western nation state (Mayntz 2004:66, my translation)9. Still, the first area of political 
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 I refer to Willke´s concept of “hybridism” (2006) to characterize institutional setups in the forestry sector as 
“hybrid regimes”. 
9
 Renate Mayntz (2005) formulates a distinction between the concept of governance and Steuerung, a concept 
used in German political science literature within the scholarship of policy, based on the studies of the 
experiences of European state formation. For the referred scholar, the distinction is based on the role of the state 
within the political/social system. In the concept of Steuerung, the state exerts a predominant role as a 
coordinating institution, a central agent in policy-making and policy implementation within national boundaries. 
For Mayntz (2005), the concept of governance follows the same institutionalistic principle and, to some extent, 
 science where the concept of governance found concrete application was the field of 
international relations. The development of cooperation among states in various areas, 
voluntarily abiding by rules on an international basis without “obeying” orders from a 
supranational instance, such as in the unique case of the formation of the EU, show the 
actuality of the concept of governance in the political science sphere as well as the 
necessity of defining the term more precisely in this field. In this context, a much 
debated application for the concept has been the scientific explanation of the 
phenomenon of the growing distention of structures of power bound to the existence of 
the nation state. While still considering the nation state and its bureaucratic apparatus as 
a central source of governing power and authority, political scientists turned to an 
analytical investigation of the enhanced search for cooperation between states and sub-
national institutions in international politics.  
The concept of governance thus involves forms of regulation in an interdependent 
constellation of actors within or beyond the state, other than centralized in the figure of 
the state. This broad understanding of governance must be narrowed down for use as an 
analysis tool in political science. As an analysis tool, the concept of governance has to 
be understood according to the three dimensions of political science. In the polity area, 
the research of governance relates to the analysis of non-hierarchical structures of 
coordination or networks of institutions. As for the politics dimension, the analysis is 
directed at negotiations between social actors among themselves or between social 
actors and the state, and conflicts in networks between various actors. Finally, 
governance scholarship has also been concerned with adaptation to new or existing 
regulation patterns among social actors. In the policy dimension of political science, co-
regulation of the production of public goods and management of networks would be a 
subject for analysis (Benz 2004: 21)10. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
goes beyond the idea of Steuerung since it relies not on hierarchical coordination, instead, on vertically as well 
as horizontally determined relations of interdependence between political actors. In a sense, both concepts 
complement each other. In her words, governance “meint dann das Gesamt aller nebeneinander bestehenden 
Formen der kollektiven Regelung gesellschaftlicher Sachverhalte: von der institutionalisierten 
zivilgesellschaftlichen Selbstregelung über verschiedene Formen des Zusammenwirkens staatlicher und privater 
Akteure bis hin zu hoheitlichem Handeln staatlicher Akteure” (Mayntz 2004:66). 
 
10
 Still within policy analysis, the examination of political coordination in various sectors of social processes has 
demonstrated that governments generally rely on other (private or public) actors to fulfill their needs in a specific 
political sector. A good example for that is the joint work of the German government and private enterprises over 
the past few years to solve the social problem of lack of sufficient trainee job offers for young people leaving 
school.  
 
 1.1.1. Governance Debates in Political Economy 
For the purpose of this thesis, the concept of governance also draws upon significant 
studies of governance in political economy research (Levy and Newell 2005). Within 
this field, governance research also reached significant resonance in the past decade. 
The development of the capitalist mode of production in a given country, when cross-
checked against its political-institutional framework, may offer a better understanding 
of the specificities of sectoral and national economies and the patterns of governance 
that are evolving. The analysis of different types of capitalism may ultimately reveal 
patterns of cooperation between states in times of growing economic globalization (Lütz 
2006; Deeg 2006). According to the author, many scholars (see Lütz 2006) have 
developed typologies of capitalism in consonance with the economic, historical, and 
political-institutional features of given country groups. Michel Alberts (apud Lütz 
2006:15) sees manifestations of capitalism as pertaining to two different groups. On the 
one hand, the Anglo-Saxon type, characterized by more flexible transactions and 
individualistic competition and on the other, the “Rheinian” type that pertains to 
European countries and Japan, characterized by decisions commonly based on 
consensus seeking. Vivien Schmidt identifies three types of capitalism, namely “market 
capitalism, a managed capitalism and a state capitalism” (Lütz 2006:15) and uses 
arguments similar to those of Alberts to correlate the type of capitalism with the 
emerging patterns of interaction between social and economic actors and the state. 
According to Lütz, Hall and Soskice developed the most thorough analysis of types of 
capitalism (2001 apud Lütz 2006:16). The distinction is made between a kind of “liberal 
coordinated capitalism” with low state intervention and the “coordinated type of 
capitalism” characterized by the presence of the state in the economic system and the 
relatively high importance of interest groups close to the state or traditional 
associations, such as labor unions, as actors in economics and politics. 
The definition of the type of capitalism seems important in an analysis of state and non-
state actors' scope for action within a given economy/general political system, and, in 
particular, helps to set a framework for the analysis of private actors in the same 
setting11.  
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 The typology of capitalism modes in groups of countries as proposed by Hall and Soskice (apud Lütz, 2006) 
forms the basis for analyzing the possibilities and limits to private actors' scope for action, and their relationships 
to public actors. It also allows reflections on the Brazilian type of capitalism, for instance, and on the role that 
different non-state actors have played in economy and politics over the last decades (see Chapter 3). 
 
 In political economy, the analysis can be conducted for something as far-reaching as an 
international economic phenomenon with implications for a large number of 
stakeholders, such as a study of interaction in finance markets, or it can be restricted to 
an analysis of governance mechanisms within a national economy or an economic 
branch.  
The interaction between the nation state and its apparatus on the one hand and the 
multiple non-state actors within the national political system on the other deepens the 
analysis of governance patterns. Lütz identifies a growing tendency towards incongruity 
between political and economic boundaries in western economies (2006: 15). This 
means that while political boundaries mainly remain the same (even considering the 
unique case of the EU, political science scholarship still holds the nation state as a 
political, sovereign unit of analysis), markets are experiencing a kind of trans-
nationalization, requiring a reconfiguration of the internal and external organization of 
businesses and new network patterns of relationships between public and private actors 
on a national and international scale. These changes pose challenges for nation states as 
well as for market agents, and the challenges are felt at all three levels: at the level of 
the state, which has to continue to provide welfare for its population in spite of growing 
economic and political interdependencies with other states, at meso level, the pressure 
on specific branches of the economy has been increasing because of the liberalization of 
markets and growing competition, and finally, at micro-level, local populations may 
feel increasingly powerless faced with the state's incapacity to solve problems 
generated, for instance, by markets. The environmental area has been one of the 
political areas where the local and the global meet, and where new patterns of 
governance have been emerging in search of solutions to the predatory treatment of 
nature and the impoverishment of local people due to diminishing natural resources. 
The study of new patterns of cooperation on issues directly or indirectly related to the 
management of the environment has been the subject of analysis in the field of 
“environmental governance”. The area of environmental governance is of special 
interest to us because it affects the timber market. But before we come to environmental 
governance issues, a discussion of the application of governance concepts to developing 
countries is necessary. 
1. 2. Institutions and Governance in Transitioning Societies  
Scholarship on governance (Benz 2004, Mayntz 2004; 2005, Lütz 2006) refers to 
characteristics of governance based on the example of secularized modern western 
 states. For instance, Mayntz (2004) refers to changes in the modern German state, 
which has been progressively evolving from a corporatist to a neo-corporatist state due 
to the nature of relations between the federal state and interest groups in policy making 
and policy implementation. In her description of the features of governance in political 
economics, Lütz refers to models of sectoral governance that can be observed in western 
capitalist countries and divided into two typified blocs: the “coordinated capitalist 
countries” of the European region and the “uncoordinated capitalist countries” primarily 
found in the Anglo-Saxon region, alluding in both terms to characteristics such as the 
social and institutional nature of the two groups of countries and the consequences of 
these characteristics for more or less liberated modes of economy in each group (2006: 
19). 
The development of an analytical concept of governance applied to a changing society 
(Huntington 1976), such as India, and the development of a model to measure 
governance applied to the social and political reality of an emerging economy such as 
the Indian, which is characterized by a strong tradition and cultural values along with 
modern features of one of the largest democracies in the world, seem to offer an 
adequate framework for the analysis of governance in this thesis (Mitra 2006).  
As a start, governance could thus be interpreted as “a dynamic interaction between 
structures and processes, institutions and actors, rules and their applications” (Benz 
2003:21)12. However, such a broad definition of governance seems imprecise and 
insufficient when applied to originally non-western societies. By analyzing the work of 
Mitra (2006), we shall try to understand the position of the state in a post-colonial 
society and its consequences for the idea of governance.  
Mitra (2006) understands governance as the rule of law, translated into the capacity of 
the state to perform practically and discursively perform its duties of providing welfare 
and security, and safeguarding (and, to some extent, generating) the identity of its 
population. The state and regional elites are at the centre of the analysis of India’s 
governance and Mitra's model (2006) demonstrates how the responsiveness of elites to 
the desires/anxieties of the population is, in the final analysis, responsible for the 
maintenance of order. Mitra´s model is useful for our analysis, primarily due to his 
sensitivity in analyzing the complex social and cultural context in India. It shows also 
how culture is intrinsically interwoven with westernized political institutions that assure 
the rule of law. However, his model cannot be applied to the object of study here, since 
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 In the original: “(…) das dynamische Zusammenwirken zwischen Strukturen und Prozessen, zwischen 
Institutionen und Akteure, zwischen Regeln und Regelanwendung“. 
 (1) the state (in the constellation of company-community partnerships we are analyzing 
here) intervenes as a mediator between the parties and (2) responsiveness to challenges 
resulting from the interaction between actors lies in the hands of both the parties 
involved in the partnership.  
Still, Mitra´s (2006) contribution to this work lies in the sensitivity with which he 
applies rational choice calculi to the post-colonial political and social reality in India. In 
contrast to India, where the state in formation was able to absorb, within its limits, 
social demands at the time of independence and catalyze them into political measures, 
paving the way for the establishment of a democratic political setup after 1947, the 
Brazilian state historically embodied a subjugating power, and was in the service of the 
rulers rather than the ruled. After independence in 1889, the state accommodated the 
demands of the agrarian elites in the period referred to as the Old Republic, then in a 
populist way (during and after the Vargas era, until 1964), and finally used a repressive 
apparatus until the mid-80s, favouring military cadres with the connivance of the urban 
middle classes. The state that came to be formed after the end of the dictatorship 
inherited administrative institutions that had been reformed to a certain extent but not 
intrinsically transformed, and the liberalization of the economy in the '90s reduced the 
state to the position of a mere mediator among other political actors, such as businesses 
and civil society. Liberalization and regime change in Brazil thus led to a significant 
change in the essence of the state, laying the groundwork for new governance 
arrangements between sectors and actors within society. The role of the state after the 
economic liberalization of the '90s and subsequent new arrangements in economic 
sectors will be elucidated in chapter 3. 
Mitra (2006) thus paves the way for the application of his conceptual framework of 
governance to Brazilian society by highlighting the concomitance of culture, identity 
and rationality as decisive in the interaction between the actors in originally non-
western societies13. Draude (2007:4) reaffirms our conclusion by identifying major 
significant points in Risse’s (2007) arguments regarding “cooperative, non-hierarchical 
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 His idea of governance places particular emphasis on the capacity of elites to react reciprocally to social 
demands in a political system, this paper will therefore solely refer to some of the arguments presented by the 
author with regard to his neo-institutional approach of governance, especially his interview questions while used 
in analyzes of “governance” in India were the inspiration of the questionnaire used in this thesis. Thus, Mitra´s 
(2006) understanding of governance can be stated to have had a contribution to the micro-level analysis of the 
target company-community partnership in the southeastern part of Brazil.  
 forms of decision-making” and their consequences for the notion of state, especially in 
countries with limited statehood14. 
When thinking about governance in political scenarios such as these, governance 
theorists consider problematic the diminishing significance of the state as one of the 
main pillars, if not the central one, of implementing political choices. The “need of the 
shadow of hierarchy” (ibid: 6) reflects the very idea presented in discussions about 
modes of governance in western democracies – the implicit centrality of the state in 
social regulation. According to Draude (2007), western concepts of governance tend to 
dichotomize public and private actors, essentializing both as if to “re-map” the 
relationships according to classical notions of the function of the state and society. 
When observing the “non-westernness of non-western societies” (ibid:9), elements such 
as culture, tradition and identity are at stake and not, as many would naively think, 
phenomena like clientelism and corruption, by the way also existent in western 
societies. Again, Risse (2007) enlarges the notion of governance in non-western 
societies to highlight the problems of the degree of statehood found there. He adds that 
the political reality does not point to either limited or unlimited statehood, since in both 
cases statehood is given and that, further, a situation of limited statehood needs to be 
evaluated by analyzing specific criteria within the given state, such as sovereignty and 
legitimacy. Using the Brazilian case as an example of limited statehood, the author 
mentions that on the whole, the country depends on the existence of a state of law and 
the government exerts its ruling competence over most political issues, while specific 
questions, such as the lack of police control in some parts of the Amazon region, remain 
unsolved.  
1.3. Environmental Governance 
Concepts of governance have been applied to many fields of study and levels of social 
reality, consolidating interdisciplinary relations between social science scholars. For 
instance, the understanding of the market as an institution has been enhancing the 
synergies between concepts of governance in political science and economics, 
according to Benz (2004:16). Within the field of international relations, environmental 
governance has been receiving much attention since global climate change has been 
influencing the policies of nation states as well as demanding the commitment of other 
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 According to Risse (2007:8-9), countries with limited statehood are those geographically located outside the 
OECD borders where the level of “statehood” specially with regard to three governance functions (security, state 
power/Herrschaft and welfare) is not sufficiently given. The standard of comparison is the concept of a 
democratic state of law.  
 non-state actors to engage in joint efforts to prevent and mitigate the negative 
implications of man's interference with nature.  
The concept of environmental governance logically derives from the idea of “new 
patterns of individual action” in the field of politics and has been defined by Levy and 
Newell (2005:2) as  
“(…) the broad range of political, economic, and social structures and 
processes that shape and constrain actors´ behavior towards the 
environment. Environmental governance thus refers to the multiple 
channels through which human impacts on the natural environment 
are ordered and regulated. It implies rule creation, institution-building, 
and monitoring and enforcement”. 
What appears to be a thin, broad-based definition is in reality a definition that is open to 
the extremely different patterns of interaction among actors in a multi-level arena. The 
authors identify the area of study as one that involves many different stakeholders, 
ranging from local communities to multinational corporations (henceforth MNCs) and, 
above all, an area in which the state increasingly needs to count on partnerships. The 
globalization of media discourse, especially of western origin, has served as a catalyst in 
publicizing issues such as the consequences of the capitalist world’s mode of production 
on the public sphere. 
Environmental issues, especially those regarding the perception of global environmental 
change, have doubtless been posing a challenge to the nation state in its role as 
sovereign political unit as well as a challenge at international diplomacy level. 
According to Pattberg (2007:389), the emergence of new patterns of governance, be 
they international, regional or subnational/public, originates in from major changes in 
world politics: “First, the locus of authoritative problem solving does not rest with 
governments and their international organizations alone. Authority is indeed relocated 
in many different settings, involving public-private as well as purely private actor 
constellations. Second, the predominantly confrontational relation between companies, 
governments, and civil society has been complemented by partnership as one possible 
mode of interaction. And third, cooperation is getting more and more institutionalized, 
resulting in social practices that effectively govern specific issue areas” (Pattberg 2007: 
389). 
Biermann and Dingwerth point out that the recognition of environmental change 
constrains the role of nation states in a twofold manner (2004). One of the constraints 
that challenge the efficiency of the nation state is the fact that environmental change 
“increases the demand for mitigative and adaptive action, which places additional stress 
 on the overall capacities of nation states to promote and protect the welfare of their 
populations” and further, it “increases the mutual dependence of nation states, thereby 
further undermining the idea of sovereignty as enshrined in the traditional Westphalian 
system” (2004:2).  
In political science, scholars of both international environmental politics and 
comparative environmental politics have been studying the political phenomena in 
response to the apparently common challenge of environmental change. Both fields 
observe patterns of interaction between nation states and non-state actors 
(Biermann/Dingwerth 2004). The cited authors refer to two streams of thought in 
political science; one believing that good practices and technological innovations spill 
over from one state to another (with some states taking the lead in developing 
innovations and adapting national policies to environmental demands – see Jänicke, 
2007) and the other, most specifically within the institutionalist stream of thought in the 
field of International Relations, believing in the power of cooperation between states 
and their compliance with international agreements. In both research fields, the nation 
state seems to play a significant role as an actor, though it is precisely environmental 
problems that threaten its sovereignty in decision-making. 
The emerging mechanisms of environmental governance place the state in an unclear 
position. Its importance is however still undeniable. 
The phenomenon of an international political arena marked by the existence and (un-
)coordinated cooperation among actors has been paving the way for new patterns of 
governance in environmental issues. Biermann/Dingwerth see the emergence of what 
they term “collaborative governance” in this scenario – modes of coordination of 
individual action involving various actors at various levels (Knill/Lehmkuhl 2002:86) – 
as a characteristic of global environmental governance (Biermann/Dingwerth 2004:12). 
A system of “mutual supportiveness” (Sanwal 2002) is becoming increasingly 
necessary in order to face global challenges and find solutions. In this context, 
businesses are important stakeholders, since many of them invest in areas that are 
environmentally sensitive (Clapp 2005:23), which makes them key actors in 
environmental politics. Levy and Newell (2005:47) come to the conclusion that 
“business plays a central role in the industrial activities that account for many of the 
adverse environmental impacts afflicting the planet (…)”. The authors go on to reaffirm 
the ultimate necessity of involving businesses in negotiations and policy-making 
processes because “(…) at the same time, its [business’s] technological and financial 
 resources could potentially make a major contribution toward mitigating and reversing 
these impacts” (ibid.).  
The emergence of global markets and the continual strengthening of the so-called 
MNCs, potentiated by emerging information technologies and capital flows, testifies to 
the relevance of these actors to political science in general and to studies of governance 
in particular.  
1.3.1. Patterns of (Environmental) Governance involving State and Non-state 
Actors 
Knill and Lehmkuhl suggest that the growing significance of private actors in the 
context of globalization is a sign of “changing governance conditions” in the national as 
well as in the international sphere (2002: 85). The growing importance of non-state 
actors, such as businesses and to some extent other non-governmental organizations, 
seems, to some political scientists, to be a sign that the decision-making/strategic power 
of national governments is waning in the face of social problems that cannot be solved 
within the scope of the state and due to the limits faced by nation states to regulate 
flows of transnational information, the integration of markets and other types of social 
networks (ibid.), acknowledging that authority is increasingly found “outside formal 
political structures” (Pattberg 2007:386). 
Knill/Lehmkuhl suggest expanding the concept of private actors to include those who, 
in some sense, generate direct or indirect common goods15 but fall out of the scope of 
“humanitarian or environmentalists organizations” (2002:85). By roughly defining 
governance as “attempts at collective problem-solving outside hierarchical 
frameworks”, they suggest a typology of interactions between state and non-state actors, 
taking into consideration the regulatory structures that already exist in the state (the 
institutional context in which the actors are rooted) and the type of policy problem 
(2002:86-87). The typology presented by the authors mentioned above is a valuable tool 
for examining relations between the state and non-state actors, as well as for identifying 
the governance capacity of each party in a given constellation. In some policy areas, 
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 Héritier (2002:1-2) understands that changes in patterns of governance are, in general, the result of new modes 
of solving “collective-action problems” under a threefold consideration: the consideration of (1.) simultaneous 
levels of (inter-) actions among and (2.) new constellations of actors, and (3.) the changing role of the state in the 
provision of common goods. Based on vast literature, Héritier defines common goods in two manners: the first 
one, takes into consideration its properties and considering three types of common goods and differentiates them 
on the basis of accessibility (if open to all, open to some, or open to according to certain people/groups according 
to defined exclusivity criteria) and consumption (non-rivalry and rivalry consumption). The second one relates to 
the “normative options” derived from the concrete ideas of accessibility to all and non-rivalry consumption such 
as the general education or general health services within a state (ibid.). 
 where the state either provides common goods in association with non-state actors or 
retains for itself the responsibility for supervising the provision of common goods by 
non-state actors, conflicts of various kinds may occur. Knill/Lehmkuhl mainly describe 
problems in the coordination between the state and non-state actors, and in agreement 
between the parties as far as the provision of goods and services is concerned (2002:87-
88). The institutional setting, i.e. the regulation framework in which the parties operate, 
may also define the governance mechanisms in a given sector. Finally, broader political 
scenarios contribute substantially to the governance capacity of states as well as other 
actors. In the case of the Brazilian state, the federalist structure, the nature of law-
making and law implementation and the distribution of power among governmental 
agencies may be of crucial importance as far as its cooperation with other (non-state) 
actors is concerned.  
The model developed by Knill/Lehmkuhl (2002:93 et sqq.) to assess patterns of 
governance involving public and private actors is based on an ideal weberian typology. 
The four ideal types of interaction in the matrix proposed by the authors are based on 
the correlation between the governance capacity of public actors (defined as high or 
low) and the governance capacity of private actors (also attributing to them the values 
high or low). 
When the governing capacity of the state is high and the governing capacity of private 
actors is low, the authors describe this as interventionist regulation. Here, responsibility 
for providing a certain common good lies with the state, and the state itself possesses 
the institutional means to regulate the given sector when those goods are to be supplied 
by private actors. This is the case in industries that are still hierarchically controlled by 
governments, being the case in part of the health sector in Brazil. Here, the manufacture 
of pharmaceutical products for treating HIV/AIDS as well as the production of certain 
types of vaccines are either undertaken by the federal government itself and distributed 
to the population as a whole or are supervised by the government when supplied by 
private parties. In the domestic macroeconomic sphere, state control of private 
enterprise in industries supplying essential services such as energy, oil and 
telecommunications was implemented during the era in which these services were 
privatized. In the 1990s, so-called national regulatory agencies were created to monitor 
the performance of these sectors (Caristina 2006:117) 16. 
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 Those were, for instance, the ANEEL (Agencia Nacional de Energia Elétrica – National Agency of Electrical 
Energy), the ANATEL (Agencia Nacional de Telecomunicacoes – National Agency of Telecommunications) 
and the ANP (Agencia Nacional do Petróleo – National Oil Agency). 
 If the governance capacity of both public and private actors is rated as high, it should be 
possible for these actors to cooperate. The authors refer to this scenario as regulated 
self-regulation. Here, the state has the possibility of intervening in the process by 
actively supplying goods should the private initiative fail to do this. An example in this 
respect would be the mode of self-regulation established by the Brazilian press under 
the initiative of various press associations in 1970, at the time of the military 
dictatorship, to create a council for self-regulated publicity (CONAR), responsible for 
instance for the quality and content of advertisements on the radio, in the printed press 
and on TV (Caristina, 2006:120).  
When the governance capacity of public actors is low and that of private actors is found 
to be high, private actors should be able to provide goods and depend on a low degree 
of intervention by the state. This scenario is referred to as private self-regulation, in 
which the state does not have sufficient means to supply the goods and is thus reduced 
to a moderator between the private actors who provide them. In both cases in which the 
governance capacity of private actors is high (that of regulated self-regulation and 
private self-regulation), the possibilities of regulation of private actors on a voluntary 
basis may open up channels of cooperation between those and public actors. In the 
Brazilian context this can be the case in industries that exploit certain natural resources, 
such as the timber sector. Though legislation has allowed a more thorough regulation of 
the development of the timber sector in general terms since the 1990s, the sole fact that 
the state does not actively participate in timber activities opens the floor to private 
enterprises as the main stakeholders in the exploration of natural resources of this kind. 
The poor controlling capacity of the state, for instance in the Amazonian region, 
enhances the responsibility of private actors for self-regulation in their activities there. 
External factors may trigger the setting up of private regulation mechanisms within an 
economic branch. Eco labels, for instance, are becoming increasingly important for 
forestry products that originate in developing countries as proof of the social and 
environmental sustainability of private activities in these regions. 
The final setting proposed by the matrix relates to situations in which the governance 
capacity of both public and private actors is limited and thus, low. This results in a 
scenario of interfering regulation, where “public interference in markets (…) occurs on 
an ad hoc basis” (Knill/Lehmkuhl 2002:97). Still, the state may intervene when it is 
necessary to minimize negative externalities (ibid.).  
 As mentioned, one of the fields where cooperation between state and non-state actors 
has been most evidently noted is that of environmental politics17. Pattberg (2007) argues 
that what he calls private governance emerges from two different sets of conditions: 
those at a macro-level, relating to far-reaching changes to projected production, the 
regulation of commerce and developments in the international community. With 
restrictions (see Gulbrandsen 2004), so-called eco-labeling procedures such as the one 
proposed by the Forest Stewardship Council have resulted in the definition of standards 
for extraction and trade in timber that depend on high acceptance in environmentally 
concerned markets among developed countries.  
In the area of the Brazilian Legal Amazon, for instance, the federal government and the 
governments of the federal states face problems concerning the widespread illegal 
logging of timber for commerce, the unsustainable way of extracting timber (this often 
has to do with illegal extracting processes), the exclusion of rural communities, slave 
descendents and indigenous people in the timber extraction and trading chain, and the 
frequent failure to impose sanctions for environmental crimes18. Within studies of 
global environmental politics, third sector as well as academic literature on 
environmental governance in general have presented criteria for evaluating mechanisms 
of (state and non-state) co-regulation of exploration of natural resources. Inspired by 
these literary contributions in general and by the literature on regulation of sustainable 
management of forestry resources in particular (FSC 1996, Mayers/Vermeulen 2002)19, 
the criteria that seem to be common to environmental governance discussions are those 
that insist on “environmentally responsible, socially beneficial and economically 
viable” (FSC 1996:3) development of the forestry sector. I have operationalized these 
notions into variables for the analysis of company-community partnerships in Espírito 
Santo, which shall be introduced in chapter 5 and analyzed in more detail in chapter 6. 
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 The growing institutionalization of environmental governance by private actors beyond national borders is 
exemplified by the creation of the Forest Stewardship Council, an initiative of non-governmental organizations 
with the support of businesses and local actors to develop certification procedures for producing and marketing 
timber products and non-timber products. 
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 Programs launched largely on the initiative of non-state actors, such as the World Bank, in collaboration with 
the national government in an attempt to increase efforts to preserve and manage forests in a sustainable manner 
in Brazil have had positive results. The Pilot Program for Tropical Forests PPG7, launched in 1991-1992 as a 
joint action between industrial countries and international organizations, achieved significant results as regards 
the progressive inclusion of small peasants and local communities in forestry policies, and represented an 
advance in the discussion of land rights in the Amazon, as well as exerting pressure on the forestry policy for 
that region. 
19
 As proposed, for instance, by the non-governmental eco labeling organization FSC – the Forest Stewardship 
Council, founded in 1993 with the aim of proposing solutions for the “responsible stewardship of the world’s 
forests”, is composed of three chambers (social, environmental and economic) and counts on massive 
participation of environmentalist organizations (see bibliography and Andrade/Dias 2003:186). 
 The economic, social and environmental benefits of partnerships were taken as criteria 
for the evaluation of the case study. 
1.3.2. Governance in “Hybrid Regimes” and Policy Implementation 
The recognition of the continuous emergence of so-called hybrid regimes (Newell 
2005), which have already been subject to studies in international environmental 
politics as well as international political economy research, draws attention to the 
analysis of policy implementation within those regimes, of how they are formed, with 
what kind of purposes, involving which kind of processes, and leading to which kind of 
outcomes and impacts. At this point, we can consider reviewing the interaction 
approaches mentioned above, realizing that the governance approach to be applied in 
this work is based on the assumptions that: (1) new mechanisms between the state and 
non-state actors are being built without the state necessarily taking the lead; further, (2) 
we realize that governance requires legitimizing instruments for its fulfillment, such as a 
specific kind of interaction between political actors and, of course, the prior 
acknowledgement of a series of social actors as political actors which are to be brought 
to the negotiating table; (3) the specific administrative and rule-based character of the 
dynamic interaction between acknowledgeable partners must exist; and (4) one of the 
outcomes of interaction must be the provision of common goods, be they of a direct 
(such as the provision of water) or indirect nature, such as the protection of the 
environment. In addition, (5) the governance mechanisms must take into consideration 
the limits and boundaries of culture, identity, history and other features of the given 
social environment. Research has been pointing out that general governance 
mechanisms can be applied only with limitations to post-colonial and transitioning 
societies.  
Bearing an enlarged20 governance concept in mind, comprising considerations on 
relationships between private and public actors mentioned above, we shall use the tools 
provided by Windhoff-Héritier (1980) to analyze the “Forestry Partners” program of the 
company Aracruz Cellulose as a forestry management policy in the state of Espírito 
Santo. Please, note that we can only talk about policy implementation in this context 
having assumed that policies (1) may be actively placed on the political agenda by non-
state actors under the shadow of the state and (2) are thus as subject to scrutiny as 
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 I use the term “enlarged” to denote that I consider the multiplicity of aspects under which this concept is 
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 governmental policies, since the research agenda proposed by Windhoff-Héritier applies 
first and foremost to governmental policies.  
Windhoff-Héritier (1980:220) points out that when researching policy, it is also 
necessary to research the phase between the adoption of a political decision and its 
actual implementation. We shall use the tools for analyzing policy implementation, 
specifically the interaction of actors, to approach company-community partnerships.  
In the forestry sector, new solutions have been developed for including low-income 
producers in commercial forestry activities so that they are granted access to the 
marketplace (Vidal 2005). To exclude smallholder farmers in general from the benefits 
of “market linkages and access to technology, capital and capacity building” (Vidal 
2005:ii) would constitute bad social and environmental business practice and could 
damage companies' legitimacy. Besides, the cooperation of the forest industry in general 
with local communities has been identified as one of the most promising strategies of 
relieving the existing pressure on tropical forests worldwide (ibid). 
According to Vidal (2005:18), two forestry company-community agreements exist in 
Brazil, namely community forestry systems, mainly in the Amazon region, and what she 
terms “out-grower programs developed by forest plantation companies”. 
The Aracruz Cellulose program, one of the best-known programs within the second type 
of joint forestry management, was created 18 years ago, involving smallholder farmers 
in the states of Espírito Santo and Minas Gerais in the southeast of the country. 
According to Windhoff-Héritier, one of the structural prerequisites for programs is the 
democratic framework of the given country, which allows parties with diverse 
individual interests to propose and negotiate political decisions (1980:22). 
Implementation of the program presupposes the existence of potentially opposed 
rationality criteria, which must be satisfactorily accommodated. In our case, as in other 
similar cooperation situations, the different rationalities guiding each of the actors 
involved in the process (smallholder farmers, indigenous and the company) define 
whether or not partnerships between them can be established.  
Anticipating the nature of the outcomes – be they individual or collective, or be they of 
a material or immaterial nature – is decisive to the establishment of criteria. In our case, 
the attraction of the program seems to be due to individual material gains such as the 
increase of individual incomes, but also on immaterial (collective) goods, such as the 
idea of contributing to the environmentally sustainable use of forestry resources 
(1980:41). The policy implementation research proposed by Windhoff-Héritier includes 
 the characterization of the group to which the program is to be proposed, and its 
classification as socially weak or strong (1980:41), since this will influence its role in 
implementation (active or passive). This type of program also relates to the code of 
behavior it implies (1980:43). Through its internal regulations and a potential sanction 
system, it creates patterns of behavior and expectations among its participants. 
According to Windhoff-Héritier (1980:46-47), the program types will be accompanied 
by steering mechanisms based on appeals of behavior. The steering mechanisms may be 
based on provisions in the form of proposals or imperatives; they may have a moral 
appeal; may occur on a symbolic level or may be of an indirect nature (for example, 
where the implementing actor shape a particular form of behavior by serving as an 
example). Or, such as in our case, steering mechanisms can offer incentives to serve as 
stimuli for complying with the rules of the program. Participation stimuli are a 
requirement for programs on a voluntary basis such as company-community agreements 
in the forestry sector. According to Windhoff-Héritier (1980:51), one of the 
preconditions for the successful achievement of a program´s goal lies in the accurate 
evaluation of motives that cause actors to join the program21. According to the patterns 
proposed by Windhoff-Héritier (1980:53), we could interpret the partnership as a self-
implementing one, where the state is present as a framework steersman. The 
organization behind the implementation of the partnership, the company in this case, 
would be the most active party. A second organization (a governmental agency), itself a 
receiver of (intermediary) benefits, remains responsible for inspecting the program. The 
final addressees receive benefits from the program if they comply with the rules 
(1980:54).  
As mentioned before, Levy and Newell (2005:7) pointed out the multiple character of 
social regulation in hybrid regimes in what they termed “environmental governance”. 
While other governance approaches until now offered theoretical assumptions about 
roles and rules in hybrid regimes, the authors identify governance arrangements 
evolving into “complex, multiparty negotiations”. According to Mayers/Vermeulen 
(2002:ii), “partnerships [in the forestry sector] are of considerable interest in the search 
for effective governance mechanisms in the age of opportunities and threats created by 
globalization”. Bearing in mind that the phenomenon of partnerships between 
communities and companies in the forestry sector has been occurring in other parts of 
the world, too (ibid.), the aim of this thesis is to have a glimpse into the contractual 
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 arrangement between company and communities reached through negotiations between 
actors from a governance point of view, in the specific context of the implementation of 
Aracruz Cellulose's “Forestry Partners” program in Espírito Santo.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to point out the polyphony of discourses on governance 
definitions, the role of the state in times of globalization, and the hybrid regimes 
emerging nationally and internationally which are characterized by consorted policy 
arrangements between partners, such as in public-private partnerships and other private 
scenarios, as for example, the company-community partnership to be analyzed here. The 
chapter aimed at identifying different aspects in each of the contributions to the idea of 
governance and moreover, drew more thorough conclusions about the importance of 
weighing the application of the idea of governance into post-colonial contexts (Risse 
2007, Mitra 2006).  
As Draude (2007) points out, different analyses of the governance discourse will define 
different rankings for the individual actors such as the state, state actors, private actors 
and society as a whole. Ideas of governance developed in western democracies often 
reach their limits when theorizing about governance types and even about the function 
of specific actors in partially non-western contexts. Different governance ideas lead to 
different notions of the state and pose different challenges to it and to private actors 
such as businesses and civil society. It seems unquestionable that, even though there are 
divergences on the position of the state as the provider of common goods and as the 
ultimate or implicit steersman in social regulations, societal forces, be they social 
networks or businesses, are assuming an active role in policy-making both in domestic 
and international scenarios. 
As state and non-state actors are admitted to cooperate in many areas, the present 
chapter also proposes the idea of placing the case study for this M.A. thesis into the 
framework analysis of policy implementation, as proposed by Windhoff-Héritier 
(1980). The idea was to embody governance into a policy implementation strategy and 
to provide an analysis of governance in this specific situation using the policy analysis 
instruments, which fit into the rational choice approach to be used in chapter 2. 
Finally, the chapter elucidates once more the central idea of the text: to understand 
governance by analyzing forestry policies, such as the company-community partnership 
in the timber sector. For this purpose, the chapter discussed Windhoff-Héritier (1980) 
 and returned to reflections on governance in the environmental area (Levy/Newell 
2005) and the specificity of embedding non-state actors in such arrangements. 
My idea of governance comprises (1) the understanding that the state’s role has been 
changing due to liberalization processes of different kinds (commercial, financial, 
political) and that, specially in post-colonial contexts, the state has been assuming a 
mediating function in governance among non-state actors, necessarily having to 
consider factors such as culture, history and identitarian conflicts to accommodate 
national and subnational political demands. Further, my idea of governance (2) does not 
aim at explaining general interaction among state and non-state actors within or beyond 
the borders of a nation state but is instead applicable to the analysis of specific sectors 
of government/economy (in this case, the environmental area/the forestry sector); (3) it 
necessarily draws on political economy to understand mechanisms and purposes of 
interaction among social actors and (4) draws on policy analysis as an instrument for 
evaluating the implementation of sectoral interactions. Fifth, my idea of governance for 
the forestry sector in a post-colonial state necessarily comprises normative guiding 
principles for sustainable development22. Literature on environmental governance 
suggests the emergence of normative criteria for the analysis of policies and joint 
undertakings between state and non-state actors and among non-state actors in the 
management of natural resources (see FSC 1996, Mayers/Vermeulen 2002). For the 
purpose of this study, some of those elements are categorized and evaluated. For now, I 
have argued that governance comprises mechanisms of social regulation between actors, 
be they state or non-state ones, based upon the consideration of each of the partners´ 
social, economic, and cultural needs and rights – all this against the background of a 
rational behavior towards the use of natural resources. 
Governance in the forestry sector means a complex social interaction between state and 
non-state actors (or only between non-state actors) embedded in culture and context, 
time and space, counting on a sometimes more sometimes less visible mediating 
function of the state (through its agencies/laws) to ensure profit and well-being of all 
actors (especially local communities and indigenous peoples) in the (commonly shared) 
management of natural resources. 
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 To answer the question of wether a company-community partnership fulfills the 
established idea of governance under the premise of the verification of the two 
hypotheses proposed in the introduction shall be the ultimate aim of this paper. 
 CHAPTER 2 - A NEO-INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO GOVERNANCE  
Introduction 
This chapter aims to introduce the analytical framework of this study. It begins by 
giving an overall definition of the term “institution”, as proposed by North (1991), and 
then makes an excursion through the types of neo-institutionalism relevant to this 
study23, criticizing the supposedly rigid frontiers between them. It justifies the decision 
to use the rational choice model for this work and applies the game theory model to the 
company-community partnerships in Espírito Santo.  
The chapter aims to link the theoretical framework, which is based on the understanding 
of governance detailed in chapter 1, with the empirical data available for this study. I 
shall argue that while a neo-institutional approach to governance as proposed in chapter 
1 provides a theoretical framework for explaining the emergence of company-
community partnerships in the forestry sector, rational choice offers an adequate insight 
into the possibilities of interaction between partners in the target case study. Game 
theory rationale helps us to understand interaction in concrete terms, emphasizing the 
interests and preferences of each of the partners. The last part of this chapter presents 
the main actors in this study, briefly discusses the interests of each actor and the direct 
and indirect relationships between them.  
2.1. Neo-institutionalism and the Concept of Institution 
The concept of institution played a fundamental role in the political science scholarship 
of the ´70s and ´80s. While North (1991:97) defines institutions as “humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” and that consist of 
two features: “both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and 
codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)”, Zimmermann 
(2006), who refers to the neo-institutional scholarship in his analysis of political 
participation in Brazil, goes on to distinguish four main features of the concept of 
“institution” – namely that institutions constitute a pattern of social relations that 
possess a regulation character, tend to be stable and have a stabilizing character and 
enforce their legitimacy, if necessary, through sanctions (2006:18). The link between 
(political) institutions and democracy is also taken into account by neo-institutionalists: 
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 democracy depends on acceptable social and economic conditions in general as well as 
on the framework provided by existing institutions (Zimmermann 2006: 16)24.  
According to Zimmermann (2006:13), the Eighties witnessed a return of academic 
interest in the formation and dynamics of institutions in the public sphere. Not least 
institutional (trans-) formation experienced by the post-Cold War Western states within 
the liberal capitalist world order of the present century and the emergence of unique 
institutional arrangements such as the European Union brought significant attention to 
the topic of institution research. While the “old” institutionalist school of thought, in the 
contect of the critical debate of behavioralist and structuralist (or systemic) theories, 
favored the study of formal political institutions, primarily the state, neo-
institutionalism amplified the concept of the institution by emphasizing the existence 
and effectiveness of informal institutions alongside formal ones, the transformations 
institutions undergo under the influence of political actors and that institutional 
frameworks are as decisive in the outcomes of politics as the preferences of political 
actors (see Zimmermann 2006).  
In their much-quoted book “Reinventing Institutions”, March and Olsen (1989) review 
political science scholarship up to the seventies and criticize the secondary importance 
of the analysis of political institutions which were seen by behavioralists as mere 
“arenas” for political action (1989:1). The authors plead for a return to the importance 
of analyzing “the organization of political life” (ibid.). Representatives of a so-called 
state-centered institutionalism (Kato 1996), March and Olsen criticize the way political 
theories were being developed, stressing the excessive importance given to exogenous 
forces in analyzing politics. Instead of seeing the state as “important to the ordering and 
understanding of collective life”, March/Olsen (1989:3) affirm that political scientists 
had started to search for explanations exclusively in social contexts. Furthermore, they 
criticize modern political theory for seeking explanations for political phenomena at 
micro-level, thus being reductionist (ibid.:4). Another point of criticism has to do with 
the idea of the utilitarian character of human decision-making, as though human choice 
solely relates to the consequences of immediate micro events. Instead, the authors 
propose the idea of human choice being constrained by the existence of an institutional 
framework(s). In addition, the authors criticized the tendency of modern political 
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 theories to pursue an instrumental view of political events, as though they were to be 
evaluated as “strategic moves by self-conscious political actors” without considering 
their embedding institutions. Finally, March and Olsen criticize the understanding of 
history as an evolutionary mechanism towards efficiency – they disapprove of the 
notion of institutions being formed to achieve a given social equilibrium. According to 
their critique, institutions would function as structures providing equilibrium and thus 
would be detached from their historical path (1989:7). Their critics are ultimately based 
on the problematic of the description of “political behavior as institution-free” 
(1989:171). The authors instead suggest an idea of institutions based on what they call 
norms of appropriateness: rules and routines that are actively shaped and that 
themselves shape the participants in political life (ibid.).  
To summarize, neo-institutionalism stresses the significance of institutions within the 
political process as setters of “options as well as restrictions for political action” 
(Mayntz/Scharpf 1995 apud Zimmermann 2006: 15) and March and Olsen’s criticisms 
paved the way for more recent debates on the importance of institutions as shapers of 
political reality, seeking to “bring the state back in”.  
2.2. Two Neo-Institutional Schools – Historical Institutionalism and Rational 
Choice 
According to Hall and Taylor (2003), three schools of thought have emerged under the 
scope of neo-institutionalism: historical neo-institutionalism, rational choice neo-
institutionalism based on political economy and sociological neo-institutionalism. 
Common to the three kinds of institutionalism are questions of how to analyze the 
relationship between institutions and political behavior and, further, how to explain the 
emergence of institutions and institutional change (Hall/Taylor 2003:194).  
Historical institutionalism, while still drawing upon structuralism, retained the idea of a 
political life as a system whose parts would “interact with others, influencing them”. 
(ibid.: 195) and in which institutions would regulate and eventually structure the 
political reality. The authors state that structural functionalism as well as pluralism and 
neo-marxist theories had an influence on historical institutionalism. Their concept of 
institution relates more to the rules within the organizational structure of 
political/economic communities (ibid: 196). The emphasis seems to be more on formal 
institutions. It is important to mention in this context that historical institutionalism 
takes into consideration the asymmetries of power that exist within institutions, and that 
it considers how institutions react to changes in processes or factors that have a direct 
 influence upon them (Hall/Taylor 2003). Historical institutionalists attribute to 
institutions the role of impacting political behavior inclusively by, among other things, 
shaping them morally and through the use of culture, incorporating symbols that 
influence an individual’s interpretation of his/her own world. Finally, historical 
institutionalists place great emphasis on the historical development of institutions – their 
path dependency. This also has a major influence on the preferences of individual 
actors. 
Rational choice neo-institutionalism has its roots in the economics scholarship of the 
1950s, which defended the primacy of rationality in general political behavior. A 
thorough understanding of the neo-institutional approach and its relevance to the field 
of political science leads us to revisit the beginnings of one of the best-known variants 
of rational choice theory, namely positive political science, also known as the Rochester 
School (Amadae/de Mesquita 1999). The Rochester School defined new parameters for 
the comparative political science in general, establishing an axiomatic, quantitative, and 
a less norm-oriented analysis of political life. Questions concerning the emergence of 
institutions and primarily the ways of reaching equilibrium among them also became 
one of the cornerstones of research while the unit of analysis for rational choice 
theorists was the homo oeconomicus, the rational, gain maximizing actor.  
Hall and Taylor (2003:205) refer to four basic characteristics of rational choice theories 
in general: their emphasis lies, for instance, on behavioral characteristics of the actors 
but not on their psychological features. Rational choicers use a simplified model of 
interaction, in which the preferences of the actors are set up transitively according to the 
actor’s projected rational calculus. Their behavior is thus predictable, since their joining 
the institutional arrangement can be seen as a utilitarian maneuver to reach rationally 
established goals. Still according to Hall/Taylor (ibid.), rational choicers face dilemmas 
of collective action when they try to maximize their gains in situations of political life. 
The “prisoners’ dilemma” and the “tragedy of the commons” illustrate the suboptimal 
gains for the collectivity and consequently for individual actors when one actor behaves 
with the sole intent to maximize his/her own preferences at the expense of others – and 
at the expense of resources also available to others. Furthermore, the authors point out 
that rational choice scholarship emphasizes the strategic interaction, institutionally 
embedded, in determining outcomes of political and social life. Interaction is thus a 
product of the maximization of preferences and gains and the evaluation of expected 
maneuvers from the other actor’s side. Rational choice scholarship ultimately views 
 institutions as a voluntary and rational construct of actors that recognize the necessity 
of interacting with others. One of the most determining characteristics of rational 
choicers is their assumed driving force for interacting and setting up institutions: they 
focus on strategic calculi instead of historical impersonal forces. 
However, according to Diekmann/Voss (2004), some assumptions within the rational 
choice approach, or better, some rational choice approaches have gone beyond the 
restricted idea of a homo oeconomicus trying to maximize his gains at all bearable costs 
while interacting with others. These authors point to variants of rational choice theory 
that consider the non-material interests of actors and the influence of social structures 
within a given context as part of the analysis (Diekmann/Voss 2004:13).  
When we consider that the goal of rational choice theory is to explain “collective effects 
resulting from assumptions regarding individual handling, embedded in a social 
context” (Diekmann/Voss 2004:14, my translation)25, game theory seems an adequate 
tool for analyzing social interaction since it narrows down complex interactions to a 
simpler form, allowing a better insight into the preferences and handling options of 
actors. 
In short, the premises in rational choice theory can be summarized as follows 
(Diekmann/Voss 2004): the theory is based on actors deciding on their own resources 
and restrictions, building their preferences according to these and faced with two basic 
options (to cooperate/interact or not to cooperate/not to interact). The theory 
encompasses rules of choice and these set the premises for the actor’s maneuver, 
according to Diekmann/Voss (2004:15). Therefore, the hypotheses highlight the 
explanans for the given sample of social interaction while the theory’s aim is to 
generalize the analysis of social interaction and apply it at macro-level26.  
In her essay “Historical Institutions in Comparative Politics”, Thelen (1999) points out 
similarities between historical institutionalism and the rational choice approach. A 
reflection on this issue is relevant for the present work since the analysis of the case of 
company-community partnerships in Espírito Santo not only draws on a rationalist 
model of interaction but also relies on features of historical institutionalism when 
answering political and social questions. For Thelen (1999), the theoretical approach to 
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 social reality as proposed by historicalists and the empirical approach as proposed by 
rational choicers are unnecessarily and inappropriately dichotomized. The different 
emphases on analytical units (for historicalists, the analytical unit would be the way 
institutions are viewed and for rational choicers, the way “players” are defined) deliver 
a false view on how research is taking place in the two schools. In this matter, Thelen 
(1999) points out that differences do not relate to the specific question whether the 
rational choice tradition prioritizes empirically oriented research as opposed to a 
theoretically oriented work done by historicalists, but rather to the different outsets of 
reflection in setting up theories for approaching the object of study27.  
While both schools show similarities in their approach as well as in the way they 
specify analytical units, there are differences regarding the role of preferences in 
analytical models. While rational choicers regard preferences as being known, 
exogenous and thus not changeable, historicalists understand them as endogenous, 
meaning that they are not just a feature of the agency, but can be also influenced by the 
institutional framework itself (Thelen 1999: 375). The author points to the necessary 
contextualization of the actors’ attempt to maximize their preferences in both traditions. 
While rational choicers generalize/universalize preferences within a preferably clear 
institutional setup, historicalists draw on the possibilities of intrinsic interactions 
between institutions and actors, resulting in changes in preferences depending on a 
specific context. The third point of divergence between the two traditions relates to what 
Thelen (1999:377) calls “the micro-foundational versus (a) macro-historical research”. 
The major difference behind these ideas is that rational choicers search for a strategic 
behavior of individual or collective actors in a specific institutional (micro-
foundational) setup while historicalists would supposedly research macro(-historical) 
scenarios without asking for a detailed account of strategic behaviour of specific actors. 
What Thelen (1999) means is that when rational choice analysis does not specify 
strategic relations or key players in an analysis, its micro-foundational appeal closely 
resembles the macro-historical research done by historicalists. The concept of agency, 
of identifying the key actors as players (in the rational choice sense), can basically be 
obtained through empirical study, and this resembles the attempt of historicalists to 
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 understand “the way actors and their interests are constituted historically” (Thelen 
1999:178, footnote). The last point of false divergence is based on the matter of 
defining the concept of institution – while rational choicers see institutions as 
functional, coordinational setups, historicalists see them as historical setups, influenced 
by time and actors. Thelen (1999:379) notes that North’s later works (e.g. North, 1991) 
contain a historically embedded comprehension of institutional developments and their 
characteristics applied to various countries. While originally, rational choicers nurtured 
a functional view of institutions based on their focus on individual choices of action, 
some research within the school has gone beyond a “materialist-oriented” analysis of 
social reality, embracing historical elements which would be inherent to the historical 
institutionalism. However, the study of the types of institutionalisms, their differences 
and similarities, points to an interesting element of neo-institutional theories which shall 
be touched on at a later stage in this work – there are “different explanations for how 
norms and culture fit into the analysis of political outcomes” (Thelen 1999:377). 
2.3. Rational Choice and Game Theory as Analytical Tools 
Rational choice can be considered a theory aiming at extensive explanatory power 
though methodologically based on an individual approach instead of a holistic one. For 
the purpose of this thesis, it is necessary to make a few comments on how rationality is 
perceived in neo-institutional rational choice and how the actors behave, or are expected 
to behave, when constellations of interaction are analyzed according to game theoretical 
models28.  
According to Johnson (1993:74), rational choice theorists are primarily “preoccupied 
with determining what rational can mean in the realm of social and political 
interaction”. Notions of rationality are a valuable tool for analyzing the rationality of 
actors in a given social and political set up. While Hobbesian and Machiavellian 
concepts of the rational actor and his/her preferences prevailed at the outset of rational 
choice theory, the perceptions of rationality in positive political theory have their roots 
in Scottish Enlightment thinking and were largely influenced by Hume and his concept 
of instrumental rationality. According to Sugden (1991:754), however, philosophical 
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 perceptions of rationality29 did not remain limited to the idea of rational thinking as in 
Hume, mainly based on the psychologically driven desires of the actor. Perceptions 
behind the idea of rationality as in the neo-institutional rational choice also take Kantian 
premises of a rational actor into consideration. For Kant, so the author (ibid.), rationality 
was deeply related to the individual’s capacity to decide autonomously. The basis for 
rational choice in Kant is no longer explained in psychological terms but using a 
rational term – coherence (ibid.). In rational choice analyses, the concept of rationality 
seems to be above all a functional one, drawing on the materiality of observed reality 
and on the information available to participants in the interaction to help solve the 
puzzle of how stability and political order are generated (Kunz 2004). Other basic 
premises in rational choice theories relate to the existence of a rational actor. The 
rational actor exercises choices based on egoistic interests to maximize their gains, 
limited only by the contextual and institutional frameworks of interaction (ibid: 10). 
Further, rational choice assumes that the rationality of a social actor is something 
inherent to all human beings, and thus detached from cultural, temporal and social 
bounds (ibid.). Rational actors are constantly in contact with other rational actors, 
interacting with the objective of fulfilling their primary interests.  
Among social theories of action, game theory has been a useful tool for social theorists 
to approach interactions of strategic interdependence between actors in the sense that 
the behavior of one actor will exert immediate influence upon the behavior of the other 
actor. According to Johnson (1993:75), game theory is “(…) the most systematic social 
scientific analysis of strategic action” and has been a widely known tool for the logical 
analysis of social and political interactions. Patterns of interaction can fit into different 
formalized analytical tools such as the zero sum game, the chicken game and the 
prisoners´ dilemma, and are formalized tools of political science (Pfetsch 2000:43). 
Though there are critics from other schools of thought regarding game theory because it 
is viewed as a reduction of social relations into mere strategic interaction (ibid.), game 
theory has proved to be a good analytical tool for identifying the preferences of actors 
and predicting their choices and the ultimate outcomes of interaction. The simplicity of 
the logical model, drawn usually upon a 2x2 matrix of interaction between two partners 
may be seen as a weakness of the theory, however methodological steps of 
identification of main actors, preferences and ultimate choices should allow a prediction 
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 of the outcome of the interaction. For the purpose of this thesis, though game theory is 
applied in a range of complex situations, I shall focus on the role of the actors and the 
definition of preferences and their orientations. 
2.3.1. Application of the Theoretical and Analytical Framework to the Case 
Study 
The case study presented here is that of a relationship established between a 
multinational company which produces cellulose from its eucalyptus monocultures in 
the state of Espírito Santo and two different groups – smallholder farmers and 
indigenous communities. The “Forestry Partners” program consists of a contractual 
agreement, which allows both groups to grow eucalyptus trees and sell timber to the 
company, it is a contract under (1) civil law that fits into a wide national institutional 
framework which allows the commercial exchange of private goods and, further, (2) 
under specific forestry law which regulates commercial forestry in general and the 
eucalyptus cultivation in particular. Thus, the contextual and institutional framework 
encompasses the state and its overall regulation mechanisms in the forestry area. 
Through its agents, the state indirectly influences the interaction matrix, which initially 
comprises en gros the two groups of peasants and the company. 
As for the characterization of actors, the company can be considered a corporate actor 
(Scharpf 2006:101), since decisions are made in a top-down manner, dictated by the 
company’s own interests. The company’s agent in this case is the technical advisor of 
the program, who is responsible for signing the contracts with producers in the name of 
the company and is also the person responsible for evaluating the progress of the 
farmers´ plantations. The interests, or expected utility (Kunz 2004: 43), of the company 
seem to be clear: the company hopes to be able to produce more timber to its 
established standards by “borrowing” land from third parties and it hopes to achieve a 
broader moral acceptance in the region by involving the local rural population in the 
production of timber, giving them the impression of sharing a common objective of 
striving for economic benefits and social and environmental sustainability. 
Farmers and indigenous peoples seem to have an interest in achieving economic 
benefits. The social and political reality of both groups on the one hand and the nature 
of the contractual agreement on the other point to the fact that farmers will only 
cooperate individually with the company, while the indigenous communities Tupinikim 
and Guarani negotiated and entered into the contract as a collective actor. The two 
groups differ essentially from one another as regards their cultural background. The 
 smallholder farmers in the hill country of the state of Espírito Santo are for the most 
part descendants of German immigrants brought to the region in the peak of the 
economic cycle of coffee production in Brazil. The Tupinikim community has been 
living in the state since times immemorial, having been joined by the Guarani over 40 
years ago, when these arrived in the region, having come by foot all the way from the 
southern part of Brazil. Initially though, their interests seem to be the same: both groups 
seek to maximize their gains by planting trees on potentially infertile or unused ground. 
Through its forestry policies and regulation agencies, the state opens up the juridical 
and institutional possibilities for such partnerships to come into being and thus 
promotes such interactions´ constellations. General government guidelines in the 
forestry sector are provided by the Ministry of the Environment (port. MMA), at 
operational level, by (1) the overall agency for the management of natural resources 
(port. IBAMA), and (2) the agency of property regulation INCRA (National Institute of 
Colonization and Agrarian Reform). At state level, the IDAF exerts a direct influence 
on the management of natural and planted forests, as well as evaluating agreements 
between companies and communities. Regarding indigenous communities, the IDAF 
has no such powers. Since the indigenous in general are directly under the tutelage of 
the federal government, the National Indigenous Foundation (port. FUNAI) is the only 
government agency suitable to serve as mediator between communities and companies. 
Overall, the pattern of governance observed in the forestry sector in the state of Espírito 
Santo is that of the regulated self-regulation, as proposed by Knill/Lehmkuhl (2002), 
mentioned in chapter 1. That is to say, government regulation seems to follow (1) clear 
patterns as to the policies that allow the growth of commercial forestry under specific 
circumstances, such as the protection of existing native trees in the state, and (2) clear 
mechanisms for evaluating forestry activities by the IDAF. 
The diagram below shows (1) the actors and contextual/institutional elements involved 
in the constellation of commercial agreements between companies and other groups in 
the forestry sector. It (2) differentiates between their levels of influence: the bold arrows 
indicate direct influence and the dotted arrows, indirect influences between actors.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Still, not all the relationships shown above are of interest in this thesis, although indirect 
relationships between actors are certainly significant in predicting the outcome of the 
partnership. Returning to a logical analysis of partnerships between the three main 
actors in our study – the company, smallholder farmers and indigenous communities – 
and applying our theoretical framework, the analysis is as follows: 
The arrows show the interaction between the actors, which is determined by individual 
(in the case of smallholder farmers), aggregate (in the case of indigenous communities), 
and corporate (in the case of the company) preferences and interests (Schapf 2006:95 et 
State mechanisms of governance in the forestry sector developed throughout 
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 sqq.). Detailed information on the actors` preferences and interests shall be provided in 
chapter 5, where the neo-institutional rational choice approach is applied to the specific 
relational interaction between those actors in the context of Espírito Santo.  
For now, it is sufficient to establish a clear idea of the relationship between the case we 
are analyzing here and the theoretical and analytical framework, considering the 
existence of interests and relationships between the actors as illustrated above. 
Conclusion 
The aim of the previous and present chapters was the introduction of the theoretical and 
analytical framework of this thesis and their application to the specific case study to be 
analyzed. Chapter 1 lays the theoretical foundation by responding to the question as to 
what kinds of governance patterns have been emerging between state and non-state 
actors, especially in sectors related to the economics of natural resources. Chapter 2 
presents two neo-institutionalist schools relevant for this study, discussing in further 
detail aspects of rational choice theories such as rationality and preferences. It aims to 
connect theory and practice, as observed in the state of Espírito Santo.  
The next four chapters deal with the theoretical framework of governance and the 
analytical framework of neo-institutional rational choice and game theory applied to 
Brazil in general and to the state of Espírito Santo in particular. From a governance 
point of view, chapters 3 and 4 explain the role of the state in conducting the 
liberalization and democratization process in the 1990s (chapter 3) and the evolution of 
forestry policies (chapter 4) allowing new mechanisms of governance to emerge in the 
forestry sector. Chapter 5 and 6 apply the knowledge gathered in chapters 3 and 4 to the 
discussion of chapters 1 and 2 so as to understand the specific relationships between the 
actors engaged in the “Forestry Partners” Program.  
 CHAPTER 3 - THE BRAZILIAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the Brazilian political framework in a historical 
perspective by giving an overview of the economic and political features of the 
formation of the nation state mainly after the promulgation of the republic in 1889, 
covering the two large periods of dictatorship and reaching the nineteen nineties which 
brought with them the country’s economic consolidation through market liberalization 
and the redemocratization. Though the outline of political and economic characteristics 
in this work dates back to 1889, the history of forestry policies can be traced back to 
colonial and imperial Brazil and the next chapter will touch on this topic. For the 
purpose of this work, this chapter aims to present the political framework of the 
Brazilian context, shedding light on the evolution of the state and its role. The aim of 
the chapter is to introduce the political and economic features of the country’s formation 
and to show that the liberalization of the economy in the 1990s led to a certain 
rearrangement of the roles and purposes of the state, opening possibilities for the 
emergence of private-public partnerships and other efforts of consortial decision-
making between public and private actors30. 
Since a thorough analysis of Brazil’s economic history exceeds the scope of this paper, 
the general idea is to offer an explanation of the political and economic setting that 
shaped forestry policies in the past centuries. 
For the purpose of this work, chapters 3, 4, and 5 shall mirror the structure of chapters 1 
and 2, to improve the cohesion of the work as a whole and give a better insight into the 
case study from a neo-institutional point of view. While this chapter highlights 
democratization and liberalization as elements that enhance new governance 
possibilities in Brazil, chapter 4 offers a historical panorama of forestry policies, 
indicating options for interaction between state and non-state actors in the forestry 
sector. Finally, chapter 5 studies the target case from a rational choice game theoretical 
point of view, detailing the preferences and choice patterns of the actors involved.  
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 We shall see in the next chapter that the cellulose production sector benefited from establishment of a 
Brazilian agro-industrial complex (henceforth AIC) up until the re-democratization (Andrade/Dias 2003). The 
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out. 
 
 3.1. The Brazilian Political Context in an Historical Perspective  
The federative republic of Brazil is the fourth largest democracy in the world in terms of 
population31 and ranks among the ten largest economies in the world today. Over the 
508 years of its formal existence, the country has experienced three types of political 
regimes. Having been under colonial rule until 1822, it became a free empire until the 
proclamation of the republic in 1889. Under coalition rule by agrarian elites until the 
coup d’etat of 1930, the country remained the under civilian dictatorship of Getúlio 
Vargas until 1937, then democratically electing the same dictator who stayed in power 
up to 1945. The democratic intermezzo lasted until 1964 when the country fell under 
military rule, coming peacefully to redemocratization 20 years after, in 1985. The 
political shifts in Brazil have doubtless had a major influence on the political and 
economic development of the country.  
The real appropriation by the Portuguese of what is today Brazilian territory occurred 
some thirty years after the arrival of the first ships from Portugal on April 22, 1500. The 
year 1530 marks the beginning of effective exploration of the land and resources by the 
Portuguese crown. When reached by Portuguese ships under the Crown’s mandate to 
search for the enlargement of commercial alternatives, the territory that is today called 
Brazil served largely as a source of raw materials, spices, and minerals. It was not 
planned to colonize the area having permanent settlement in mind. The first settlers 
reported on the richness of the territory and its inhabitants. The policy of exploring the 
resources was accompanied by a minor investment in the settlement and infrastructure 
of the land (Holanda apud Zimmermann 2004: 72). In the first colonial years, the 
extraction of timber and other natural resources served to mitigate the economic crisis in 
the recently formed nation states of the Iberian Peninsula. The regulation of raw 
material extraction was ordered directly from Portugal and, in the years to follow, the 
colony’s administrative apparatus would be solely be geared to the provision of goods 
for the European markets. The history of the first hundred years of the country’s 
existence witnessed the formation of a small agrarian elite, representing the Portuguese 
Crown overseas. The economy was at first largely based on the exploration of one 
particular type of timber, whose red color was used to dye textiles. It was abundantly 
found in the Atlantic biome along the Brazilian coast, which is almost inexistent today – 
and Brazil owes its name to it (Bernecker 2000:28). 
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Hagopian in Almond, Gabriel A./ Powell Jr., G. Bingham, (eds.). 1996. Comparative Politics Today – a world 
view. New York: Harper Collins, 556-607. 
 The political system in colonial times was largely based on the exploration of natural 
resources in the territories distributed in 1532 by the Portuguese sovereign Dom João III 
to 15 nobles of his court – the so called capitanias hereditárias32 which represented the 
first division of the territory in 15 horizontal land strips: some of the actual states have 
retained the name and position given to them at that time (see Caldeira 1997:24).  
Along with the appropriation of territory came the establishment of social relations with 
the aboriginal population. The well-known Brazilian sociologist Freyre constructed a 
scheme for analyzing the initial social relations in colonial Brazil. In his “Casa Grande e 
Senzala”, the pictorial representation of the social relations between agrarian elites and 
the slavery system pretends to sociologically legitimate the harmony of the system by 
demonstrating intra-societal relations at a cane mill.  
For Zimmermann (2004), the composition of society in Brazil, unlike other colonies, 
was strongly influenced by the colonists from the Iberian Peninsula. He points out 
(based on Freyre and Holanda, see Zimmermann 2004: 71) that there are authors that 
defend the thesis that the origins, the character, the institutions, the state and the 
balance of powers of/within the Brazilian society are grounded in the Iberian 
tradition33. North (1991:110) reaffirms this idea by stating that the Iberian “conquerors 
imposed a uniform religion and a uniform bureaucratic administration on an already 
existing agricultural society” which lasted far longer than the political independency of 
the Latin American states. Other authors see the political system in Brazil not as a 
reflection/the image of the Portuguese system but as something born out of the special 
political and social circumstances in the early colonial times (see Lamounier 2005). 
Colonial rule was replaced by a political arrangement between the crown and its heir, 
bringing about the independence of the country in 1822. This formal arrangement 
secured the power of the agrarian elites and drew the ultimate frontiers of the empire.  
The period between 1822 and 1889 is characterized by the emergence of republican 
parties and abolitionist forces. The republican state was founded in 1889 – unbeknown 
to the Brazilian people. At the dawn of the twentieth century, the so-called “Old 
Republic” that replaced the monarchy managed to dictate a specific political rhythm in 
the country, characterized by the political and economic supremacy of the south-eastern 
region over the other regions. The southeast region, where the capital of the country – 
                                                 
32
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 In the original: “andere Authoren vertreten die These, dass der Ursprung, der Charakter, die Institutionen, der 
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 Rio de Janeiro at the time – was located, was able to channel its economic power 
(coffee production and cattle breeding) into political power, being supported by social 
mechanisms of coercion such as patronalism and caudillismo. This era was soon 
overcome by the dictatorship of Vargas, who in spite of populist maneuvers to 
legitimize his power, extended suffrage to all citizens of 18 years of age, including 
women, introduced labor laws, and launched the industrialization process in Brazil.  
According to Lamounier (2005), the Vargas era saw Brazil grow from a nation defined 
by archaic oligarchic bonds of power and social cohesion to a nation preparing for the 
modernization of its own means of production and the establishment of networks of 
power beyond the politics of the three traditional political centers of what had been the 
Old Republic: an exchange of power, benefits, and political influence between the 
federal states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul. Still, Lamounier 
affirms that the country had not yet faced a “true democratic question” (2005:134) since 
the Old Republic officially lasted from the promulgation of the republic in 188934 until 
the so-called Revolution of 1930, a military coup catalyzed by the armed forces that 
brought the governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul in the South of the country, 
Getúlio Vargas, to the seat of the federal government in Rio de Janeiro. 
At his time, Vargas embodied features of a true weberian charismatic leader, who might 
have officially inaugurated the concept of populism in Brazil. His legacy to the political 
system and to the election of the presidents to come was the strong plebiscitary appeal 
of his governing style, favored by the fact that even during the dictatorship of the 
Estado Novo, the voting pool was enhanced enormously because of the inclusion of 
women in the political arena after the promulgation of the Constitution in 1934. 
To summarize the political features of this period, Vargas was able to architect a strong 
executive based on a largely fragmented and consequently weak party constellation 
ranging from right-wing federalists to communists, unevenly represented throughout the 
country. Special features of the political environment of the time were the politicized 
media as the source of information for the general public and highly politicized armed 
forces. They had a self-given mandate of zeal for the “honor of the country” (Lamounier 
2005) which made itself noticed in the political sphere at a later stage of the country’s 
history. Vargas relied on the broad support of other elites before coming to power and 
throughout his dictatorship. Though initially reticent about the administrative capacity 
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 This was a political arrangement between the local elites with the consent of the monarch to rescue the 
political structure of the state in spite of the failing monarchy – a top-down initiative without the consent and the 
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 of the getulist state, the emerging business class, which was supported by incoming 
foreign investments, ended up supporting his government, which sealed the transition 
from an agro-exporting society to an urban-industrial one (Diniz 2003:67). At this point 
in Brazilian history, the state incorporated the function and responsibility for the 
economic progress of the country, delivering incentives for investments in many 
industrial sectors, such as energy. By regulating the industrial sector and creating the 
legal and institutional means for workers to politically organize themselves under its 
own auspices, the state was making a political pact with both social groups. The 
monopoly of the state in delivering essential services and in managing natural resources, 
such as minerals and water reservoirs, were established in the federal constitution, 
which paved the way for the centralization of decision-making in political economy in 
the hands of the (dictatorial) governments to come.  
Vargas´ final successor, Juscelino Kubitschek, could not count on the popularity that 
was linked to the personality of Getúlio Vargas, but his government showed signs of 
continuing to promote Vargas´ nationalist and developmentalist ideals. The construction 
of Brasília as the new capital and the transfer of the federal government to the middle of 
the country signalized that the aim of the new government to “regain” power over the 
whole territory, and the construction of transportation infrastructure along and through 
forest areas of the Amazon region, such as the pharaonic Belém-Brasília highway, 
showed both the project of integrating the Amazon region into the production network 
already established in the South and Southeast and maintaining the region as an 
attractive source of raw materials for foreign markets (Becker 2004). 
The democratic intermezzo that preceded the military dictatorship of 1964 was 
characterized by the resurgence of a plurality of intellectual poles in many cities like 
Recife, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, for instance, openly rethinking the destiny of the 
country35. The economic boost at the outset of industrialization in the country in the 
1930s was succeeded by a slump in economic growth in the ´50s and ´60s which 
promoted political instability. As the government of João Goulart, elected after 
Juscelino Kubitschek36, had proven to be aligned with more socialist government 
structures, there was enough evidence in the eyes of the conservative forces as well as in 
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 After Juscelino Kubitschek, Jânio Quadros was elected to presidency, staying in office for 6 months. 
 those of international observers to convince the social collective of the “reddening” of 
the country’s political elites, which had to be suppressed.  
If the end of the democratic period in Brazil was really due to its economic failures and 
consequent political instability, the military intervention that led to military dictatorship 
seems to have been almost inevitable37.  
All in all, two characteristics can be said to have marked the instauration of the military 
dictatorship. Firstly, it had the large support of the urban middle classes and, secondly, 
the putsch relied on the ultimate discursive justification that the aim of the military 
forces was that of finally freeing the country from corruption (Lamounier 2005). The 
General Castello Branco assumed power after the coup that overthrew the populist 
president João Goulart in 1964. There were substantial internal conflicts within the 
military cadres about how to proceed when they came to power. When the cadres 
assumed power, there was no architected short or long term political project for the 
country (see Lamounier 2005)38. Those sectors of society that ultimately stood for the 
coup would later value the benefits of the regime to the industrial consolidation of the 
country. In the end, the creation of a broad industrial and transportation infra-structure 
allowed the government to claim, at last, its sovereignty and power over the remotest 
corners of the Brazilian territory.  
The military dictatorship, though initially internally unorganized and externally weak, 
constituted a rupture of the constitutional order of Brazil. The depth of this rupture 
became evident at the latest after the radicalization of the regime in 1968, through 
Institutional Act 5, which is frequently referred to in Brazilian history and which 
withdrew all political and civil rights and imposed severe censorship on the Brazilian 
press. Nonetheless, in the institutional sphere, some continuity could still be recognized: 
the maintenance of electoral processes for secondary posts within the national 
bureaucracy and the – sometimes artificial – maintenance of a two party system. The 
existence of a party system during the years of the dictatorship certainly contributed to 
some civil mobilization during the transitional years from dictatorship to democracy in 
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 the early eighties. Another institutional continuity of major political significance was 
the maintenance of the federalist organizational structure of the country and the 
maintenance of the political importance of the state governors39. The historical political 
force of state executives and its importance as a pillar of civilian representation in the 
country was evidently overseen by the regime. The strategic error of allowing direct 
elections for governorship in the capitals of the states at the beginning of the eighties, 
where the opposition was able to regain concrete political power, served as a catalyst for 
the transition.  
The outset of democratization in Brazil was discouraging for many and led to 
speculations that a transition to civilian power was indeed impossible. Tancredo Neves, 
the first civilian to be elected by the dictatorial election board to take over the 
presidency in 1985, died before assuming office, and his vice president José Sarney, a 
member of the former dictatorship party, assumed the presidency up to the direct 
presidential elections in 1989.  
The end of the eighties marked the beginning of the liberalization of the Brazilian state 
and economy. Fernando Collor de Melo, the first directly elected president, would take 
the first institutional steps at the beginning of the nineties that paved the way for the 
commercial opening of the country. This process would be finalized some years later, 
by the end of the second mandate of the former dependence theorist, Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, in 2002.  
3.2. The Brazilian Economic Liberalization in the Nineties and its Implications  
As seen in the previous section, the Brazilian economic development is historically 
related to market demands on the one hand, having been driven throughout history by 
cycles either of exploration of natural resources such as water, timber and minerals or 
by the cultivation of raw products for consumption primarily in foreign markets. On the 
other hand, economic development was one of the legitimizing pillars of the state and it 
was the sphere in which governments historically demonstrated their executive power 
and their political projects for the country. 
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 The economic cycles that were exhausted from colonial times until the end of the Old 
Republic/beginning of the first civil dictatorship in 1930 were the ones of wood along 
the coast, gold in the south-eastern hinterland, sugar cane in the Northeast, rubber in the 
North, and coffee in the Southeast. All economic cycles brought with them social 
consequences which cannot be underestimated40.  
During the Vargas era of 1930 to 1945, state-based developmentalism served as a pillar 
for his populist government, and during the second dictatorship in 1964, the military 
intensified the relationship between the state and the economy. Their economic policies 
were successfully sustained by the concerted decision of three specific actors: national 
businesses/industries, international businesses/industries, and the state itself (Diniz, 
2003:67). The redemocratization of the country, induced by the military regime itself, 
brought with it the serious questioning of a state-based development. At the end of the 
eighties, the challenge of market globalization and the serious consideration of the 
criteria established by the World Bank and the IMF began to be incorporated in both 
conservative and social democrat political agendas. Still, the state as a monopolist of 
main industry sectors and the most important provider of essential services had 
remained so in the definitive text of the first promulgated constitution after 
redemocratization, dated October 1988.  
We must bear in mind that the rearrangement of political forces to start commercial 
liberalization was neither the country’s first initiative towards, nor its first contact with 
massive foreign capital and investments in the industrial sector. The age after Vargas 
also witnessed the presence of multinationals in the Brazilian industrial pool, though not 
yet in the services sector. The existence of direct foreign investments in the industrial 
sector fitted in with the politics of economic progress of the dictatorial regime (Garcia 
2004: 15). Diniz (2003) mentions the role of the industrial sector in supporting the 
coalition that overthrew João Goulart with the aim of establishing a type of 
development his social and populist aims would not be able to bring about. As the 
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 military’s economic project began to fail in the 1970s, for internal reasons such as the 
government’s insufficient administrative resources to maintain the strategy of import 
substitution and for external reasons such as the oil crisis, the industrial class began 
urging for market-driven regulation of Brazilian economy41. In the 1990s, constitutional 
reforms that were necessary for restructuring the economic order and putting an end to 
state monopolies in the service sector were launched by the Collor government suffered 
under political stagnation during Itamar Franco’s transitional government, and were 
finally completed in a record time of 125 days (Garcia 2004: 65), during the second year 
of Cardoso´s mandate.  
The difficult economic situation of the country at the end of the dictatorship and its low 
credibility with international financing institutions seemed to demand the restructuring 
of economic policies in general and seemed, further, to require a commitment to 
political liberalization along with the liberalization of markets. The compliance with the 
macro-economic principles of what from then on became known as the Washington 
Consensus of 1989 was initiated at the beginning of President Collor’s government. The 
principles set by the representatives of the international community and financial 
agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF and the Inter-American Development Bank 
touched the core of the macro-economic setup of the country. The Brazilian economic 
liberalization benefited from, and was probably also strongly influenced by, the 
international liberalization wave at the end of the eighties caused by the transformation 
of many eastern-european economies. The end of dictatorships in the Latin American 
context equally speeded up the effect of commercial liberalization among Brazil’s 
neighboring countries (Guimarães 1995, 22). The country’s economic policies in the 
past decades had been based on import substitution, the imposition of tariff barriers and 
governmental incentives which aimed at reducing the costs of overall investment and 
production costs (Guimarães 1995:3). The incorporation of advice from the 
international community into the Brazilian economic agenda demanded substantial 
transformations at an institutional and juridical level, which had already been tentatively 
initiated during President Sarney´s government, through its Nova Política Industrial, 
coming to pass already in 1988.  
The economic policy, and above all the industrial policy of President Collor de Melo’s 
government, can be considered a turning point in industrial politics in the country. 
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 According to Guimarães (1995:4), the central axis moved from an investment in 
productive capacity to an investment in competitiveness. The idea was to push Brazilian 
industries into competition against each other and in foreign markets by offering 
technological incentives and reducing market protection. This reduction in market 
protection would be achieved through the “reconstitution of customary tariffs as the 
basic protection [and regulation] instrument” (Guimarães 1995:4-5, my translation). 
One of the measures at juridical level to assure this dynamic was, for instance, the 
abrogation of the conceptual distinction between national and foreign businesses under 
Brazilian law. Another major reform, started at juridical level, was the slow attempt to 
increase competition in oligopolized sectors such as energy and telecommunications, 
among others (ibid:6).  
Itamar Franco’s cabinet did not impose major changes to the political course already 
defined during Collor´s presidency. From 1992 to 1994, the idea of commercial 
liberalization seemed to be accepted as inevitable and the probability of its full 
implementation in the short term was assured by the nomination of the sociologist 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso as Finance Minister in 1994. His policy of stabilizing the 
economy by introducing what was termed the Real Plan, which brought the Brazilian 
currency in line with the U.S. Dollar, ended up being the most successful instrument of 
controlling the high inflation rate and paved the way for Cardoso´s candidacy for 
president national elections of the same year.  
During Cardoso´s eight-year presidency, economic liberalization was completed from a 
legal and institutional point of view. His most significant achievement regarding 
economic restructuring was to pass the constitutional amendments that made the 
privatization of national industries possible42. Intra-parliamentarian cohesion would not 
have been one of the main influences on the necessary constitutional amendments 
passed in 1995 had it not been for the constant pressure exerted on government by lobby 
groups from the industrial sector with the purpose of influencing voting sections in 
parliament in favor of commercial opening and equal treatment of national and foreign 
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 Specialists agree that Cardoso was able to aggregate a rare majority in congress, though he achieved this 
by negotiating political favors, which gave him the necessary votes to change the constitution. However, the 
fast implementation of his cabinet’s ambition was only possible by recurring to so-called “provisional 
measures”. This institutional tool available to him as the head of the executive, a presidency’s governing tool 
inherited from the times of dictatorship, made it possible to literally push congress, with its many other 
interests, to vote for the necessary amendments during his first mandate. As the head of the executive branch, 
Cardoso abused of his power of editing “provisional measures”, bills of law which actually have the legal 
power of a law for a period of 30 days (which can be extended for another 30 days), and must then be 
debated and approved by congress within a given time frame. Though “provisional measures” were meant for 
a possible state of emergency, over 5.000 of them were edited during Cardosos´ two mandates – a clear sign 
of the executive’s supremacy in legislative matters.  
 companies under the law. The third major catalyst for the commercial reopening of the 
country was the ideologically laden belief in a new liberal Brazil, unable to defeat the 
consequences of globalization, unprepared for international commercial competition 
and, above all, eager to win the confidence of foreign investors and the international 
community in general (see Garcia 2004). 
The privatization of major national companies such as the mineral company Vale do Rio 
Doce had a split repercussion among the population in key cities of the country. The 
selling of stocks of national companies to foreign companies which were allowed to 
borrow government money for that purpose through the Brazilian development bank 
BNDES43 was seen as a betrayal and a threat to the sovereignty of the state. Massive 
discontentment with the lack of improvement in the overall employment situation, the 
financial ruin of small and medium businesses that were unable to survive in the 
suddenly competitive national market in the nineties, and the difficult economic 
situation at the end of the decade, with the crises on the Mexican, Asian, and later on 
Russian, stock markets presented Cardoso with a difficult and, on the whole, less 
successful second term. 
After eight years in presidency, Cardosos´ PSDB and its coalition stepped down from 
power. The colorful coalition between the Laborers’ Party PT and liberal parties won 
the national elections of 2002, bringing the ex-metal worker Luís Inácio Lula da Silva to 
the presidential office. The economic course set from1990 to 1998 was faithfully 
followed by Lula’s cabinet and thus, the Brazilian economic agenda was characterized 
by high continuity during the first socialist term. 
Overall, the state was able to introduce major elements of a thorough state reform in the 
political agenda during the nineties, one of these being the rationalization of public 
spending through the privatization of national companies and thus a break with the 
state’s discretionary power over the country’s industrial sector. 
Conclusion 
The nineties saw a major shift in the state’s role as a provider of common services and 
in the governmental agenda regarding the industry sector in general. Economic 
liberalization had the following consequences for the national industrial sector: the 
pursuit of increased autonomy by reducing fiscal incentives and the attempt to improve 
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 the productive system by means of institutional regulation of internal and external 
competitiveness (Guimarães 1995). 
The economic liberalization gave rise to improvements in the overall political scenario. 
The nineties can be recalled as the decade of reconciliation between international and 
national economic agents, partly because of changes to the recent Constitution that 
altered the status of state industrial monopolies and allowed economic regulation 
throughout the market and partly due to the acceptance of cooperation with financial 
institutions such as the IMF as a political sign of adherence to international rules of 
governance in times of globalization (Lamounier 2005:201). 
Still, major difficulties in implementing the new economic policy agenda during this 
decade had to do with the slow process of redemocratization of overall political 
structures and the difficulty of identifying “new political instruments (…) adequate to 
the new pattern of industrial growth” in Brazil and the inexistence of governmental 
agencies that were already prepared to evaluate the implications of the commercial 
liberalization in each sector of the economy and to propose proactive adequacies for 
eventual course corrections (Guimarães 1995:25, my translation).  
Nevertheless, the rathe unharmonious path towards democratization and liberalization 
created new possibilities of interaction in the political and economic field for state and 
non-state actors. The next chapter shall examine the evolution of this political and 
institutional context in the forestry sector, paving the way for a discussion of company-
community partnerships in chapter 5. 
 CHAPTER 4 - FORESTRY POLICIES IN BRAZIL AND ESPÍRITO SANTO 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to offer a panorama over the use of forestry and natural resources and 
its incremental regulation over the past centuries. Though records of forestry use for 
various purposes can be found in Brazilian historiography and are also present in 
textbooks, little information seems to be available about the real amount of damage 
caused to nature after the arrival of the Portuguese colonists in 1500. Few faithful 
reports can be drawn on as sources testifying to the actual condition of forests at the 
beginning of the first economic cycle – that of the Pau-brasil – in 1503. The idea of this 
chapter is to show how forestry regulation came into being. It identifies path 
dependence as far as the exploration of national resources is concerned. The myth of 
natural abundance, the (until now) little known resources of the Amazon region and the 
investment in a sequence of monocultures to satisfy external markets shaped man’s 
relationship with nature over the last centuries. This chapter will briefly touch on the 
development of forest use and legislation from colonial times onward, trying to 
establish a historical sequence leading through imperial times, independence, Old 
Republic, dictatorship and recent improvements after the promulgation of the 
democratic constitution of 1988 and the wave of valuation of environmental issues in 
the 90s. The most recent developments in forestry legislation, particularly since 2000, 
show that the country continues to favour economic surpluses that can be extracted from 
the use of natural resources, though the aspect of resources´ management seems to have 
moved to the foreground and the aspect of sustainability has found its place on the 
government’s agenda. Efforts have been made to include communities, non-
governmental organizations and other private partners in the management of natural 
resources on a normative level as well. This chapter will also tackle the issue of the 
efforts of the state of Espírito Santo to cope with the challenges of including (1) the 
population’s participation and (2) the sustainability of forestry management in its 
political agenda. 
4.1. Forestry Policies in Brazil: 1500-1822 
As already mentioned, the first contact of the Portuguese with the nature and the 
inhabitants of the New World named by the lorrainian cosmograph Waldseemüller after 
the florentine Amerigo Vespucci – America – marks the beginning of mainstream 
 Brazilian historiography, and, with the arrival of the Portuguese, first efforts were made 
to map natural resources in order to draw up an inventory of the new property of the 
crown (Bernecker 2000:29). 
The origins of the relationship between man and the environment in Brazil were 
mediated by the initial conclusion of the Portuguese colonists that there was no 
aboriginal high culture in the “new grounds” with which they could exchange goods. 
Nor was it possible to identify whether there were any valuable minerals or other 
materials of interest in the new territory44. However, the first expeditions to explore the 
coastal territory, covered by what would later be called the Atlantic forest offered the 
newcomers a glimpse of the territory they were about to claim. In a comprehensive 
study on the timber market in colonial Brazil, Miller (2000) points out that the first 
natural resource in the new territory that was viewed as a commodity was timber, in 
particular brazilwood, which grew in abundance, and other hardwoods such as the 
durable jatobás, giant jequitibás and the extremely strong massarandubas, precious 
woods used in ship construction45. He adds that “the real value of Brazil’s colonial 
forests consisted in its hundreds of timber species that were entirely new to Europeans, 
scores of which were stronger, larger, more durable and beautiful than any timbers 
available in temperate Europe or North America” (ibid:2)46.  
The image and significance of Brazil had the symbolic force of its economic value for 
external markets. What brought Brazil to life as a political unit was ironically its 
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 Soon after its frigates arrived in the tropics, the Portuguese crown was informed of the abundance of unknown 
species of trees as well as the ‘qualities’ of the natural environment and the native population. Perhaps one of the 
most emblematic testimonies to the first colonizers´ astonishment at the new land was the famous letter of Pero 
Vaz de Caminha, a royal scribe to the king, after the arrival of the Portuguese caravels on the coast of Salvador. 
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 An almost complete record of the noble woods explored exclusively by the crown during colonial times (1500-
1822) and their usages can be found in Miller (2000:238-252). 
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 Of course, the first Portuguese settlers around 1530 could not have made a realistic evaluation regarding any 
dimension of the new territory. However, its virtues were to be publicized in order to legitimize the exploration 
of the new territory. In this connection, colonial chroniclers played a significant role in the establishment of 
Brazil as a place of exotic beauty, on the one hand, and on the other, a source of inestimable economic value for 
the crown. While some narratives, for instance those regarding the dimensions of trees and the diversity of fruits 
and animals, were close to reality, others combined exotic elements of the tropics with mythical ones, creating 
the idea of having discovered a Garden of Eden. The creation of myths by early settlers and clerical workers 
responsible for the civilization of the New World in their daily life narratives seems to contrast with the crude 
notion of Brazil as a great pot of natural treasures to be explored. What may have appeared as a paradox actually 
had a complementary character. In fact, the picture of Brazil as a source of new empirical knowledge about the 
world for humanists and as a source of quick profit for merchants represents the two sides of the same coin. The 
idea behind both discourses was that of stimulating possession of the unknown, of the still “unposessed”, of the 
expansion of Portuguese power. Ultimately, both the renaissance and the mercantilist discourses formed the 
basis for the initial exploration of South American territory and for the extraction of the first marketable goods 
from the colony: timber. The religious ideology of the Catholic Church was discursively ruled out by the 
outstanding economic meaning of those new grounds for the Portuguese crown. The land that had been initially 
named Terra de Santa Cruz, recalling the importance of the church as the civilizing power, was renamed after the 
product that gave rise to the first economic boom in the colony – Brazil. 
 concrete importance to European trade. In the words of Pádua (1992:19, my 
translation), “the foundational act of Brazil was, therefore, a project of predatory 
exploration of nature – and this stigma encroached upon its own name”47.  
In Portugal, the idea of conservation of forestry resources as well as the protection of 
animals and water reservoirs had already been considered in legal documents such as 
the “Ordenações Afonsinas” and “Ordenações Manoelinas” of the fourteenth century 
(Nazo/Mukai 2001:77). The first measure taken by the Portuguese to legislate over 
natural resources in the New World was the edition of the Regimento of 1605 – 75 years 
after the first Portuguese settlements in Brazil, the crown approved this document 
dealing with the regulation of general timber extraction in new territories. The idea 
behind the document was partly to conserve trees in the new territory – the Portuguese 
forests had historically suffered from devastation – and also to establish a legal 
framework for its extraction and utilization. Miller (2000: 49) affirms that the “1605 
Regimento would remain in effect after Brazil’s independence”, though initially 
defining conditions and limitations for the king’s monopoly of this noble natural 
resource. 
As Portugal largely extended its legal framework to the colony, it claimed possession of 
the new lands, ordering its defense against Dutch and French colonial powers. Though 
Brazilian timber had soon been rated as being of higher quality and thus a potential 
source of immediate profit for the crown, the Portuguese claimed a monopoly on all 
species that were considered valuable for construction and security after 1652 (Miller 
2000:18). These were protected “by law”, later to be referred to as “timber under the 
law”. The “madeiras de lei” (“timber under the law”) were inventoried and the latter 
introduction of the so-called “plans” of 1799-1800, royal recommendations regarding 
timber harvesting, came to act as codes of conduct for producers and landowners in 
dealing with public property (Miller 2000:55).  
The regime of so-called donatary capitaincies, established for the purpose of a better 
governance of the colony in 1532 (Bernecker 2000:36), brought with it the colonization 
of the hinterland, the discovery of other treasuries such as precious metals, the 
domination of other indigenous tribes, and investments in agriculture. According to 
Bernecker (2000) the model of capitaincies and the legal mode of land leasing which 
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 Pádua, an intellectual of ecological politics in Brazil, writes a lucid analysis of the relationship between man 
and nature in Brazil since its supposed “discovery” by the Portuguese. In the original he states that „O ato 
fundador do Brasil, portanto, foi um projeto de exploração predatória da natureza – e esse estigma está 
entranhado em seu próprio nome”. 
 was put forward by the Portuguese crown (ibid: 36) represented a transition from a 
medieval governance mechanism, similar to the feudal distribution of land, to a modern-
day state administration. One characteristic of this interfacial regime of land distribution 
in the colony was, for instance, the crown’s freedom to revoke donations to captains if 
they failed to conform with management rules, although donatary capitaincies were to 
be inherited – a characteristic of modern state intervention.  
As early as the mid-eighteenth century, the extraction of brazilwood was already 
seriously threatened by the real scarcity of timber supplies on the coast (Resende 
2006:26, Bernecker 2000:44). The regions most severely affected by the extraction of 
timber were the coasts ranging from the northeast of the country to the capitaincies of 
Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo at the southeastern coast. The existence of ports and the 
ease of transporting timber from the coast of Brazil to Europe transformed the coastal 
forests into the most attractive extractivist reservoirs in the first years of colonization.  
However, according to Miller (2000), the extraction of timber from the Atlantic coast 
alone could not have caused as much damage as was stated in later times. The author 
offers good arguments based on primary documents that testify to the difficulty for 
merchants to penetrate the dense coastal forests constantly menaced by natural threats 
and by not always friendly native inhabitants. Much destruction was caused by the 
farmers themselves, who had the incumbency of populating new grounds and 
establishing agriculture upon them. The crown, showing poor managerial skills in 
dealing with recently discovered natural resources on colonial territory and overtaken 
by royal avarice, determined that the harvest of madeiras de lei should be done at the 
crown’s service, even on private property and solely by registered fellers. Individual 
landowners were not allowed to commercialize madeiras de lei and were not to utilize 
them except on a small scale for their own domestic needs, for example to construct 
fences or mills (for these purposes, they were charged lower rates for the timber 
utilized). The possession of timber under the law thus meant that landowners had to 
cope with the damage caused by registered fellers entering their land to harvest without 
receiving compensation for the harm caused to existing crops or other trees that were 
utilized on the property. Further, the crown’s control upon the madeiras and their right 
to “invade” land to obtain them constituted a direct and violent intervention of the 
crown in the settlers’ lives. Finally, the necessity of expanding borders for agriculture 
provided a good incentive for clearing land by setting fire to trees. As a result, after 
obtaining possession of lands, landowners would destroy everything that could be 
 reclaimed by the crown as theirs. Miller (2000:8) points out that “the destruction in 
Brazil was uncommon as a direct consequence of Portuguese forest policy, which 
provided no incentives for conservation, few opportunities for timbering profits, and 
every stimulus for landowners to destroy what, by decree, did not belong to them”. 
The commodification of nature went beyond the first years of effective colonization 
efforts and its initial damage to forests. In the mid-1500s, a sugar monoculture had 
already become the dominant cultivating mode in colonial Brazil and ensured the 
metropolis high revenues in the main cities since the production was almost entirely 
destined for consumption in European markets (Bernecker 2000:42). The region which 
was first utilized for the cultivation of sugar cane (and, later, for coffee production) 
belongs to a biome called “the Atlantic forest biome”, of which less than 10% of its 
original area48 is left today. Three capitaincies, those of São Vicente, Rio de Janeiro in 
the southeast, and Pernambuco in the northeastern succeeded in starting what was later 
termed the“sugar cycle”, but the pau-brasil economy continued to be the most 
significant source of revenue for the crown. The region of Espírito Santo, which is of 
major importance for this paper, was among the first capitaincies to be founded in 
Brazil. Bernecker (2000:38) however, reviewing literature on the successes and failures 
of the first settlements, comes to the conclusion that Espírito Santo was not a major 
source of timber in the first colonial years mainly because the settlement there, under 
the responsibility of Vasco Fernandes Coutinho, did not function as well as expected, 
due to the constant conflicts with hostile native tribes in the region. The political and 
social development of Espírito Santo would not take place until more than 300 years 
after the arrival of the Portuguese49. According to Schettino (2000:43), by 1888, 15.4% 
of the captaincy’s territory was under private possession, the other part of the territory 
consisted predominantly of public land. While the south of Espírito Santo was already 
generating revenue from the sugar culture that complemented subsistence agriculture, 
the north of the capitaincy remained largely unexplored. The capitaincy of Espírito 
Santo would play a far more significant role as late as 1850, as the coffee economic 
cycle and foreign immigration stimulated the economy there. 
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 Capobianco (2002:131). The same author mentions previously in the article that the Atlantic forest biome was 
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 As Miller (2000:85) remarks, „the distance of Espírito Santo’s forests from the ports of Rio de Janeiro and 
Bahia and the strength of the natives who were often belligerent and unafraid to attack colonists, worked 
together to keep the exploitation of local forests at a minimum throughout the colonial period”. 
 Pádua (1992), Miller (2000) and Nazo/Mukai (2001) analyzed records from colonial 
times from historical, economic, juridical, and ecological perspectives and reached the 
following conclusions: little was made to prevent the extraction of natural resources 
such as timber until they were exhausted in certain areas of the coastal Atlantic forest. 
The aim of rapidly establishing a “functioning” colony through settlements that could 
provide the expansion of the agriculture frontier to the hinterland in the name of the 
crown and could seek to satisfy the avidity for other commodities to meet the needs of 
international markets determined the handling of natural resources. Nazo/Mukai (2001) 
see the “Regimento do Pau-Brasil” of 1605 as the first law of forestry protection on 
Brazilian territory. Miller (2000) recognizes the crown’s ambition to protect timber 
sources – however, the idea of conservation and protection in colonial times was linked 
to economic objectives of private right of usufruct. Policies established by the public 
power to preserve natural treasures and assure the king’s monopoly over their 
exploitation were flaunted by colonists as well as by royal officials. Lack of control 
over the great land extensions and the nature of the law that completely excluded 
settlers from making a profit from timber commerce may have been the main cause of 
the overall low efficiency of colonial forestry policies in the Brazilian case. Another 
reason for the massive destruction of coastal forests in Brazil has to do with the very 
nature of the colonization of the New World: clearing the forests to live in them was a 
matter of salubrity and, above all, a matter of security, a way of controlling the 
immediate living environment. Forestry policies of the colonial period, still according to 
Miller (2000), generated a scenario similar to the “tragedy of the commons”. The fact 
that it was not possible to profit from the commercialization of precious wood resulted 
in a general liquidation of those woods existing in private properties in Brazil, causing 
the crown to profit less from these resources than it could have and leading it to 
establish a heavy-handed penalty system to deal with “copious legislation” established 
at the time (ibid.). Pádua (1992) analyzes the colonial period from an eco-political point 
of view and comes to the conclusion that the complementary existence of the discourses 
of “predatory exploration” and “laudatory rhetoric” of natural resources shaped 
collective thought both in the home country as well as in the colony. 
Of course, the political and economic relationship of the Portuguese crown to the 
colony changed substantively after the arrival of the royal court in Brazil in the year of 
1808 due to the Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. Scientific rationalism and 
the anthropocentric urge to empirically take stock of the nature of the tropics led the 
 Portuguese emperor Dom João VI to inaugurate a botanic garden in the capital Rio de 
Janeiro as early as June, 16th 1808 (Nazo/Mukai 2001:78). Towards the end of the 
colonial period, the preservation of the existing coastal nature was relegated to a second 
plan in the face of the growing urbanization and solidification of the Portuguese 
political dominion. However, the sui generis setup of a monarch governing his 
abandoned nation state from the colony gave rise to turmoils of various kinds in the 
metropolis, which led the crown to take the strategic measure of turning Brazil into an 
independent empire by appointing the heir of the Portuguese crown as Dom Pedro I, the 
first monarch of independent Brazil50. Though other interests of economic and political 
nature certainly catalyzed the independence process, there remains little doubt that 
independence came to be a top-down maneuver that factually did not disturb the social 
status quo of Brazil’s small population of settlers, banished criminals, and natives.  
In summary, colonial Brazil was slowly incorporated in the Portuguese state from a 
legal point of view, through the extension of Portuguese conservation law to the New 
World; this also took place from a geographical point of view, thanks to the frontier-
opening expeditions of colonists and their settlement with the purpose of exploiting 
natural resources and establishing agricultural economic activities. The economic aspect 
prevailed as the main driving force for colonization once the potential of its resources 
was detected, and the draining ethos collectively developed in the first years would 
become decisive for the relationship between man and nature in the centuries to come. 
4.2. From Independence to the Proclamation of the Republic: 1822-1889 
For practical reasons, this period is taken as an analytical unit. The political scenario 
ranges from the independence, effected by the heir of the Portuguese empire with strong 
financial support from one of the greatest economies of the time – England (Furtado 
1971:32 et sqq.). The entire period is characterized by three monarchic regnancies: from 
1822 to 1831, then from 1831 to 1840 and finally from 1840 until the Proclamation of 
the Republic in 1889. Scholars (Furtado 1971, Resende 2006) disagree on the precise 
historical moment at which the agricultural sector became a source of national revenues 
as important as the extraction of raw materials. However, at the time of the declaration 
of independence, a symbolic gesture by the monarch on the shores of the Ipiranga River 
in São Paulo, there was still no legislation regarding private and public land property. 
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 Official history registered a unique kind of interaction between the colonists and the colonized as the seat of 
the Portuguese empire was forced to move to the capital of its largest colony during the Napoleonic invasion of 
the Iberian peninsula in 1807 (Lustosa 2003).  
 
 In July 17th 1824, the regent prince extinguishes the capitaincy system (Resende 
2006:50). In the same year, the first imperial constitution was promulgated without 
mentioning any specific regulation of land issues. The sole mention of natural resources 
appears in the criminal code of the same year that reaffirmed the cutting of noble woods 
(pau-brasil, perobas, tapinhoãs, among others) as a crime. During the second half of the 
nineteenth century republican voices started demanding changes in power configuration. 
Anticipating the eventual end of slavery – Brazil was the last modern country to abolish 
slavery –, the monarchy issued the law 601 (Sept 18th, 1850), named “Lei de Terras”. 
This law had been established for the purpose of suspending the possibility of 
possessing land other than by its purchase from the government (Resende 2006:53). 
One of its idealizers, José Bonifácio, believed the measure would prevent the black 
population under the slavery regime from destroying forestry areas (Pádua 1992). In 
fact, in view of the existence of the “Lei de Terras”, the abolishment of slavery in 1888 
relegated a huge population of freed slaves to the condition of landless to be subjugated 
as second class workforce in the framework of the suddenly installed liberal labor 
market. Discursively, Brazil was about to enter a new era of free commerce, nation 
building, progress and civilization – the continuing destruction of the forests would be a 
consequence of that.  
The regulation of land possession after 1850, the state initiative of encouraging the 
immigration of foreigners as workforce, and the abolishment of slavery setting free 
more workforce for market purposes, signaled the close relationship of the arrangement 
of agricultural production to public policies at macro-level and to the positioning of 
Brazil as a land willingly capable of bearing large monocultures. The national project of 
keeping close dependence on foreign markets and political powers was not 
uncontroversial among the emerging Brazilian intellectuality. 
The vanguardist preoccupation of the monarchy, especially that of Dom Pedro II, with 
the extinction of forestry areas in general and particularly in the region near the capital, 
Rio de Janeiro, where coffee plantations had taken the place of Atlantic forest regions, 
deserves to be mentioned. In 1862, the replanting of native species upon an area which 
had been cleared for coffee plantation in Tijuca, within the capital, rendered him the 
fame of having contributed to the ecological preservation and to the promotion of the 
development of the Brazilian empire (Nazo/Mukai 2001: 79). The uncoordinated and 
largely illegal anthropogenic pressure on timber resources was combated, at state level, 
with the issuing of the decree 4887 (Jan. 5th, 1872) legalizing private forestry activities 
 related to the commerce of wood (Resende 2006:55). The political setup of the 
republican period, lasting until 1889, was characterized by a recently established two 
party system, which drew its political power from the same economic basis – the 
agrarian regime of production based on a few large properties. The author (ibid.) 
stresses that during the republican outset, the preoccupation with state forestry resources 
diminished as the exploitation of those in private property was legalized in 1875. The 
relegation of the preservation of natural resources to the private domain was in 
consonance with the lockean exaltation of private property rights as one of the ethos of 
the political system in formation in Brazil. This national project drawn up by agrarian 
elites generated a kind of private state, as Fernando Henrique Cardoso puts it in his 
works – a state in which there are no collective interests, but instead, many juxtaposed 
individual ones.  
 4.3. Forestry Policies from the Old Republic (1889) to Late 1980s 
The first republican constitution dated from as early as 1891 and its article 34 defined 
that the federal government was to legislate over lands and mines (Nazo/Mukai 
2001:79). The constitution was in force until the end of the Old Republic, and a second 
constitution was promulgated in 1934 under the auspices of the revolutionary 
government of Getúlio Vargas. The 1934 constitution ruled “exclusive competence of 
the Union” in matters of hunting and in the same year, the first Forestry Code was 
promulgated by decree number 23.793 of January, 23rd 1934 (ibid.). According to 
Kengen (2001:22), one of the progresses institutionalized by the Forestry Code was the 
decentralization of power to control forestry activity by establishing of Conselhos 
Florestais (Forestry Councils) at the municipal, state and federal levels responsible for 
all forestry activities in the country. In the following years, in 1938 and 1941, separate 
institutes were created to regulate policies for the growth of special tree types such as 
mate herb and fir. 
As for the emergence of eucalyptus plantations in the country, the first are recorded at 
the beginning of the 20th century and were cultivated by the Companhia Paulista de 
Estradas de Ferro51 in the region of Rio Claro, state of São Paulo, at the turn of the 
century for the production of “girders, telegraphic poles and wood for locomotives” 
(SBS 1990 apud Silva 1999:6). Forestry monocultures were introduced in Brazil at the 
dawn of the century specifically for economic purposes, though the growth of planted 
forests remained restricted to the southeastern region.  
According to Silva (1999:6), the major part of the demand for wood was still supplied 
by native trees at that time. The Forestry Code of 1965 was a milestone in the regulation 
of forestry economics and brought major improvements to the existing legislation 
stating that forests upon national territory were to be considered a common good owned 
by the Brazilian people (Kengen 2001:24 et sqq.). The idea behind the statement was 
perhaps less democratic than it seemed – the federal government reserved for itself the 
right to intervene, eventually in order to protect. At the dawn of the military 
dictatorship, state intervention was being forcefully implemented in every dimension. 
The Forestry Code of 1965, though a product of the recently installed dictatorship, 
brought up issues of “forestry protection and forestry development”, as Kengen (2001: 
24) would put it: the creation of legal reserves, conservation forests and areas of 
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 permanent protection went hand in hand with financial stimuli for the development of 
the commercial forestry sector. 
The expansion of monoculture plantations came followed suit with the approval of 
federal law 5106 (September, 2nd 1966), granting fiscal incentives from the federal 
government to build the forestry industrial complex. And these fiscal incentives would 
last until 198852.  
During the getulist government, forestry policies seemed unarticulated at institutional 
level and aimed at stimulating a few productive cultivations within the forestry sector. 
The myth of development had taken hold in the higher governmental echelon in the 
getulist republic. In the years to follow, the forestry sector was promoted by the 
organization of the private sector into a political association away from the government 
umbrella. The Sociedade Brasileira de Silvicultura (Brazilian Society of Silviculture, 
henceforth SBS) was founded in 1955 and played an active role in lobbying and 
negotiating with government partners to draw up a plan to offer incentives for private 
forestry on a large scale in the country. According to Kengen (2001:23), the government 
recognized that at this point, the regular supply of raw materials was one of the 
prerequisites for the industrialization of the country. 
During the dictatorship, new policies were defined to manage the forestry sector. At that 
time, the IBDF53, as it was then called, was responsible for “coal extraction, managed 
(…) native forests, deforestation, industrial complexes, domestic and external 
commercialization and the preservation of fauna and flora resources” (IBDF 1979:1). 
The researched guidelines for the forestry sector at that time seemed to direct the 
forestry sector towards more complex activities such as the management and incentive 
of planted forests, which were more compatible with the kind of development the 
country was seeking to achieve. The same document registers the importance of the 
reforestation sector for the entire economy by referring to the rise of employment rates 
after the establishment of the market of planted trees (ibid.). Further, at that time the 
government’s position was to encourage the growth of commercial forests so as to 
supply the growing timber sector54. The market for commercial monocultures seemed to 
be rated as promising and the estimates for future benefits in the domestic market 
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 derived from financial investments in planted trees had been forecast by the IBDF 
(ibid:4). The proposals in the national guidelines for the forestry sector during that 
period can be understood as follows: apart from a preoccupation with the sensitive 
reduction of anthropogenic pressure on the forestry resources which were already 
threatened by immoderate exploitation in some areas of the country, the idea was to 
fulfill the government’s aims of productivity and contribute to Brazil’s presence in 
international timber markets. For that purpose, investments in a sector with long cycles 
of return such as those of planted forests had to be subsidized. Following the same line 
of argumentation, the government documents state that the twofold reasons for 
investing massively in planted trees (considering that this would be done by the private 
sector) were the “social benefits generated” by the sector and its “condition of column 
of important industrial sectors” (IBDF 1979:6).  
In summary, the governmental position explicitly considered alleged social benefits on 
the one hand and the sponsorship of planted forests on the other as an incentive for the 
Brazilian timber potential to be taken advantage of. At the zenith of the military 
dictatorship in Brazil in 1974, another federal law, this time act 1376 of December, 12th 
1974, had defined specific programs to promote the growing industry of paper and 
cellulose. The federal government seemed to have found the growth of planted forests 
one of the keys for the development of the agrarian sector paving the way for the private 
sector to join the emerging agro-industrial complex in Brazil. 
The growth of forestry activity in general from the ´60s onwards occasioned a growth in 
the number of government agencies at state level to regulate the sector. According to 
Schettino (2000), the first forestry institutes for the management of planted forests were 
created in São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo, which today are the three most 
promising producers of eucalyptus.  
 4.3.1. Forestry Policies in Espírito Santo 
Espírito Santo was founded in 1535 being thus one of the first capitaincies of colonial 
Brazil. The history of Espírito Santos’ colonization is full of conflicts with belligerent 
indigenous and difficulties to the settlement’s expansion through natural barriers. The 
eventual victory of its first captain, Vasco Fernandes Coutinho, over the obstacles posed 
by man and nature, led to the foundation of the city of Vitória, the present capital of the 
state, and to the establishment of villages and commerce along the Atlantic coast. As 
part of Brazil’s southeastern region – the historically most developed and politically 
most interesting area in the country – Espírito Santo benefited from the investments in 
the coffee cycle of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, welcoming many European 
immigrants for that purpose. The coffee culture and the presence of German and Italian 
peasants to a large extent shaped the culture of the state. At the end of the 50ies 
however, the coffee cycle came to a bitter end due to the unforeseen baisse of prices in 
the foreign market and affected smallholder farmers all over the state. In the 60ies, 
Espírito Santo would witness the emergence of another culture very suitable to the 
geographic and climatic qualities of the state: that of planted eucalyptus forests. The 
first company to seriously settle in the state, in the municipality of Aracruz, was one of 
our main actors in this thesis – the Aracruz Cellulose.  
The controversial history of the settlement of the company in the state incorporates in 
its origins the important matter of land property and land acquisition. During the last 
decades, the company established itself as one of the largest producers of eucalyptus, 
bringing considerable revenues for the state and invigorating the forgotten idea of the 
forestry vocation of the state (Schettino 2000:23). The growing incentive for the 
development of commercial forestry among smallholder farmers, in form of a “fomento 
florestal” (forestry incentive/management), was implemented in 1996 (Portaria no 
029/96 – IBAMA).  
The forestry vocation of the state was also recognized in the National Forestry Program 
(port. PNF) and in the Integrated Forestry Plan (port. PIF) opening the possibility for 
smallholder farmers to join public or private modes of forestry management (ibid.). 
Both documents establish the legal framework that delimits the action of all actors in 
the forestry sector. Public forestry management, as foreseen by the legislation, is 
effected in partnership with public organs, and private forestry management is, 
according to Schettino (2000), done with private resources, often conceptualized by 
private companies in partnership with small rural workers. The anticipated benefits of 
 private modes of forestry management were, in the case of Espírito Santo, the reduction 
of the impact of the restraint on fiscal incentives for companies and, for the 
communities, the stable inflow of revenues out of agrarian products, since the coffee 
price in Brazil has oscillated considerably over the last decades.  
The idea of establishing partnerships between companies of the agro-forestry business 
and local communities was originally developed in Minas Gerais in the late eighties 
(Schettino 2000:59), and was proposed by the company in the 90’s for the states of 
Espírito Santo and Minas Gerais (Fomento Aracruz 2003: 4). 
The federal and state governments institutionally supported the growth of managed 
forestry activities in the state. Schettino (2000) reports that the Institute of Forests of the 
state of Espírito Santo (port. IEF) was created in 1975 with the purpose of orienting 
reforestation and aforestation in the state. In the beginning of the eighties, the Institute 
of Lands and Cartography (port. ICT) was created to manage the forestry policy in the 
state, coming to be responsible for forestry in the end of the eighties and being 
substituted by the Institute of Agriculture, Livestock Farming and Forestry Defense 
(port. IDAF) in the 90’s. Both the IEF and the ICT were institutionally linked to the 
government agency on environmental matters that preceded the IBAMA.  
Policy incentives from the government have caused Espírito Santo to be, today, one of 
the southeastern states in Brazil with the best prerequisites for forestry and agriculture. 
With a total of 3.408.365 inhabitants spread over an area of 46.077.519 km2 (IBGE, 
2006), its revenues in wood production for the cellulose industry (madeira em tora – 
paper and cellulose) reached 293.777.000 Reais in 2006, making the region the second 
largest producer in the South East (24%), second only to São Paulo (65%) and ahead of 
Minas Gerais, with 11% of the production amount in local currency. It produced 
5.269.324 tonnes of wood for paper and cellulose in 2006, being responsible for 18% of 
the total production in the South East, again second only to São Paulo (69%) and 
surpassing Minas Gerais (12%).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map of Brazil, indicating the State of Espírito Santo55 and, on the right, the State of the Espírito 
Santo56: the black arrow indicates the municipality of Aracruz and the red arrow indicates the 
municipality of Domingos Martins 
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 4.4. Forestry Policies from the Nineties Onwards  
At the beginning of the eighties, the investment in the forestry sector made during the 
past decades by the federal government was showing results. However, changing events 
at a domestic and an international level impacted the relationship of the Brazilian state 
to forestry and economy. The end of the dictatorship brought with it a restructuring of 
the monetary incentive for the land’s productive forces, and new political, economic and 
social elements emerged: the protection of human rights (a victory of 
redemocratization), the protection of nature and the liberalization of the economy after 
the end of the era of import substitution. The economic opening at the beginning of the 
nineties and the Earth Summit of 1992 in Rio, supported by a considerable number of 
non-governmental organizations, reframed national as well as international expectations 
of public and private actors in matters of environment and development.  
Positive repercussions of the complex imbrications of the redemocratization process, the 
adjustment of the Brazilian economy to the international community’s objectives and 
the fact that the Earth Summit took place in Brazil in 1992 representedthe increased 
institutional opening to manifestations of the civil society in general 
(Camargo/Capobianco/Oliveira 2002:34). Among them, the creation of the National 
Council on Environment (CONAMA) with the participation of society members and the 
collective claims of the production of the Brazilian Agenda 21 surely contributed to a 
higher awareness of environmental issues among the population. One of the positive 
results of broad debates about the preservation of natural resources was the joint effort 
of federal and local governments along with private actors to expand conservation 
areas, resulting in 55% of the national territory being under legal protection today (ibid: 
25). On the other hand, the Amazonian biome recorded losses of 156.893 km2 of 
forestry area between 1992 and 2000, much of it due to the implementation of the 
“Avança Brasil” development plan, which stipulated infrastructure investments in 
vulnerable areas (ibid: 26).  
The Forestry Code of 1965, still in force today, was subject of intense debate in the 
nineties. Deforestation records, especially in the Amazon, led the president to raise the 
amount of legal reserve areas from 50% to 80% of the total Amazon region by editing 
the “provisional measure” number 1736 in 1996 (Capobianco 2002:144). The cross-
party ruralist fraction, responsible for the enlargement of the agrarian frontiers in the 
Eastern- and Southern Amazon, strongly opposed the idea. At institutional level, as we 
 can see, much was debated but idiosyncrasies in objectives were maintained at 
governmental level. 
In 2000, a presidential decree approved the Programa Nacional de Florestas (National 
Program on Forests) following the recommendations provided by an IFF report 
(Intergovernmental Forum on Forests) and discussions within the Ministry of 
Environment. According to Smeraldi (2002:103-104), the general guidelines included 
(1) the expansion of planted forests, (2) better management of native forests in public 
areas and (3)in private areas, (4) monitoring of illegal logging and related activities, 
(5) support of traditional forest peoples and indigenous communities and (6) the 
incentive of the commercialization of sustainably produced forestry products.  
Conclusion 
This chapter starts with the initial attempts to regulate exploitation of natural resources 
in colonial and imperial Brazil. The near extinction of pau-brasil, which was perhaps 
the most emblematic symbol of Brazil’s natural richness and symbol of its economic 
value for the Portuguese crown, was the result of a similar pattern of “tragedy of the 
commons”, as Miller (2000:216) puts it. Though land was not common and forests were 
not entirely public, the crown’s monopolization of timber production caused the 
“economic value of timber to the colonist to be zero, [causing] timber’s annihilation a 
more rational choice than its conservation or even its harvest” (ibid: 224). In centuries 
to come, destruction would remain the link between man and nature in the Brazilian 
tropics. At the dawn of the twentieth century, the proclamation of the republic and the 
federalization of the country brought with them new hopes for a more conservationist 
type of national forestry legislation. These hopes were partly met by the Forestry Code 
of 1965, which outlived the end of the military dictatorship and the redemocratization of 
the country without substantial changes in its nature. This chapter ends with the 
description of the most recent developments in the country’s forestry policy, such as the 
launching of the Programa Nacional de Florestas in the year 2000. The chapter 
presented divergences between decisions and actions that can unfortunately be traced 
during the entire development of forestry policy. 
The box (4.2.1.) provided information on the legislative and institutional development 
of the forestry sector in Espírito Santo. The legislation enacted between the ´60s and 
´80s was of vital importance for the establishment of an industrial pole of forestry 
production in the state. The legislation adopted after the redemocratization is 
 characterized by a less significant role of the state as instigator of commercial forestry 
in Espírito Santo, which now oversees partnerships between smallholder farmers and 
companies and welcomes initiatives of joint management of forestry resources when 
these are conducted on a private initiative. 
 CHAPTER 5 - A NEO-INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF COMPANY-
COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to analyze the preferences, interests and actual choices of action of 
the actors involved in the “Forestry Partners” program, according to the logic of rational 
choice game theory. I will return to some thoughts that were briefly introduced in 
chapter 2 and, after detailing the Brazilian context and its actors, go one step further to 
the analyze the actors´ interests. This last section lays the foundation for a presentation 
of my findings in chapter 6.  
From the historical side, we saw that the proposal of a partnership between companies 
and communities was in line with general government policy for the forestry sector in 
the country from the 1990s onwards and, in this case, the partnership program was 
added to the proposal of the state of Espírito Santo as an incentive for cooperation in the 
timber sector (as stated in the general guidelines of Plano Integrado Florestal57). The 
fact that the program was in line with government initiatives seems to have contributed 
to its legitimacy as a forestry management option for the region. I chose this particular 
case because of its significance in general literature about new methods of cooperation 
between non-state actors in the forestry sector, such as the WCSD (WDSD; Case Study 
2004), and in third sector literature (Mayers/Vermeulen 2002). The sample state, 
Espírito Santo, is located in the southeastern region of the country, bordering with the 
states of Rio de Janeiro to the south, Bahia to the north, Minas Gerais to the west and 
the Atlantic Ocean to the east. Its geographical position was one of the reasons for the 
exploration of its natural resources as far back as the 16th century. The origins of its 
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 political organization (a feudal-type system established in colonial Brazil to develop the 
silvi-agricultural potential of the region) date back to the beginnings of colonial 
settlement in that century (Miller 2000). 
Based on a game theoretical model of encounters between rational actors, I suggest 
applying 2x2 matrixes to the interaction between the company and both smallholder 
farmers and indigenous communities. A further element of analysis is added here: 
assuming that the relationship company x farmers differs in its nature from the 
relationship company x indigenous communities because of the different cultural 
backgrounds of both groups, I will divide the matrixes into two sets, though both sets of 
matrixes follow the same principle of rational interaction. The concept of preferences in 
the matrixes indicates the gains and losses considered by each actor in each of the fields. 
The idea was to set up simple matrixes of interaction, incorporating contextual elements 
from literature and the interviews taken to render more accuracy to the analysis.  
It is necessary to stress here that this work does not formalize the interaction between 
partners mathematically as would be expected in the framework of game theoretical 
analyses. The game theoretical rationale was applied with the sole purpose of studying 
the expected utility of choices and thus all actors´ decision-making. 
5.1. The Case Study  
5.1.1. Conducting the Case Study 
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin, 1990:23). 
Of course, case studies count on other characteristics than those mentioned by the 
author. However, in political science as well as in other social studies, there have been 
attempts to develop and accredit case study research in many ways, not all of them 
successful. The present study claims, therefore, to offer minimum conditions for the 
political science learning approach of company-community partnerships, with the aim 
of going beyond descriptive elements and trying to find explanations for the actors´ 
handling options. 
The case study draws upon a variety of sources of evidence, as Yin (1990) puts it. The 
attempt was to draw on literature about company-community partnerships from other 
areas of social and forestry sciences (in particular about these specific partnerships, 
though experiences in other regions of Brazil and of other countries were considered as 
 well), as well as relevant third sector literature. Further, the attempt was to gain a closer 
insight into the interaction of company and communities by visiting the region and 
interviewing the actors in loco58.  
In the nomenclature of case study design scholarship, the present case study can be 
considered a well-based pilot case study. As Yin points out, so-called pilot cases are 
those in which specific criteria for the analysis, such as the selection of the case itself 
according to geographical proximity and access to empirical data, are legitimized as 
such (1990:80). Pilot cases fulfill the role of “´laboratory´ for investigators, allowing 
them to observe different phenomena from many different angles or to try different 
approaches on a trial basis”, allowing them to improve existing criteria or develop new 
ones for further research in the matter (ibid). 
5.2.2. Case Data Base  
The case to be analyzed is that of a partnership between a multinational pulp and 
cellulose company with local groups in the federal state of Espírito Santo. To this end, it 
is necessary to give a brief account of the main actors´ profiles. 
Aracruz Cellulose was founded in Espírito Santo in 1972 and is a leading Brazilian 
company in the production of cellulose for the fabrication of paper – according to its 
own sources, it is responsible for 27% of the global demand for cellulose59. The 
company is directly or indirectly present in four federal states: Espírito Santo, Bahia, 
Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul. It is a multinational controlled by three 
entrepreneurial groups (Safra, with 28%, Lorentzen, with 28% and the Brazilian 
Votorantim, also with 28%) and the Brazilian Development Bank BNDES (with 
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 12.5%). Though Aracruz's initiative of setting up a kind of partnership for “fomento 
florestal”, or in English, a “Forestry Partners Program” was not the first of its kind, this 
model of partnership, which has been ongoing since 1990, has been by far one of the 
most successful and best known models of interaction between companies and 
communities in the forestry sector in Brazil.  
The first group interviewed was that of smallholders in the Domingos Martins region. 
The municipality is located 44 km away from the main factory of Aracruz Cellulose. It 
is a mountainous region, with around 30.000 inhabitants and up to 80% of the 
population comprises German and Italian immigrants who had been recruited to work 
on coffee plantations in the nineteenth century. Until today, the region is occupied by 
smallholder properties characterized by subsistence agriculture. Two of our 
interviewees (F2 and F3) are of Italian descent and F1´s ancestors were Pomeranians. 
All three were born in the municipality, are between 40 and 60 years of age and reside 
in the subregion of Paraju. The other main group interviewed was that of the Tupinikim 
and Guarani indigenous communities. While I1 was interviewed in the indigenous 
village of Caieiras Velhas, in the main building of the Chiefs´ association, the female 
leader was interviewed in her home, in the village of Pau-Brasil60. The Tupinikim have 
inhabited the municipality of Aracruz since times immemorial and the Guarani, though 
a nomadic community, settled in the region approximately 40 years ago61.  
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 The denomination “Tupinikim” (and correlations that have been used along the centuries) derives from the 
expression tupin-i-ki, which is equivalent to “the neighbors of tupi”. The Tupinikim are an indigenous group 
which pertains to the Tupi nation that historically has been residing at the coasts of Brazil. Today, the only 
existent Tupinikim communities reside in the municipality of Aracruz, in the north of the state of Espírito Santo. 
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colonization. Residing at the time in capitaincy of Espírito Santo, the Tupinikim were exposed to acculturation 
by the Jesuits. The contact to the Portuguese introduced various kinds of diseases which ended up reducing the 
number of inhabitants. The first Jesuit settlement among the Tupinikim dates back to 1556 (see Loureiro 2006). 
The indigenous received from the Portuguese crown between 1610 and 1760 an area equivalent to 200.000 
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white population started at the latest in 1940, when the state government sold 10.000 hectares of indigenous 
land, as though this land pertained to the state itself, to an Iron and Steel Company (the “COFAVI”), which was 
later bought by the company Aracruz Cellulose. As the company starts expanding its eucalyptus plantations, the 
Tupinikim are progressively confined into their villages, being harmed in their culture and liberty.  
The Guarani Mbya, which also reside in the municipality of Aracruz, are originally a subgroup of the Guarani 
nation of the southern part of Brazil. According to Teao (2007), the history of the Guarani Mbya in the region 
begins when they arrive in Aracruz after a 40-year pilgrimage, with the objective of finding the tekoa, the “land 
without evil”, where they would be able to live peacefully. According to the author, the guata (Guarani word for 
pilgrimage) of the Guarani are one key to their complex relationship to territory. The accounts of the existence of 
the Guarani in Espírito Santo date back to the 50´s and 60´s, where they have remained ever since. Studies of the 
FUNAI and other scientific literature render more information on the habits and traditions of the Mbya. While 
the Tupinikim speak Portuguese, the Guarani Mbya kept their original Guarani language. Although both ethnic 
 The actors who influenced the partnership were also included in the analysis. These 
were the IDAF, the institution responsible for defining and evaluating forestry policies 
in the state of Espírito Santo, and the FUNAI, the institution responsible for indigenous 
matters at federal level. One IDAF coordinator and one ex-employee of FUNAI were 
interviewed for this thesis. 
While other studies of the partnership over the years have mainly focused on the actual 
economic gains generated by the communities that joined the program, this paper aims 
to look at the partnership itself and examine the interaction between the actors by way 
of identifying the possibilities and limits to the future existence of this model of 
partnership. Once more, the hypotheses raised are that (1) governance in this specific 
context takes place if economic benefits are perceptively met, and (2) other material and 
immaterial benefits that make the partnership durable are also perceptively met. 
I would like to make a few comments on the data base used for the analysis.  
The data base for the case study is composed of: a copy of the actual contractual 
agreement between the company and communities/farmers (individual actors), which 
was made available by the company itself through its technical advisor upon contact 
with the researcher. Interviews with actors directly involved in the partnership: three 
smallholder farmers of the region of Domingos Martins, in the hill country of the state 
of Espírito Santo, selected by means of personal contact with the local class association 
MPA62, according to the duration of their engagement in the partnership. The interviews 
with the three smallholder farmers and the MPA member were carried out on two non-
consecutive days. The technical advisor was randomly selected from the group of 
technical advisors working at the company’s headquarters in the municipality of 
Aracruz. The IDAF coordinator was appointed by the technical advisor. He was already 
in personal contact with the IDAF coordinator for the municipality of Aracruz and the 
interview with the coordinator took place in the framework of a one-day visit to the 
office of the company’s “Forestry Partners” program, at the factory. The indigenous 
communities were chosen for their relevance in the region, though the interviews were 
conducted with decision-makers available on the day of the visit. The researcher spent 
most of the day in the community and had the opportunity to spend time observing the 
region. The NGO member was contacted through personal acquaintances in the regional 
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 third sector organizations and this interview took place at the NGO member’s place of 
residence, at the end of the day of the visit to the company. The idea of understanding 
the interaction between the company and the two sets of actors – the smallholder 
farmers as well as the indigenous communities – had the purpose of offering multiple 
sources of evidence and thus enlarging the possibility of and maintaining a chain of 
evidence. 
5.2.2.1. The Interviews  
I opted for a small sample of in-depth interviews (9 in total, 8 of which were utilized as 
sources for the current and subsequent chapters and 5 of which were the basis for 
chapter 6) with the following subjects: 
 
• One technical advisor from the program office in Espírito Santo, located at the 
company’s pulp plant in the municipality of Aracruz;  
• the coordinator of the IDAF Institute in the same municipality;  
• one representative of the chiefs of the Tupinikim and Guarani (indigenous) 
communities resident in the same municipality; 
• one female Tupinikim leader; 
• one representative of a smallholder farmers' class movement named MPA, 
which is active in the hill country of the same state, in a municipality called 
Domingos Martins; 
• one member of the third sector, a former employee of the government agency for 
indigenous rights FUNAI; a total of three smallholder farmers (all three from the 
municipality of Domingos Martins). 
  
Interviews were thus conducted with decision-makers from the company and 
government and with representatives of two social groups that interact with the 
company63. The interviews analyzed were those conducted with the three smallholder 
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pre-test narrative interviews with experts in August 2007. The questionnaires were applied to all interviewees 
and they were said to feel free to submit additional information to the themes touched by the questions if they 
wanted to.The interviews had in average a duration of forty minutes, and the sequence of questions was altered 
according to the conversational flow given by the interviewee. The first group of questions (Q2-Q4) and to some 
extent Q11 and Q 12 aimed at identifying the status of land property, the formal relationship to the company 
(what is the relationship status to the company through contract/ periodicity of meetings with the company’s 
technical adviser) and how the partnership was started. The following set of questions (Q5-Q9) aimed at 
 farmers and the members of the two indigenous communities. The other interviews 
were taken as source of additional information on the interaction between actors64.  
The municipalities were chosen according to the criterion of geographical diversity in 
the state: Aracruz is located at the northern coast of the state of Espírito Santo; 
Domingos Martins is located in the hill country of the same state. The smallholder 
farmers were selected for interview according to the length of time they had participated 
in the program. Interviewee 1 joined the program at its outset, in the nineties; 
Interviewee 2 five years ago, and Interviewee 3 two and a half years ago. Unfortunately, 
it was not possible to conduct an interview with a smallholder farmer who had not 
joined the program. The results of this interview would have been useful in establishing 
a control N. All the interviewees in the group reside in the municipality of Domingos 
Martins. The indigenous communities were included in the research for three major 
purposes: they reside in the direct neighborhood of the company, are currently involved 
in a land dispute with the company over 11.000 hectares of productive land in the same 
region, and they have seven years' experience with the partnership agreement (1998-
2005), which was terminated once the 11.000 hectares of land were reclaimed by the 
indigenous communities in May, 2005. 
In summary, each actor’s interests, preferences and actual choices of action were 
learned from information gathered and sorted according to the following criteria: 
                                                                                                                                                        
identifying the perception of fulfillment of socio-economic demands such as the importance of forestry activities 
for single farmers. Q10 is a central question since it aims to discover if the interviewee sees benefits for partners 
engaged in the partnership and pursues the reasons for joining/not joining the partnership in his opinion. 
Questions 14 and 15 (see appendix) aimed to discover more about the relationship of farmers with governmental 
institutions/third sector institutions and aims ultimately to understand the role of the state in the partnership, 
through its institutions. Questions 17 and 18 aim to identify the view of farmers about environmental issues, for 
instance, their evaluation of the growth of eucalyptus in the region in general and in their properties in particular. 
The last question relates to the perception of the interviewees of the “future of such types of partnerships”. Aim 
of this last question was to discover more about the perception of farmers on cooperation mechanisms and, 
ultimately, of governance of partnerships.  
64
 The interviews with all participants followed the structure of the (governance theory) driven questionnaire in 
the Appendix II. The questions that did not apply to them were skipped. The information then was reduced into 
expressive general statements in order to render an overview of the empiric data available, those were grouped 
into the categories which were as such assumed as key variables for the analysis of actors´ perceptions. A greater 
value was given to the perceptions of social groups which were categorised and interpreted (see chapter 6). The 
information gathered in the remaining interviews were compared, what Yin (1990) calls pattern matching, to the 
information on partnerships in general, learned from Mayers/Vermeulen (2002), and on the “Forestry Partners 
Program” in particular, learned from Andrade and Dias (2003) and Oliveira et al. (2006) and the company’s 
publications about the program in its internet homepage. According to Cropley (2002:136 et sqq.), since the 
possibility of proving hypotheses by means of applying quantitative research methods is limited by its 
intrinsically limited objectivity, an adequate tool for reaching results is the explicitation of findings. In this case 
study, the interviews were “reduced” to meaningful statements, content units (Inhaltseinheiten) were marked in 
italics (see appendixes) and then sorted out according to the categories utilized. The categories were then 
aggregated into the three independent variables – fulfilment of economic, social and environmental demands, 
which are discussed in chapter 6.  
 
 economic, social and environmental benefits, taking into consideration the participative 
structures of the program, the perception of the institutional framework by the 
participants, general environmental issues and the participants` perception of 
governance. 
5.2.2.2. The Contractual Agreement 
The contractual agreement comprises 17 pages and I would like to present and analyze 
the main clauses65 from the first seven pages in a nutshell. In the first paragraph, the 
agreement states the formal relationship between the company and 
communities/smallholder farmers. The firm is characterized as buyer and the other 
party, be it an individual or collective actor, defined the seller. The technical advisor is 
authorized to sign in the name of the company. The juridical framework is that of the 
Brazilian civil code and the contract stipulates adherence to the forestry legal 
framework66. 
Here, the state makes itself present through the governing mechanism of establishing 
the framework for policy implementation and for defining the agency responsible for 
implementing the framework and evaluating overall relationships in the commerce of 
natural resources, which would be the IBAMA. 
The first clause defines the overall characteristics of the contract. At point 1.1, it seems 
relevant to highlight the status of the seller: he/she may be the owner or leaseholder of 
the property rendered available, and there must be an official registration of the property 
at the government agency responsible for land property matters, the INCRA. On the one 
hand, this secures the individual interests of the company, preventing them from signing 
contracts with untrustworthy parties and guaranteeing that they will be able to harvest 
the eucalyptus trees from these properties. On the other hand, this condition also exerts 
pressure on smallholder farmers, who would need to legalize their properties in order to 
be able to participate in the program.  
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 Clauses 5 (about the farmer’s obligation to possess an official document for transporting timber), 9 (the 
company’s obligation to pay taxes levied upon the contract), 14-16 (general dispositions) shall not be 
commented, see Appendix I (please, contact anelise.gondar@daad-alumni.de for further details on the 
Appendixes). 
66
 As mentioned on page 1“(...)atendendo às condições do Plano Integrado Florestal, registrado junto ao 
Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis, o presente Contrato de Compra e 
Venda de Madeira”, see Appendix I (please, contact anelise.gondar@daad-alumni.de for further details on the 
Appendixes). 
  
 
 The government member interviewed rated the company’s intervention in such matters 
of land property and in the preservation of native species as positive, stating that the 
company contributed through the agreement to a better management of natural 
resources, fulfilling an informative role (see Appendix I). The first clause thus regulates 
the relationship between the two parties in the contract establishes the object to be sold 
and bought (termed “eucalyptus forest” in the contract) and determines how long the 
contract shall last. The contract states that farmers must register their land before they 
can conclude the contract. The second clause states that all resources for planting 
eucalyptus to be rendered available to the wood seller and to be converted into m3 of 
wood, shall be returned to the buyer six (6) years after having been rendered available at 
the time of harvesting. The wood price is that prevailing at the time the inputs were 
given to the seller. Paradoxically, there is no charge for these so-called “operational 
resources” if the seller complies with the contract and returns the whole amount of 
wood specified in the agreement67. Point 2.5 is interesting: the seller is obliged to accept 
the “results of technical inspection”68, made by the company’s technicians. On the one 
hand, it seems natural that the company will send its own technicians to verify the 
growth of trees, but on the other hand, no other authority is referred to at this point as a 
possible mediator when evaluating growth. The third clause handles the obligations of 
the seller: (1) to obtain all legal licenses at all necessary levels to be able to sell the 
produced wood. This rule-in-norm is complemented by the rule-in-use (Andersson 
2006: 28): the IDAF technicians seem to work jointly with the company to assure that 
all legal paperwork is completed before the contract is signed. Another obligation of the 
seller is to (2) conduct all planting, harvesting and transportation at their own 
responsibility and according to “environmental legislation and politics” (Appendix I:2), 
giving special attention to native forests, areas of legal reserve and areas of permanent 
preservation (ibid). In this clause, the company reiterates something that forms part of 
the obligation of producers under Brazilian forestry policy anyway. This might be 
viewed as a good sign, showing that the company supports legal initiatives of 
preservation. On the other hand, the company not only frees itself from the 
responsibility for harvesting or collecting the timber (disburdening itself from social 
costs) but it also imposes the burden of “sustainable timber production” on the 
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 There is no obvious monetary gain here – although interviewees assured that if one manages to spend less in 
harvesting, he/she retains the money received for that. 
68
 In the original, termed“laudo de vistoria técnica”, see Appendix I (please, contact anelise.gondar@daad-
alumni.de for further details on the Appendixes). 
 smallholder farmers. Similarly, it requires that the farmers abide by environmental, 
labour, social security, labour health and job safety legislation while working on the 
field or employing third parties. In this same clause, the seller receives the offering of a 
percentage of native seeds calculated from the total amount of eucalyptus seeds he/she 
shall receive from the company (he may officially refuse to receive the native seeds). 
The fourth clause regulates what is apparently the only instance of joint decision-
making: the chronogram of harvesting and wood delivery is defined jointly by the 
company’s technical advisor and the smallholder farmer/community. Clause 6 regulates 
the actual gains obtained from selling timber. The seller is allowed to retain up to 3.5% 
of the total production of his/her planted forest and, according to clause 7, receives 
eventual bonuses if the contract should “function well”. Clause 8 defines the price of 
wood to be sold/bought: all price adjustments are based on the average regional market 
price for community-managed eucalyptus trees. Clause 10 demands that all insurance 
documents provided by the company should be signed by farmers and clause 11 points 
out that the contract shall be terminated if the property encounters legal problems or if 
the contract is not properly fulfilled. Clause 13 ensures that the timber produced within 
the framework of the contract becomes “agrarian distress” and states that the company 
exerts full rights upon the timber. The company becomes mandatory procurator for 
commercializing the referred timber.  
All in all, the contract seems to be much more beneficial to the company than to 
individuals or groups negotiating with it. 
5.3. Game Theoretical Analysis of the Actors’ Winning Options  
Having re-examined the literature on rational choice (Amadae/ de Mesquita 1999) and 
game theory (Pfetsch 2000; Scharpf 2006), the most adequate way to research the 
interaction of players in this social scenario was to draw a simple two-by-two matrix of 
interaction, restricting the choices of both actors in a scheme of cooperation/non-
cooperation and interpreting their preferences as motives to join the partnership or not. 
We shall keep in mind that the partnership for timber production was proposed by the 
company in the ´90s, as a result of the end of federal subsidies for the timber sector and 
its interest in enlarging its production potential without having the legal means of 
purchasing more land. The idea of the fomento florestal matched the government’s 
interests in offering possibilities of commercial forestry in Espírito Santo. We can 
therefore assume, based on the initial arguments that generated the idea of the 
partnership in the first place, that in this constellation of interaction, the company will 
 always want to cooperate/conclude such contracts, and the state will act as an 
intervening variable, participating directly or indirectly in policy implementation among 
communities. The shadow of the state is noticeable through the framework of forestry 
policies that it has been providing over the past decades, which have been characterized 
by a priority shift from the definition of key resources to be explored for the direct or 
indirect economic benefit of the state machinery to an environmentally friendlier 
exploitation of resources with the involvement of local communities in projects. The 
state is also represented by several agencies involved either directly with the process of 
partnership implementation such as the IDAF from the state of Espírito Santo, in control 
of the areas defined for the monoculture such as the IBAMA, in the defense of interests 
of a specific group among local communities – two indigenous tribes, such as the 
FUNAI.  
Two premises may thus be added at this stage when setting the framework for the 
matrixes of interaction between the actors in company-community partnerships in 
Espírito Santo: the first premise is that the company, as the initiator of the of the 
“Forestry Partner” program, will always be willing to interact (cooperate) with 
smallholder farmers and indigenous communities. The second is that the state makes 
itself present in the partnerships at a macro-level by setting up the policy framework for 
the arrangement and at a micro-level, through its institutions, IDAF (in the case of 
producers) and FUNAI (in the case of indigenous communities). 
As for the company, we learned from the interview with the technical advisor that the 
company clearly has economic interests when engaging in partnerships with 
communities. In talks with smallholder farmers, they too stated that they had an initial 
economic interest in joining. This might be one of the explanatory factors for the high 
probability of both partners in concluding a contract and for the exponential increase of 
participants in the partnership offered by Aracruz Cellulose over the years69. The 
expectation of obtaining gains is thus, at first sight, high and economic benefits seem to 
be the most attractive argument for joining the program. 
We can therefore depend on the premise that the company will want to cooperate and 
that the communities will be likely to cooperate, given the promises of profits stated in 
the program offer.  
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 Today, 18 years after the program has started, the company has reached the record of 3.000 contracts signed 
with smallholder farmers (source:http://www.produtorflorestal.com.br/br/anos-programa2.jsp; 26.02.2008) 
  
 
For analytical reasons, we will therefore eliminate the two scenarios in which the 
company would not want to cooperate from the analysis. If we specify the different 
actors involved in the partnership (differentiating between indigenous communities – I, 
and smallholder farmers – F) and consider the premises cited above, that the company is 
per se interested in cooperating with both types of actors and that the state exerts 
influence as a third party, four further possible situations remain to be analyzed. We 
shall therefore consider that the company has two counterpartners, namely a non-
representative sample of smallholder farmers of the hillside municipality of Domingos 
Martins and two indigenous communities living in the coastal municipality of Aracruz.  
The dependent variable is the partnership between the company and the community. To 
quantify its success, we must take a closer look at the possible interactions between the 
actors involved in the set up (the communities/farmers, the company, mediated by the 
state through its policies and advice) and the influence of explaining variables 
(subsumed under economic, social and overall environmental benefits) in the rank of 
preferences and handling options. The study of the context and the conduction of 
interviews showed that all the scenarios elucidated above can be found in social reality. 
Information gathered in the interviews delivered important information for the ex post 
completion of the game matrix presented here (Pfetsch, 2000).  
The possible scenarios that can be generated from the disposition of interaction between 
the players are presented as follows: 
Scenario A offers us a set up in which both the company and small farmers agree to 
enter the 6-year (equivalent to one cycle of growth of eucalyptus trees) contract of 
selling/buying timber. From Interviewee 1 we learned that, as the program started, the 
company took the initiative of proposing the partnership to the region’s smallholder 
farmers. The program brought benefits to those first participants and became known in 
the region through word-of-mouth recommendation. The other two interviewees (F2 
and F3) took the initiative of contacting the company to join the partnership70. 
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 The company can be contacted through telephone and through the website, in which producers can fill in a 
form asking to be visited by the company’s technical advisor. 
 Company 
Communities YES NO 
YES Y, Y Y, N
 
 
NO N, Y  N, N  
 Individual preferences are considered the key to handling options, so that K1 is what 
partners bring into the partnership, e1 are the expected gains (stated by interviewees F1, 
F2; F3 and the technical advisor to be of economic nature) at the initial point of 
interaction (t1) that lead to the handling option “Yes” on both sides. 
 
Company (C) Smallholder farmers (F) 
K1+ e1 in t1 Yes  K1 + e1 in t1 Yes 
 
The fulfillment of economic demands, one of the benefits explicitly expected from the 
partnership, was confirmed by F1 (in the program for over 10 years), F2 (in the program 
for 5 years) and F3 (in the program for less than 5 years). F1 stated that she joined the 
program after a visit from one of the company’s technical advisors. She decided to “try 
out the partnership” because she had nothing to lose by doing so. And she reaffirms that 
it has produced revenues ever since. As she stated in the interview, “the plantation of 
eucalyptus renders us revenues because it is a culture that does not demand working 
force. In the first year of cultivation you will have to work a lot but afterwards it grows 
alone [meaning autonomously – note of the author]”71.  
However, F1 evaluates the growth of eucalyptus as a positive investment only for those 
that possess an amount of land that would allow them to grow eucalyptus trees as one of 
their economic activities, not the sole economic activity. According to her72, other crops 
(be they corn or beans) cannot be grown alongside eucalyptus trees because the trees 
grow at a fast rate, overshadowing other crops and impeding their growth. This factually 
impedes the diversity of crops on a small property, preventing the producer from 
growing food for its own subsistence. Further, revenues from eucalyptus cultivation 
would come solely on harvest, 6 to 7 years after the seedling has been planted. F1 
fortunately can diversify her production: she grows eucalyptus as one of her secondary 
economic activities, profiting from other crops such as coffee, corn and manioc, and 
from homemade products such as cookies and jams.  
F2 and F3 decided to join the partnership after hearing about the good experiences of 
neighboring smallholder farmers and both affirm that the revenues from trading in 
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 In the original: “Ele deixa uma renda boa porque ele nao tem mão-de-obra. No primeiro ano você vai 
trabalhar muito no eucalipto, depois ele vai sozinho”, see Appendix IV(please, contact anelise.gondar@daad-
alumni.de for further details on the Appendixes). 
72
 In the original:“(...) só que eu acho que pra quem tem pouca terra é ruim, porque é uma área de terra e se 
você quer plantar mais alguma coisa você não tem pra onde correr”, see Appendix IV (please, contact 
anelise.gondar@daad-alumni.de for further details on the Appendixes). 
 
 eucalyptus are considerable (“some 50%” of his overall income, in the case of F2). F3 
has not yet harvested his plantation but reaffirms the expectation of making 
considerable gains from of the commerce with the company. Both F2 and F3 also state 
that a smallholder farmer cannot survive on eucalyptus cultivation alone. Still, F2 
calculates the revenue from cultivating the minimum number of hectares required by the 
company and reaffirms that one would not otherwise produce anything on that soil73. F1 
and F3 mention explicitly that eucalyptus production renders more profits than the 
traditional coffee production of the region, which is also a main economic activity of 
smallholder farmers in Espírito Santo. 
F2 cites criteria for evaluating the partnership as positive: “they gave me everything I 
needed to plant eucalyptus”74. He assesses that if the smallholder farmer manages well 
the money that he/she receives from the company to produce eucalyptus, he/she will be 
able to make a profit. They were all aware of the relationship’s inequality and of the fact 
that the company would make greater profits than they would. They considered as a 
disadvantage the fact that they sell the wood to the company at the regional price 
prevailing when they signed the contract. F2, for instance, said that while the eucalyptus 
timber price was at 22 Reais/m (estéreo)75 when he first signed the contract with the 
company, at the time of harvest the wood was rated at 37 Reais, which was the price for 
which the producer sold the wood to the company76. F2 recognized that the agreement 
benefits the company more than the individual farmer but still rated the company as 
serious and reliable for the commerce of timber and states with regard to the actual 
business of selling wood to the company that after the wood is delivered, the company 
retains all the money invested in the smallholder farmer and everything that is left from 
that belongs to the farmer, which he rates as positive77 Though not aware of the status of 
the company (he asked the interviewer to whom the company belongs), F3 rated the 
relationship as very positive as far as his economic benefits were concerned. When 
                                                 
73
 F2 in the original: “(...)se você tem 5 hectares, você vai produzir uma média de 1500 metros de madeira, 
desses 1500 vai sobrar tranquilamente uns 600 metros de madeira. 700 metros a 37 reais dá quase 30.000 reais. 
Onde não produzia nada, nada, nada” (phrase not contained in the appendix, only in the tape). 
74
 In the original: “Eles me deram tudo o que era necessário para plantar eucalipto”, see Appendix IV (please, 
contact anelise.gondar@daad-alumni.de for further details on the Appendixes). 
75
 The measure “meter/estéreo” is a Brazilian unit of measurement equivalent to the volume in m3 of wood 
stapled (in a transporting trunk, for instance). It considers the total volume of wood stapled upon one another 
regardless the empty space between the wood. 
76
 F2 says in the original: “O eucalipto quando eu vi na época tava 22 reais o metro estéreo. Hoje ele tá a 37 
reais, só que eu vou entregar o metro de madeira no valor daquela época, entendeu? Não tem juros mas eu vou 
entregar [no valor daquela época], e eu me responsabilizo a bater o eucalipto na [empresa] Aracruz”. 
77
 F2 says in the original: “Eu sou obrigado a entregar lá, depois que é descontado aquilo que eu devo pra 
Aracruz, os insumos, eu vou pagar só o frete e pra botar no caminhão, e o resto fica pra gente, o resto sobra pra 
gente”, see Appendix IV (please, contact anelise.gondar@daad-alumni.de for further details on the Appendixes). 
 asked about his overall evaluation of the partnership, he firmly states: “eu acho uma 
boa”78. It is necessary to mention that F3 does not only grow eucalyptus trees in the 
framework of the contract but also grows a small forest on his own. This might explain 
his lack of interest/ knowledge about his counterparty – the company. He may simply 
view the company as one of several buyers. He is also the one who points to the fact 
that one has the possibility of renewing the contract after the first harvest but is not 
obliged to do so, meaning that the smallholder farmer then has the option of “doing 
business” autonomously. 
The possibility of renewing the contract remains open for both partners. However, 
interests remain the same after the contract finally ends: the company will keep on 
wanting to buy timber and the farmer will want to sell his/her harvest if he/she grows 
eucalyptus trees after the end of the contract. 
Briefly, in Scenario A, both expect mainly economic gains from the interaction. After 
entering into the contract, a spiral of expected gains begins, which leads to an 
expectation of more gains if the contract continues. The contractual agreement between 
the company and individual farmers defines the quantity and quality of the gain. 
Eventual environmental damages are taken into consideration and do not keep farmers 
from entering the contract79. If everything goes on as it is, partners can imagine 
continuing negotiations with the company. 
In Scenario B80, small farmers do not enter into the contract or decide not to renew it 
because they expect material or immaterial gains from not joining/renewing. The 
information gathered in the interviews indicates that small farmers may not enter into 
the contract if they have the feeling that they have something to lose (for instance, if 
they would have to render available crops that would have been necessary to grow food 
for subsistence) or if they think the gains to be made from eucalyptus cultivation do not 
outweigh potential monetary losses (they might have the money to seed eucalyptus but 
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 Translated: “I think it is a good [option]”, see Appendix IV (please, contact anelise.gondar@daad-alumni.de 
for further details on the Appendixes). 
79
 F1 states that the plantation of eucalyptus has a considerable environmental impact: ”aonde você planta 
eucalipto a divisa do vizinho leva chumbo” or, “if you decide to plant eucalyptus at the borders of your 
property, your neighbour will be damaged”, and F2 states in two moments of the interview that “(…) ora mim 
ajudou, agora que prejudica a natureza, prejudica um pouco” = “[the eucalyptus plantation helped me a lot, 
but it does harm the nature a bit” and further he says “Eu no geral tirando a parte que faz mal pra nós e pro 
meio-ambiente achei ótimo” = “As for me, if I do not take into consideration that it [the culture of eucalyptus] 
harms us and the environment, I rate it as very good”, see Appendix IV (please, contact anelise.gondar@daad-
alumni.de for further details on the Appendixes). 
 
80
 Which is a hypothetical one in this study since all interviewees had a contract with the company at the time of 
the interview. 
 would not have enough capital to hire fellers for the harvest). Small farmers do not 
renew the contract if the feeling of economic dependency on the company outweighs 
the gains they obtain with each harvest. Since the company is the most reliable buyer of 
wood in the region, producers tend to accept the market price it imposes (see Appendix 
IV for the testimony of F2). If the feeling of being “used” for the purposes of the 
company is stronger than the expected gains or if there are clear advantages of opting 
out (for example, the smallholder farmer finds an autonomous wood buyer who is 
willing to pay the market price for his/her eucalyptus trees), the smallholder farmer will 
terminate the contract. The producer will not renew the contract if he/she wishes to use 
the area where he/she once planted eucalyptus trees for another type of cultivation.  
The table below illustrates that while the company’s interests, preferences, possibly its 
gains and surely its handling options would remain the same, smallholder farmers may 
reflect on losses before entering into the contract or they may identify losses afterwards, 
so that they withdraw from or do not renew the contract. Reflections on winning options 
which result from the decision not to cooperate (emerging from the interviews with F1, 
F2 and F3) point to economic benefits as being the factor that defines the relationship 
with the company in the framework of the contract. 
 
Company (C) Smallholder farmers (F) 
K1+ e1 in t1 Yes  K1 - e1 in t1 No or 
K1 - e1 in t2 No 
 
Scenario C stands for the setup of cooperation between company and indigenous 
communities. Cooperation was once possible and given. The referred indigenous 
communities signed a contract with the company and received, beside technical 
assistance on the growth of eucalyptus, some capital for the development of social 
projects on the tribal property. As Interviewee I1 states, the partnership emerged at a 
time where the government agency responsible for the indigenous communities – the 
FUNAI – was negligent towards social projects for those communities. I1 states that the 
government agency encouraged those communities to enter into the contract with the 
company. According to the interviewee, four anthropological studies were conducted by 
the same institution between 1994 and 1998 and concluded that 18.070 hectares of land 
in the municipality of Aracruz pertained to the communities. 11.000 hectares of those 
 had been allegedly bought by the company, some of them being used for the cultivation 
of eucalyptus.  
The historical background prior to this agreement, settled between the company and 
communities in 1998, was a land dispute between both partners. The Tupinikim and 
Guarani communities that originally inhabited the area were progressively confined 
over the decades to a smaller area of land because of the company’s expansion. The 
company’s main argument throughout the years for not giving in to the demands of the 
tribes was that the area claimed by the referred communities had been purchased from 
small farmers at the outset of the company’s activities in the state of Espírito Santo. 
Conflicts over land ownership have their historical roots in (1) the unsatisfactory 
manner in which land issues have been settled both legally and politically over the 
decades and (2) the idea of historical indemnification especially towards native citizens 
after the Constitution of 1988 which was accompanied by new land concession 
throughout Brazilian territory. The contract was thus settled between the company and 
indigenous communities because the property subject of conflict was already covered 
by eucalyptus trees that had been planted by the company. The contract offering from 
the company in 1998 might thus have represented a way for the company to ensure the 
possession of the planted eucalyptus trees and of maintaining a harmonious relationship 
with the communities. The company offered the contract for the same 
material/economic gains the interviewee would expect when joining any contract of that 
kind, but it might also have had immaterial gains (e2) in mind, such as a peaceful 
relationship with the communities and the possibility of maintaining access to the 
cultivated land. As for the indigenous communities, the initial gains were of an 
economic nature (see testimony of I1 in the appendix).  
 
Company (C) Indigenous Communities (I) 
K1 + e1, + e2 in t1 Yes  K1 + e1 in t1 Yes 
 
The agreement was maintained for one eucalyptus harvesting cycle and the renewal of 
the contract was thus reconsidered by the indigenous association after that, which leads 
us to imagine Scenario D.  
  
Company (C) Indigenous Communities (I) 
K1 + e1, + e2 in t1 Yes  K1 + e1 in t1 Yes but 
K1 + e1, - e2 in t2 No 
 
In Scenario D, the company and indigenous communities do not enter/renew the 
contract. The preferences on the side of the indigenous that lead to the break of the 
institutional settlement are as follows: the contract generated economic dependency on 
the company in a twofold manner: (1) the land would be permanently available for 
growing the monoculture and this would prevent indigenous from growing other 
products for their own subsistence or for commercial purposes, and (2) social projects 
would from then on be sponsored by the firm, factually marginalizing the federal state 
through its agency FUNAI and its efforts to offer other services. In Scenario D, the 
preferences of the indigenous communities relate to materialized (and politicized) 
immaterial gains, such as regaining the territory and fighting for the acknowledgment of 
the indigenous’ identity.  
In summary, the constellation of interaction shows that smallholder farmers seem to 
adhere to the contract less hesitantly than indigenous communities. The reason for this 
can be determined by analyzing interviews and considering the elements that are 
prerequisite to the interaction being perceived as a governance mechanism. Until now, 
we have been able to detect the preferences of the actors joining the partnership and the 
interaction between them. However, for interactions to become a mode of governance, 
we must also evaluate their quality. 
In chapter 1, I referred to criteria of sustainable joint management of forests, which 
indicates necessary elements in environmental governance. Normative criteria point to 
two aspects that must be fulfilled in an environmental governance constellation: social 
justice and environmental justice. Instead of discussing the concepts of environmental 
and social justice, the analysis pointed to the empirical evaluation of these aspects. They 
were categorized (see explanation below and appendixes) and aggregated into three 
variables according to which I would evaluate the empirical data of this case study.  
In the context of company-community partnerships, these variables are the following: 
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* Fulfillment of economic demands 
 
Partnerships in Espírito Santo should 
be able to generate visible economic 
revenues for their participants. 
* Fulfillment of environmental 
demands 
Partnerships should respect institutional 
frameworks of environmental and human 
rights, paying attention to possible 
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These variables (the fulfillment of economic, social and environmental demands) were 
also inspired by literature on company-community partnerships (Mayers/Vermeulen 
2002) and shall be discussed in the next chapter. In the interviews, these variables 
corresponded to the following categories: the fulfillment of economic demands was 
learned when interviewees were directly asked about the revenues obtained in the 
partnership. The fulfillment of social demands was analyzed based on questions aiming 
to understand (a) the interviewees relationship to the company and to the state, (b) the 
possibilities of joint decision-making between actors (at the moment of contract signing, 
for instance) and (c) the presentation of the land situation in general. The criterion of 
fulfillment of environmental demands was operationalized by means of questions about 
the interviewees´ opinion of the environmental consequences of planting eucalyptus 
within the partnership framework. The last criterion was that of their perception on the 
durability of the partnership. 
Conclusion 
The neo-institutional approach to the analysis of company-community partnerships 
comprises the game theoretical analysis of the relationship between actors with the aim 
of discovering the winning options for each of them in the partnership. 
The matrixes designed according to field information pointed to the fact that 
smallholder farmers continue in the contract when their material expectations are 
fulfilled. The empirical reality also pointed to the fact that the agreement seemed not to 
be a durable solution for indigenous communities. The next chapter shall aim at 
understanding why this is the case. The operationalization of the concept of governance 
in three variables – fulfillment of economic demands, fulfillment of social demands, and 
fulfillment of environmental demands – was conducted through interviews with the two 
* Fulfillment of social demands  
Partnerships should be grounded on 
mutual respect for 
individual/collective rights to land, 
identity and (political) participation. 
 
rights, paying attention to possible 
environmental degradation due to this 
specific forestry activity and its 
consequences for the environment and for 
the smallholder farmers and other 
communities. 
Perception of governance 
Participants should be satisfied with gains obtained in the partnership and see it as durable 
 main groups entering into the contract with the company and the results and conclusions 
are presented in chapter 6.  
The aim of the present and the next chapters is to find general explanations for the 
success or failure of partnerships under the conditions explicited in the variables 
utilized. As Cropley (2002) states it, the ambition is to generate broader explanation 
frameworks that can be utilized in political science learning when studying company-
community partnerships and when analyzing neo-institutional governance approaches in 
the forestry sector.  
 CHAPTER 6 - RESULTS – CASE STUDY 
Introduction 
This final chapter aims at presenting my main findings.  
The specific analytic technique used to obtain the results was that of pattern-matching81. 
In my case, the patterns to be confirmed or discarded are those upheld in the 
independent variables defined to analyse the interaction of actors, based on the 
theoretical framework described in chapter 1 and using the analytical framework 
described in chapter 2. The independent variables were the fulfillment of economic 
demands, fulfillment of social demands, and fulfillment of environmental demands82. 
Further, the perception of governance was also captured in interviews with actors from 
both groups interacting with the company. 
The analysis was based on a non-representative pool of semi-structured interviews with 
stakeholders involved with the company-community partnership keeping the description 
and analysis of the contractual agreement in the background. The analysis of semi-
structured interviews gave a glimpse into the real/experienced limits and possibilities of 
interaction (perceptions of the partnership) and allowed me to reflect on the patterns of 
governance that can be recognized in the partnership. The information gathered formed 
the basis for testing the hypotheses and answering my core question.  
The puzzle to be solved was whether, given the economic benefits of the contractual 
agreement between partners in this specific partnership program and the actors´ 
opinion about the partnership, this partnership can be considered a durable win-win 
situation. The hypotheses raised were: the partnership can be a win-win situation for 
both partners (1) if the economic and social demands of both partners are sufficiently 
met in their own view; and (2) if the other social needs that are equally important for 
participants are met as well. 
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 6.1. Perceptions of the Partnership by Smallholder Farmers under the Auspices 
of the Governance Concept Proposed 
According to rational choice rationale, the generation of economic benefits seems to be 
one of the most significant expectations from joining the program. Actors enter the 
partnership expecting to have their economic needs to some extent fulfilled. In 
environmental governance, stakeholders seek economic revenues when jointly 
managing natural resources. Equally, the interviewees seemed satisfied with the 
fulfillment of social demands. The three smallholder farmers had legalized and 
respected properties so that they could decide where to start their eucalyptus production. 
In the case of Interviewee F1, the property area destined for eucalyptus cultivation was 
on a steep slope and on the top of the hill, where other agricultural activities would have 
been difficult. F2 and F3 mentioned also having chosen unproductive hectares of land to 
try planting eucalyptus. The smallholder farmers interviewed, who were of German and 
Italian descent, took part in the production cycles of agrarian products within the state: 
the culture of eucalyptus was nothing more to them than another culture to be produced 
and did not intervene with their own culture or identity. Social benefits such as the 
assurance of participation rights in terms of joint elaboration of the contract or 
negotiation of gains beyond those promised in the contract seemed not to be rated as 
relevant. F1, F2 and F3 praised the company for its reliability and all three rated as 
positive the fact that the company would provide all input and materials necessary for 
planting eucalyptus. As to their social demands, all interviewees from the municipality 
of Domingos Martins stated that the relationship was good, and could be rated as being 
a durable one.  
The idea of durable governance in the forestry sector is partially fulfilled when gains are 
concrete and measurable. In the case of smallholder farmers, the partnership seems to be 
a viable option. Though they cited some disadvantages, such as the inequality of 
economic benefits (which is measurable, for instance, in the definition of the price of 
the timber bought from the smallholders) and the incertitude of the sustainability of 
cultivation of the exogenous eucalyptus as far as its environmental impact is concerned, 
the social aspects were also fully covered since the company is seen as trustworthy and 
serious – and does not pose any threat to the smallholders´ property rights. In summary, 
in the words of F2, “pra mim foi rentável plantar eucalipto, pra mim foi a salvação”83. 
Variables according to the theoretical framework of Governance: 
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 In the original, “for me it was rentable to grow eucalyptus, it was my salvation“ (see Appendix IV). 
 Economic benefits In the case of the smallholders interviewed, the economic benefits surpass 
any eventual economic losses of starting eucalyptus cultivation. As long as 
the economic benefits are higher than the costs (and those are evidently 
near to zero), the partnership will be considered a viable modus of 
cooperation in the management of forest resources in the region and for any 
individual producer. 
Economic demands were fulfilled as stated in the contractual agreement; 
empirical data matched other case studies (Oliveira et al. 2006) and 
attests to the economic viability of the partnership. 
Social benefits  Based on the interviews, social benefits are achieved at a material level, 
through technology sharing and the improvement of neighborly relations 
between company and smallholders; and at an immaterial level, through the 
company’s achievement of the legitimization of its social importance in the 
region (as a social partner) and its growing influence in the community 
thanks to its social role. One negative feature is the recognized 
impossibility of diversification of economic activity intercropped with 
eucalyptus but, in the case of the interviewees, this was not a threat to their 
economic subsistence, since they did not substitute a traditional culture with 
eucalyptus. 
The partnership was ultimately rated by the interviewees as socially 
beneficial. 
Environmental 
benefits 
According to the interviews, environmental benefits are not evident at a 
macro-level (smallholders are not sure if  the eucalyptus culture does not 
indeed harm the environment and other species), but are recognizable at 
micro-level, since one interviewee could verify the renewal of his property 
in terms of nutrients after eucalyptus had been removed. 
Environmental responsibility is given at normative level, in so far as the 
partnership obeys general national institutional guidelines for the 
cultivation of eucalyptus. Though there are no conclusive studies on the 
consequences of eucalyptus cultivation for soils and water reservoirs, the 
company reliability assures that cultivation occurs in environmentally 
secure terms. 
Based on the interviews with F1, F2 and F3 in December 2007-January 2008, see Appendix IV (please, 
contact anelise.gondar@daad-alumni.de for further details on the Appendixes). 
 
These results are validated by previous scientific publications on the economic benefits 
of smallholder farmers in Espírito Santo that join this specific partnership program. All 
three interviewees stated that, though revenues are considerable, they are not enough to 
make a living and thus remain a secondary economic activity on their property. This 
result also matches other studies conducted in the state (Mayers/Vermeulen 2002: v, 
Oliveira et al. 2006, Andrade/Dias 2003). 
These results for the grouped variables of economic, social and environmental benefits, 
confirm hypothesis 1: the smallholders themselves confirmed the economic viability of 
the partnership. Environmental suitability is considered by both actors involved 
(farmers and the company) to be given, since there is no concrete evidence that 
eucalyptus cultivation would harm local ecosystems. Further, social benefits are given 
for smallholders as well as for the company, although the smallholders understand the 
inequality as regards their share in the economic benefits and their lack of bargaining 
possibilities and participative structures. 
 In the analysis of patterns of interaction applied to the group of farmers, the economic 
benefits are seen as more important than social and environmental benefits or they 
compensate social or environmental losses. In this case, in the eyes of the smallholder 
farmers, there is a pattern of governance, a pattern of self-regulated concertation 
between actors to produce goods within a “discourse of win-win situation”84. We can 
consider Hypothesis (1) as proven. 
When we analyze the indigenous group and their impression of the partnership, we must 
consider other items that enhance the notion of quality of governance and show that, 
even when economic benefits are met, other benefits (which are as crucial to some 
groups as economic ones) are decisive to the initiation and duration of a partnership. 
6.2. Perceptions of the Partnership by Indigenous Communities under the 
Auspices of the Governance Concept Proposed 
The economic demands on the side of the Tupinikim and Guarani communities were 
fulfilled, though not to their satisfaction and, thus, not durably. The direct benefits from 
harvesting the trees planted by the company on soil that was under dispute led initially 
to the belief among the communities that eucalyptus cultivation could save them from 
poverty. The introduction of the exotic eucalyptus plantation in their midst and the 
institutional presence of the company in the area through its social projects while the 
agreement was still ongoing led the indigenous communities to feel environmentally 
and socially threatened, which in turn led them to essentialize their identity and culture, 
turning these into political issues and coherently leading them to terminate the contract 
with the company. A major point of conflict in the relationship between the company 
and communities is the different significance of culture and identity and its different 
position in the preference scales of both actors. For the company, the culture and 
identity of the indigenous communities do not necessarily need to have an intrinsic 
relationship to the right to ancestral land or to the determination of which goods should 
be planted there. To the company, the cultivation of eucalyptus can be another source of 
income and occupation for indigenous as it is for smallholder farmers. The different 
perceptions of immaterial goods drove a wedge between the company and the 
communities (Andrade/Dias 2003).  
In analytical terms, the first distinction in rationality and thus handling options between 
smallholders and indigenous communities is the significance of immaterial goods 
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 (culture and identity) based on the concrete possession of material goods (namely, 
secured land property). The second distinction is the order of preferences when it comes 
to defining criteria for cooperating or not cooperating with the company. With the 
emergence of culture and identity as immaterial gains to be sought, the economic gains 
became secondary in nature. This means that though they might be fulfilled, they are 
perceived by the actors as deficient. The rationality of the actor and his/her perception 
of reality will determine his/her interaction with other partners. At some point in the 
relationship with the company, co-regulation mechanisms were seen by the indigenous 
as insufficient in quality. Though their first experience with the company in the years 
between 1998 and 2005 would confirm Hypothesis 1, the analysis shows than when 
Hypothesis 2 is not fulfilled, the partnership cannot be durable.  
We have learned that governance mechanisms permit self- or co-regulation between 
partners whose expectations must be fully met. Further, governance in the forestry 
sector has to produce economic, social and environmental benefits in order to become 
durable. If these requirements are not met, immaterial gains of other kinds 
(identitarian/cultural) can push actors into exiting options that would guarantee their 
survival. This is vividly present in the words of I1 (“[…] the company alleged to have 
all documents attesting this land’s possession, and we did not have any documents, but 
we have a history that is, under the Constitution, much more worth than any documents. 
In paragraph 6 it says that all land titles of lands traditionally occupied by indigenous 
are to be considered invalid”85, and in the words of I2, (“Mother Earth, that’s what 
we’re fighting for”). 
 
Variables according to the theoretical framework of Governance: 
Economic 
benefits 
The economic benefits were partially given in the period of 1998 until 
2005, while the partnership took place. According to the interviews, on 
the one hand they ensured that the eucalyptus already planted on territory 
under dispute would be harvested by the indigenous, generating income 
for them, but on the other hand, the economic benefits were not enough 
for the collective subsistence of the two indigenous communities and 
restrained communities from diversifying production on the referred 
property. 
In the view of the interviewees, the economic benefits are not 
sufficientlyt given. In their priority scale, economic benefits are of 
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 secondary importance. Development for the indigenous has less to do 
with the assurance of economic gains than with securing their cultural 
survival. Therefore, the economic viability remains obscured by the 
preferences of the actors. 
Social benefits There were ultimately no social benefits in the eyes of the indigenous. 
Immaterial goods such as identity and culture (which were eventually 
turned into political tools for bargaining for the repossession of property) 
had more significance than material goods such as a peaceful relationship 
with the neighboring company and the benefits through their sponsoring 
of social projects in the communities´ area. 
Social benefits were interpreted as strategic tactics by the government 
and the company to soften the non-fulfillment of the actors´ 
preferences. The partnership was perceived as socially beneficial but 
still as an intermediary stage for a more sustainable conflict resolution 
– the definitive right to land. 
Environmental 
benefits 
The indigenous leaders who were interviewed stated that eucalyptus 
cultivation harms their ecosystem, thus affecting their identity, which is 
deeply related to their land (to “mother earth”, as interviewee I2 stated). 
They confirmed the alteration of existing ecological patterns after the 
“arrival” of the company and identified fauna and flora species that 
ceased to exist after the spread of eucalyptus crops in the Aracruz region. 
For them, environmental benefits were already non-existent during the 
partnership, but this became notorious after the partnership was 
terminated. 
The interviewees focus their criticisms not only on the partnership in 
particular but on the monoculture of eucalyptus in general. Their 
perception is based on the exogenity of eucalyptus monocultures. These 
are considered a threat to the environment and to their existence. 
Based on the interviews with I1 and I2 in December 2007, see Appendix IV (please, contact 
anelise.gondar@daad-alumni.de for further details on the Appendixes). 
 
Generalizations and Discussion of Results 
Generalizations can be drawn at three levels discussed in this thesis. 
From a theoretical – governance – point of view, the results point to the importance of a 
governmental framework in form of legislation and policies as a basis for negotiations 
between unequal non-state partners. Though the initiative of starting a forestry 
partnership may be launched by a non-state actor (the company), it has to occur 
according to specific government policy, which means that the state has to provide a 
legal framework enabling forestry partnerships to take place within acceptable and 
democratic boundaries of negotiation, bargaining and rights usufruct by all parties 
involved. Windhoff-Héritier`s (1980) literature on policy implementation as well as 
Andrade/Dias`s (2003) work on social-environmental strategies of corporations confirm 
the need of an overall institutional and a specific policy framework as setters of game 
rules for policy makers as well as participants. As confirmed in chapters 3 and 4, these 
are given and offer clear lines for integration of forestry partnerships in Brazilian 
political reality. The institutional framework helps in analyzing the conditions under 
which partnerships can be initiated in Brazil as well as in other countries; the 
 mechanisms for overall social regulation provide hints as to the possibilities and limits 
of interaction between non-state actors under the shadow of the state.  
From a governance perspective, various rational criteria must be accommodated if a 
policy is to be implemented successfully (or received by its participants) (Windhoff-
Héritier 1980). Applied to the case of the interaction between the company and the 
indigenous Tupinikim and Guarani communities, this would also mean that, for a 
policy/partnership to succeed, material as well as immaterial gains (in the eyes of both 
partners) need to be taken into consideration when defining the setup of the partnership. 
Two characteristics identified in the relationship between the company and the 
indigenous communities can be explained based on the theoretical framework: the 
company failed to strategically conduct a characterization of the target group 
(Windhoff-Héritier 1980) (in order to prepare its corporate position regarding the land 
property problem, for instance), and (2) indigenous communities did not recognize the 
steering mechanisms of the company, among other reasons, because of their resistance 
to render property for the monoculture of eucalyptus. Further, the elements of culture 
and identity were attributed a higher significance in the relationship between the 
company and the indigenous communities than in its relationship with the smallholder 
farmers. For the Tupinikim and Guarani, the symbolic value of culture and identity were 
related to the (threatened) materiality of their land possession. In the case of the 
smallholders, their property security (and thus their cultural and identitarian roots) is 
given, leaving them “free” to concentrate on economic gains. 
The overall analysis shows that two outcomes are possible when we consider one 
micro-level framework (in this case, the contractual agreement between groups and 
company): if culture and identity are not at stake, if both are secured, and if land 
property is securely recognized, partnerships are likely to succeed since both actors 
perceive wins according to their preferences and remain in the agreement if it does not 
bring economic losses. 
Should other gains be at stake, should identity matters and structural matters such as 
political participation and land rights not be perceived as given, the actors are likely to 
stay in the partnership until those immaterial losses outweigh their material gains, or 
they are likely to not even consider joining partnerships.  
Another possible generalization can be made on a theoretical level: while corporate 
governance of companies that explore natural resources increasingly encompasses 
debates on environmental issues, corporate strategies are also increasingly seeking to 
 establish relationships of cooperation with external agents such as local communities. 
The strategic action of cooperation not only legitimizes the company’s beneficial 
existence in the region but also helps it to fulfill the demands of sustainable 
development maxims which are required by consumers and other links in the production 
chain on an international level. 
We can generalize that the development of socio-environmental strategies by companies 
tends to exceed “the classical limits of its technical-economic plan”- companies´ 
decisions permeate political matters in the localities in which they are active86. 
When the findings are analyzed according to the proposed governance approach and the 
rational choice understanding of interaction, we come to the conclusion that the 
administration of interaction between the partners in Espírito Santo, be they conflictual 
or harmonious, is a necessary instrument of regulation since a complete break in the 
relationship is not possible because of the actors´ strategic interdependence as far as 
resources are concerned. 
On a neo-institutionalist rational choice level, the findings point to the actors´ search for 
exit options based on their perception of low-quality of governance in the social setup in 
which they are involved. This phenomenon cannot be considered as specific to Brazil. 
This thesis, as well as further research on company-community partnerships in other 
disciplines, points to the fact that basic rights and needs of communities, historically 
and strategically considered the weaker partners in the partnerships, need to be taken 
into account for them to feel acknowledged as counterparties. If this is not the case, the 
local communities might refuse to play the game, meaning that the interaction would 
not take place, which would bring potential losses to all partners. Or they might also 
enter the game using their preferences and specific rationalities as tools, thus making 
negotiations between the partners more difficult. 
On a normative level, we found out that culture and identity can have different 
meanings for different kinds of actors (in this case, smallholder farmers, companies and 
indigenous peoples). However, the partners in dispute on resources (in our case, the 
company and the indigenous communities) also disputed concepts of sustainable 
development. For the company, development means good management of the eucalyptus 
monoculture. Sustainable, in their view, are all measures that allow trees to be 
cultivated generating a maximum of gain with a minimum of environmental damage, if 
possible. For the indigenous communities, sustainability cannot be reached at all in a 
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 monoculture production mode. The monoculture as such is emblematic of a kind of 
development that per se cannot be sustainable. This difference in perception and 
rationality may have harmed the relationship between the company and the indigenous 
peoples. Different understandings of sustainability and development may also lead to 
conflicts over natural resources in other parts of the world. These divergences are 
ensconced in the general debate on the concept of sustainability and different kinds of 
development, and also point to the complexity of the ideas of environmental and social 
justice. After testing the variables in these particular company-community partnership 
setups (the company cooperating with smallholder farmers and with indigenous 
communities), one general conclusion can be drawn: though the notions of social and 
environmental justice should be independently categorized and evaluated for analytical 
reasons, both notions seem to be interwoven with each other, both normatively and in 
practice. The complexity with which social and environmental justice are interrelated 
becomes blatant in the case of indigenous communities. Their access to natural 
resources is mediated by their access to recognition as citizens, to land and to political 
participation.  
As far as partnerships in the forestry sector are concerned, different views of the 
problem situation, be they of a practical or normative nature, will make the interaction 
between the partners less stable. 
 CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
At the beginning of this work, the reminder of the linkage between man and nature 
through the domination of the first by the second was the introductory thought paving 
the way for a reflection on two linked political phenomena that could be observed at the 
beginning of the present century: the globalized realization of the necessity of a 
rationalized treatment with the environment and natural resources, and changes in the 
very nature of the western (and westernized) states, leading to new mechanisms of 
regulation between state and non-state actors, and non-state actors and resources.  
In times of threats to biodiversity, forests and water reservoirs, the appeal for global 
governance seems more en vogue than ever before. Forests are at the centre of political 
and market strategies. They are considered carbon sinks and their maintenance and 
control are necessary to the overall environmental (as well as political and economic) 
stability of the globe. The commodification of nature, one of the consequences of global 
appeals for preservation and sustainable management, has crossed frontiers and 
encompassed businesses and civil society. 
The neo-institutional approach to governance examined in this work aimed to offer, if 
not definitive answers, at least investigative tools for the research of emerging 
mechanisms of social regulation in the forestry sector, by means of presenting and 
analyzing aspects of partnerships between businesses and local communities in the 
southern hemisphere. The dynamics of interaction and functioning of an economy 
branch such as that of forestry and forestry products are intrinsically connected to 
emerging ideas of governance and new institutional arrangements in the environmental 
area.  
In this context, company-community partnerships are inherently different from other 
multi-stakeholder setups such as public-private partnerships. The activities of 
companies in the timber sector and their relationships to the nation state and to other 
stakeholders within the area of management of natural resources have a significant 
importance not only for the economic development of the sector but also for the 
sustainability of the interaction between man and nature.  
The study of company-community partnerships may shed some light on the limits and 
possibilities of private governance in the forestry area in general.  
The neo-institutional approach provides a framework for analyzing formal institutions 
at macro-level that structure the action of companies and communities in managing 
forest areas in Brazil, such as governmental forestry policies. Furthermore, the analysis 
 of institutional settings at micro-level, researched at empirical level by analyzing the 
contractual agreement between the target company and communities in the state of 
Espírito Santo, shows the kind of arrangements that are possible between unequal 
stakeholders. Finally, the analysis of semi-structured interviews offers a glimpse, for 
exemplary purposes, of informal institutional arrangements in the setting of company-
community partnerships and their perceptions of the partnership.  
My general strategy in analyzing the company-community partnership called “Forestry 
Partners” in Espírito Santo alludes to the theoretical propositions considered in chapters 
1 and 2.  
The first chapter briefly presented the current status quo of governance debates in 
political science scholarship and discussed a concept of governance that could be 
applied to the partnership between actors when growing and commercializing natural 
resources. The second chapter elucidated the rationale behind the theoretical approach 
to governance – a rational choice neo-institutionalism – and pointed to the way of 
thinking that determined the leitmotif of this M.A. thesis. The theoretical propositions 
were embedded in the hypotheses and operationalized in the independent variables.  
Following the case study typology of Yin (1990), the thesis is based on a single case 
study in which each interaction between two partners can be considered a sublevel of 
the case. The idea was to identify whether the partnership was a win-win situation for 
both actors involved by drawing on the experiences of two types of actors – smallholder 
farmers and indigenous communities.  
The justification for analyzing a single case study is that this present work is a pilot case 
study for the investigation of partnerships in the forestry sector from a governance point 
of view. One of the most famous cases, referred to as exemplary in third sector 
literature, was chosen for this purpose. Factors such as the availability of material, the 
period of time the partnership has been operating, availability of studies of different 
study fields (such as forestry and business administration), influenced the choice of the 
unit of analysis.  
The results confirmed the idea that economic demands can be met if the rural producer 
does not depend for his/her material living on the land he/she could set apart for 
growing eucalyptus, if he/she has secured its property rights and if he/she does not 
experience economic losses. 
Unfortunately, the program seems to generate a relationship of dependency between 
producers and the company, since the company continues to be the largest and most 
 dependable buyer of wood in the region and pays low market prices for the wood 
delivered. The program thus seems to benefit the company more than producers.  
A general point of criticism is the absence of concrete governmental proposals for 
similar commercial forestry programs in the area of Espírito Santo. Among the 
interviewees, there was little knowledge about the concrete possibilities of entering such 
a relationship within the government structure or engaging in a governmental program 
for subsidized timber production. According to Levy and Newell (2005), the state’s 
tendency to refrain from a proactive agenda in policy issues gives rise to the formation 
of so-called private regimes that are on the one hand still restricted by domestic law and 
international agreements, but on the other offer few possibilities of growth without the 
influence of an agent with own particular interests – companies are at best limited 
generators of common goods. 
Another remark relates to the concrete outcomes of forestry partnerships. We learned 
from both interactions (indigenous communities and smallholder farmers) that 
partnerships in the forestry sector are not able to substantially reduce poverty rates, 
since the forestry activity is unlikely to become the primary source of income for 
communities that need to diversify production in order to make a living. This, too, is 
supported in specialized literature (Mayers/Vermeulen 2003). 
From a macro political perspective, the expansion of eucalyptus production in Brazil 
corresponds to the politics of extending technology and the “market presence” of the so 
called agro-industrial complexes in the country. The inclusion of local communities in 
the chain of production boosted by agro-industrial complexes may have a twofold 
impact: modernization of local agriculture through technology sharing and the 
acquisition (on the company’s side) of a certain social legitimacy. The legitimating 
discourse of such a company as a provider of social and economic benefits for the 
population in its surroundings is enhanced by the alleged benefits that the concept of 
commercial forestry is said to generate in environmental terms. 
The interaction game between the company and (1) the indigenous communities 
residing at the coast and (2) the smallholder farmers of the hillside of the state seems to 
follow a similar pattern.  
Indigenous communities, however, does not only pursue the satisfaction of their 
economic needs but also consider other immaterial gains as significant.  
Economic benefits might be the most important criterion for interaction between 
communities in general and companies to take place, as shown in our case study. 
 Hypothesis (1) could thus be verified as the interaction between the company and the 
smallholders was analyzed. However, for a durable mechanism of governance to take 
place and for hypothesis (2) to be fulfilled, the partnership needed to count on further 
qualitative elements such as the respect of unnegotiable cultural and identitarian rights 
and rights of political participation, which were not fulfilled in the company’s 
relationship with the indigenous communities.  
Both hypotheses can be applied to forestry partnerships in general terms – chapter 6 
summarized and applied the results drawn of the case study to the general approach of 
(environmental) governance. 
As Andrade/Dias (2003) point out, further research on the logics of the action between 
partners in social-environmental projects is necessary. As seen in the case study of a 
company-community partnership in the forestry sector, the logic of action and the 
beliefs of partners have a significant weight in the interaction matrix. The actor’s 
primordial impulse to maximize economic gains, as considered by classical rational 
choice approaches, must be relativized when applying neo-institutional models to these 
specific social setups. 
While research in political science and other disciplines help us examining social 
interactions between partners in the environmental area, other issues regarding the 
global preoccupation with the overall sustainability of the environment remain 
controversial, as does the dominating mode of production and the as yet few measures 
undertaken to balance the relationship between man and nature.  
There is also need for further research in this area and, above all, for alternative political 
and ontological Weltanschauungen. As Guha (2000) wisely pointed out, “(…) while 
there might be one world, it [is still] divided into two unequal halves”. 
 LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AIC Agro-Industrial Complex 
ANATEL Agência Nacional de Telecomunicações (National Agency of 
Telecommunications) 
ANEEL Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica (National Agency of Electrical Energy) 
ANP Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis (National 
Agency of Petroleum, Nature Gas and Biofuels) 
BNDES Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (Brazilian National 
Bank of Economic and Social Development) 
CONAMA Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente (Brazilian National Council of 
Environment) 
CONAR Conselho Nacional de Auto-Regulação Publicitária (Rough translation: 
Brazilian National Council of self-regulation on Advertising) 
EU European Union 
FSC Forest Stewardship Council 
FUNAI Fundação Nacional do Índio (National Indigenous Foundation) 
IBAMA Instituto Brasileiro do Meio-Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis 
(Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources) 
IBDF Instituto Brasileiro de Desenvolvimento Florestal (Brazilian Institute of Forest 
Development) 
IBGE Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography 
and Statistics) 
IDAF  Instituto de Defesa Agropecuária e Florestal do Espírito Santo (Rough 
translation: Institute of Agriculture, Livestock Farming and Forestry Defense 
of the state of Espírito Santo) 
IEF Instituto Estadual de Florestas (Rough translation: Institute of Forests of the 
state of Espírito Santo) 
IFF Intergovernmental Forum on Forests 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INCRA Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (Brazilian National 
Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform) 
ITC Instituto de Terras e Cartografia (Rough translation: Institute of Lands and 
Cartography) 
MMA Ministério do Meio Ambiente (Brazilian Ministry of Environment) 
MNC Multinational Corporation 
MPA Movimento dos Pequenos Agricultores (Rough translation: Brazilian 
Movement of Smallholder Farmers) 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PNF Programa Nacional de Florestas (Brazilian National Forestry Program) 
PPG7 Programa Piloto para Proteção das Florestas Tropicais do Brasil (Pilot Program 
for the Protection of Brazil’s Tropical Rain Forests) 
PSDB Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) 
PT Partido dos Trabalhadores (Brazilian Worker’ s Party) 
SBS Sociedade Brasileira de Silvicultura ( Brazilian Society of Silviculture) 
UN  United Nations 
WBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
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 APPENDIXES 
 
APPENDIX I – Contractual Agreement - Company-Community Partnership 
APPENDIX II – Questionnaires  
 
Questionnaires  
 
A) Questionnaire (FARMERS) 
 
Introduction to interviewees: This questionnaire is part of my academic research on 
partnerships between forest farmers and companies. The idea is to identify reasons for 
joining/having joined the program and to identify advantages or disadvantages of the program 
for every day lives of producers. I would like to thank you very much in advance for your 
collaboration. 
My own idea is to raise questions about the role of government agencies, knowledge about 
national/local forestry policies, participative structures, social-economic demands, land 
rights, transparency mechanisms. The questionnaire is composed of structured, semi-
structured and open questions. It has an exemplary character. The interview should last up 
until one and a half hours.  
 
Q1. General identification of Interviewee: 
Q1.a. (signatory of the contract:  yes/no, if not: Spouse/relative)   
Q1.b. Male/female 
Q1.c. Occupation: 
Q1.d. Age: 
 
Q2.a.Land stratum (medium size of property for later classification, comparing to other 
interviewees) 
Q2.2. Land situation: 
(as for the status of property – land was bought, conquered, given by the state…) 
  
Q3. (Formal relationship to program) Situation of the contract of partnership for forestry 
management: 
Q3.1. Finalized and not renewed (ask further questions as for “when was the contract 
initiated/finalized?”) 
Q3.2. Ongoing (ask further questions as “ongoing since when?) 
Q3.3. Finalized and renewed (ask further questions as “ when was contract 
initiated/renewed?”) 
Q3.4. Never engaged in this sort of partnership (could serve as control participant, since the 
questionnaire will not deal with the before/after dimension) 
 
Q4. Are you a member of any farmers’ association/union? 
Q4.1. yes 
Q4.2. no 
 
(Social-economic criteria) 
Q5. Would you classify forestry activity as your primary or secondary economic activity? 
 
Q6. What are the other activities (coffee/manioc/papaya)? 
 
 Q7. How important are revenues from forestry activity to you? 
Q7.1. very important 
Q7.2. fairly important 
Q7.3. not much important 
 
Q8. Forestry activity makes how much percent of your revenues? 
Q8.1. Less than 20% 
Q8.2. Between 20% and 40% 
Q8.3. More than 40% 
 
Q9. Thinking about the timber market in your region in the last 10-15 years, would you say 
that it has: 
Q9.1. Improved 
Q9.2. Deteriorated 
Q9.3.Remained the same 
Q9.4. Don’t know 
 
Q10. Thinking about the timber market at the time of contractual agreement, what advantages 
have you seen in joining the partnership? 
 
Q11. Thinking about the timber market today, what advantages/disadvantages have you seen 
in joining the partnership? 
 
(Participative structures) 
Q12. Please, describe the procedure of joining the program, what were the necessary steps to 
joint it from your side? 
 
Q13. How often do you meet the technical adviser? Do farmers meet collectively of privately 
with him? How often do you exchange impressions with other participants of the program? 
 
Q14. Farmers often have to talk to technical advisers for many kinds of problems. How often 
do you approach the technical adviser with each of these problems? 
 
Q15. I would like to talk about institutions that help create the partnership. Can you please tell 
me how important they are in your opinion? (role of government and other parties) 
 
a. IDAF 
c. Federal government 
d. Company’s technical adviser 
e. farmers´ associations/unions  
 
Q15.1 very important 
Q15.2. fairly important 
Q15.3 not important 
 
 
Q16. Compared to 10 years ago, are life and property safer than before? (land rights) 
Q16.1. Agree 
Q16.2. Disagree 
Q16.3 Don’t know 
 
(Environmental sustainability as a reason for joining the program) 
Q17. In your opinion, are there advantages coming from the program for the environment? 
Why? 
 
 Q.18. was this issue important for you when you joined the program? Is it important for you 
now? 
 
Q.19. how do you evaluate this partnership you are in in terms of administrative sustainability 
(governance)? 
 
 B) Questionnaire (INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES) 
 
Introduction to interviewees: This questionnaire is part of my academic research on 
partnerships between forest farmers and companies. The idea is to identify reasons for 
joining/having joined the program and to identify advantages or disadvantages of the program 
for every day lives of producers. I would like to thank you very much in advance for your 
collaboration. 
 
 
Q1. General identification of Interviewee: 
Q1.a. (signatory of the contract:  yes/no, if not: Spouse/relative)   
Q1.b. Male/female 
Q1.c. Occupation: 
Q1.d. Age: 
 
Q2. How would you describe the relationship between communities and company over the 
past decades? 
  
Q3. (Formal relationship to program) Situation of the contract of partnership for forestry 
management: 
Q3.1. Finalized and not renewed (ask further questions as for “when was the contract 
initiated/finalized?”) 
Q3.2. Ongoing (ask further questions as “ongoing since when?) 
Q3.3. Finalized and renewed (ask further questions as “when was contract 
initiated/renewed?”) 
Q3.4. Never engaged in this sort of partnership (could serve as control participant, since the 
questionnaire will not deal with the before/after dimension) 
 
Q4. Are you a member of any farmers’ association/union? 
Q4.1. yes 
Q4.2. no 
 
(Social-economic criteria) 
Q5. Would you classify forestry activity as your primary or secondary economic activity? 
 
Q6. What are the other activities (coffee/manioc/papaya)? 
 
Q7. How important are revenues from forestry activity to you? 
Q7.1. very important 
Q7.2. fairly important 
Q7.3. not much important 
 
Q8. Forestry activity makes how much percent of your revenues? 
Q8.1. Less than 20% 
Q8.2. Between 20% and 40% 
Q8.3. More than 40% 
 
Q9. Thinking about the timber market in your region in the last 10-15 years, would you say 
that it has: 
Q9.1. Improved 
Q9.2. Deteriorated 
 Q9.3.Remained the same 
Q9.4. Don’t know 
 
Q10. Thinking about the timber market at the time of contractual agreement, what advantages 
have you seen in joining the partnership? 
 
Q11. Thinking about the timber market today, what advantages/disadvantages have you seen 
in joining the partnership? 
 
(Participative structures) 
Q12. Please, describe the procedure of joining the program, what were the necessary steps to 
joint it from your side? 
 
Q13. How often do you meet the technical adviser? Do farmers meet collectively of privately 
with him? How often do you exchange impressions with other participants of the program? 
 
Q14. Farmers often have to talk to technical advisers for many kinds of problems. How often 
do you approach the technical adviser with each of these problems? 
 
Q15. I would like to talk about institutions that help create the partnership. Can you please tell 
me how important they are in your opinion? (role of government and other parties) 
 
a. IDAF 
c. Federal government 
d. Company’s technical adviser 
e. farmers´ associations/unions  
 
Q15.1 very important 
Q15.2. fairly important 
Q15.3 not important 
 
 
Q16. Compared to 10 years ago, are life and property safer than before? (land rights) 
Q16.1. Agree 
Q16.2. Disagree 
Q16.3 Don’t know 
 
(Environmental sustainability as a reason for joining the program) 
Q17. In your opinion, are there advantages coming from the program for the environment? 
Why? 
 
Q.18. was this issue important for you when you joined the program? Is it important for you 
now? 
 
Q.19. how do you evaluate this partnership you are in in terms of administrative sustainability 
(governance)? 
 
 C) Questionnaire (NGO MEMBER) 
 
Q1. similar above  
 
Q2. How long have you been following policy making and its implications on the timber 
sector in Espírito Santo? 
 
Q3.How do you see/evaluate progresses in forestry policies in this state? 
 
Q4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of community-company partnerships in your 
opinion? (/major difficulties of producers in the partnership) 
 
Q5. Why, in your opinion, do farmers enter the partnership?/why, in your opinion, did the 
company enter the partnership? 
 
Q5. How do you see the role of the state in the partnership? 
 
 
 
APPENDIX III – Sample of interview made with target group 
APPENDIX IV – Systematization tables  
 
A) Interview with Smallholders Farmers (F1) 
B) Interview with Smallholders Farmers (F2) 
C) Interview with Smallholders Farmers (F3) 
D) Interview with Indigenous Leaders (I1) 
E) Interview with Indigenous Leaders (I2) 
F) Interview with Decision-Makers (Technical Advisor) 
G) Interview with Decision-Makers (Government member) 
H) Interview with Decision-Makers (Former FUNAI worker) 
I) Interview with Decision-Makers (NGO member) 
 
 
 
 D) Questionnaire (GOVERNMENT MEMBER) 
 
Q1. Similar above 
 
Q2. What is the role of the state in this sort of partnership?/What was its role in the 
implementation of the program? 
 
Q3. how does the state evaluate the implementation of community-company partnership? 
How often does it evaluate implementation? (how are farmers approached? How does 
bargaining take place? Collectively?) 
 
Q4. What are the main reasons for farmers to enter the partnership? And for the company? 
 
Q5. What have been the major difficulties encountered in the partnership´s implementation? 
 
Q6. How do you think a company-community partnership contributes to: 
6.a. environmental sustainability 
6.b. social sustainability 
6c. economic sustainability 
 
Q.7. how do you evaluate partnerships in terms of administrative sustainability (governance)? 
 
 E) Questionnaire (TECHNICAL ADVISOR) 
 
Q1. Similar above 
 
Q2. How long have you been accompanying the program “Produtor Florestal” (name of the 
partnership)? How would you describe the program? 
 
Q3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of community-company partnerships in your 
opinion? (/major difficulties of producers in the partnership) 
 
Q4. What are the main reasons for farmers to enter the partnership? And for the company? 
 
Q5. How do you see the role of the state in the partnership? 
 
Q6. How do you think a company-community partnership contributes to: 
6.a. environmental sustainability 
6.b. social sustainability 
6c. economic sustainability 
 
Q.7. How do you evaluate partnerships in terms of administrative sustainability (governance)? 
 
 
 
